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The uncomforting reality is that the majority of asset owners in critical 
infrastructure, and maybe even those within the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security who are responsible for assisting them, would have no idea what to do 
when learning that a significant cyber attack was imminent. Until this changes, 
the authors suggest to put less emphasis on information sharing.  Where warning 
time will predictably always be far short of adequate, preparedness must become 
a strategic priority.  
– Ralph Langner and Perry Pederson, 
Bound to Fail: Why Cyber Security Risk 
Cannot Be “Managed” Away [1] 
Numerous public and private organizations, as well as many public-private partnerships 
(PPP), provide valuable cyber resilience services, such as information sharing and malware 
analysis, to the energy delivery sector (EDS) [2].  Yet there are strong indications, from Federal 
authorities and private utility companies alike, that dedicated mechanisms capable of 
coordinating EDS stakeholders to pre-empt, intercept, and otherwise respond to a widespread 
cyber event is necessary to avoid catastrophic failure of critical infrastructure, loss of life, and 
adverse economic impact [3], [4]. 
This thesis supports the Cybersecurity at MIT Sloan (CAMS) project Response 
Examination of Malware Attacks on the Energy Delivery sector (REMAED) sponsored by the 
Cyber Resilient Energy Delivery Consortium (CREDC).  CREDC is funded by the Department 
of Energy’s Office of Electricity and the Department of Homeland Security Science and 
Technology Directorate.  REMAED is part of an overarching effort to initiate the transformation 
of the energy delivery sector’s approach to responding to cyberattacks.  Its objective is to provide 
a tool to identify deficiencies of cyberattack response on a sector-wide scale and educate EDS 
stakeholders on unknown complexities of the sector.  REMAED examines the EDS, specifically 
the electricity subsector, to identify requirements of mechanisms capable of coordinating 
preemptive and reactive response efforts within the electricity subsector.     
1.1 Motivation 
REMAED builds upon the foundational research performed in the Department of Energy-
sponsor project, Research Exploring Malware in the Energy DeliverY Sector (REMEDYS) 
conducted from 2017 to 2018.  REMEDYS discovered that there was no single entity responsible 
for coordinating a response to a cyber-attack on the electricity sector.  Instead, there are multiple 
agencies and organizations responsible for many, but not all, of the actions necessary to respond 
to a cyber event.  Similarly, REMAED uncovered that the fragmented nature of cyber response 
in the EDS contributes to significant misunderstanding over the required actions, sector 
capabilities, roles, responsibilities, and prioritization of resources for cyber event response. 
Preliminary analysis suggests that this misunderstanding could result in a slower cyber response, 
particularly for a more significant attack, than if more robust mechanisms were in place.   
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Moreover, Madnick (2017) highlights examples of the U.S.’s lack of preparedness and its 
potential consequences on the grid [5].  He, too, concludes that a systems-level approach to cyber 
preparedness is necessary to mitigate the impact of a major cyberattack.  Other studies show that 
the economic impact for a large scale cyberattack, though not easy to perpetrate, could result in 
losses between $243B to $1T [6]. 
Further, cyber resilience approaches for all sectors tend to be reactive and backward-
looking as a function of the economic and political factors that influence critical infrastructure 
sectors.  Four primary drivers motivate research into the area of electricity sector cyber response 
to support a more proactive stance, and each is explored in greater detail in Chapter 2: 
1. Recent high profile cyber events affecting the electrical grid in Ukraine and the U.S. that 
demonstrate the feasibility of widespread cyberattacks and a sharp rise in cyberattacks on 
critical infrastructure throughout the world [7], [8], [9] 
2. Increasingly capable and sophisticated cyber actors and malware [10] 
3. The evolution of the energy industry towards the Internet of Things (IoT), smart 
technologies, distributed energy resources (DERs), and other significant changes in grid 
architecture that increases the threat surface of the grid [11], [12], [13], [14] 
4. Lack of consensus about standards of cyber resilience, roles and responsibilities for a 
response to a cyberattack, and the nature of cyber threats to the electricity sector 
stakeholders 
Finally, in the Department of Energy’s “Assessment of Electricity Disruption Incident 
Response Capabilities” (2017), the Department rightfully noted that existing response 
mechanisms focus on severe weather, and while a cyber incident might have many similarities, 
there are significant differences which must be addressed, including: 
(1) no-notice events that prevent the electricity subsector from taking preemptive 
measures to protect the electricity system, develop restoration plans, or activate 
key personnel; 
(2) unpredictable system responses due to the potentially disparate nature of the 
impacts and/or the simultaneous failure of targeted critical components;  
(3) the additional time required to perform system diagnostics following an incident; 
(4) available expertise in cybersecurity, ICS, and other potentially impacted 
segments of grid operations; and  
(5) the ability of existing response mechanisms to fully support restoration due to 
many complicating factors [3, p. vi] 
Additionally, the report notes gaps in the electricity sector’s cyber response mechanisms but 
takes a Federal Government-centric view of the problem and its solution.  To accurately assess 
the electricity sector’s ability to respond, an analysis must impartially view the sector through a 
lens that is independent of influences of existing mechanisms, technologies, political, threats, 
regulatory, and market factors. 
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1.2 Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to support REMAED by identifying possible improvements 
in existing cyberattack response mechanisms and current gaps that require new mechanisms to 
accelerate the U.S. electricity sector’s response and better inform risk management decisions. 
1.3 Key Terminology 
1.3.1 Definition of the Electricity Subsector 
Throughout this thesis, the term electricity sector, electricity subsector, and electricity 
industry are synonymous and include entities that:  
• Produce electricity (e.g., private utility companies, municipal electricity utilities, etc.), 
• Support electricity production by providing ancillary products and services (e.g., 
electrical hardware manufacturers, cybersecurity professionals, etc.), and  
• Publicly govern it (e.g., Department of Energy, state utility commissions, etc.).   
This thesis establishes the terminology as a boundary around those entities specifically 
because they include all the required elements for the transformation of cyber response 
mechanisms in the electricity sector.  The World Economic Forum captures all of these entities 
in Figure 1.1 [15, p. 6]. 
 
Figure 1.1: Entities in the Electricity Subsector 
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Though also tempting to use the term ecosystem to describe such an expansive view of a 
sector, the methodology used in this thesis considers the word ecosystem as a term that 
distinguishes external stakeholders and factors from internal ones.  Since nearly all of the 
stakeholders in, what would otherwise be termed the electricity ecosystem, are included in the 
analysis, it does not meet this definition.   
1.3.2 Definitions of Electricity Reliability and Resilience 
The reliability of electricity can be thought of as the ability of the electricity subsector “to 
deliver electricity in the quantity and quality demanded by users” [16, p. 1].  More specifically, it 
involves the planning and operations of the power system and includes “ancillary services” to 
balance between the supply and demand of electricity in real time.  Actions such as frequency 
support, ramping and balancing of generation, and voltage support that keep electricity 
consistently accessible to consumers fall into this category [17], [18].  The North American 
Electricity Reliability Corporation (NERC), the primary entity responsible for enforcing 
electricity reliability for nationally regulated components of the electrical system, uses two terms 
to describe reliability:  
Adequacy. The ability of the electricity system to supply the aggregate electrical 
demand and energy requirements of the end-use customers at all times, taking 
into account scheduled and reasonably expected unscheduled outages of system 
elements. 
 
Operating Reliability. The ability of the bulk power system [BPS] to withstand 
sudden disturbances, such as electricity short circuits or unanticipated loss of 
system elements from credible contingencies, while avoiding uncontrolled 
cascading blackouts or damage to equipment [19, p. 2]. 
By some measures, reliability is considered distinct from, but inherently intertwined with, 
electricity resilience [16].  NERC, however, considers grid resilience as a component of 
operational reliability and has adopted the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) 
definition of infrastructure resilience.  NIAC’s defines resilience as the ability to reduce the 
magnitude and duration of disruptive events. The effectiveness of a resilient infrastructure or 
enterprise depends upon its “ability to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and rapidly recover from a 
potentially disruptive event,” and is the accepted standard for critical infrastructure sectors [20, 
p. 8], [21].  NIAC also developed a four-feature resilience construct, as shown in Figure 1.2, 




Figure 1.2: NIAC Resilience Construct  
Thus, in this thesis, cyber resilience in the electricity sector is the ability to reduce the 
magnitude and duration of cyber incidents on the electricity system by increasing its ability to 
anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and rapidly recover from them. 
1.3.3 Definition of Cyberattack 
REMAED focuses on the specific requirements for the electricity subsector to respond to 
a malware attack as differentiated from other categories of cyberattacks, collectively referred to 
as cyber incidents or cyber events.  Within this thesis, however, the term cyberattack refers to 
malware attacks and other enabling or packaged cyber threat vectors for the following reasons.  
First, the nature of actual cyber incidents reveals a trend to use multiple attack vectors, such as a 
combination of phishing and malware to gain access to a utility’s control system environment.  
Second, as is shown in subsequent chapters, it is often difficult to diagnose the cause of an 
electrical system malfunction and distinguish between system failure and malicious acts.   
Likewise, it is difficult to quickly identify and distinguish between the type of attack vector since 
the immediate effects are similar if not identical.  Thus, most cyber response actions, which are 
primarily concerned with prompt restoration power and recovery of operating systems, are 
uniform, regardless of threat vector, similar to the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 
all-hazards model [22].  The need for specific malware response mechanisms separate from other 
attack vectors still exists. Where those mechanisms appear within this thesis, they are so 
designated.   
1.3.4 Definition of Widespread  
REMAED focuses on cyberattacks that are widespread.  In this thesis, the term 
widespread, large-scale, and at scale are used synonymously to represent a cyberattack that 
affects or has the potential to affect multiple utility systems.  In particular, the definition used 
herein refers to the point at which internal or individual cyber response mechanisms of an 
electric utility, or multiple utilities, are no longer adequate to operate the utility system reliably.  
In this case, consequences could result in power outages, brownouts, physical infrastructure 
damage, loss of control by system operators, or some combination of the above. 
Such a cyberattack may affect entire regions or, conversely, noncontiguous geographical 
areas with similar utility systems.  Similarly, the number of utility companies affected does not 
indicate the scale of the attack.  For instance, if a single, large utility that provides electricity 
across multiple states is infected with malware, loses the ability to provide power to portions of 
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its consumers, and cannot respond with its internal processes and resources, it would be 
considered a widespread cyberattack. 
Additionally, the use of widespread is also assumed to have a temporal element, namely 
that because the requirement to coordinate and obtain external resources, the response would 
likely take longer and the consequences would have a longer duration.  Specifically, this paper 
adopts the Department of Homeland Security’s definition of long-term interruption of reliable 
electricity provision, which is an interruption lasting 72 hours or longer [23]. 
1.3.5  Definition of Cyber Response 
Additionally, this paper focuses solely on cyber incident response, or synonymously, 
cyber response.  The spectrum of cybersecurity functions runs from identifying risks to recovery 
from an incident.  Where cyber response begins and ends on the spectrum is difficult to ascertain 
as the functions are generally considered to be concurrent and continuous.  Still, there are aspects 
of effective cyber response mechanisms which necessitate that measures be put in place before 
an attack to enable response and, likewise, to facilitate a transition to the recovery phase.   
Nearly all sectors recognize the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s (NIST) 
Cybersecurity Framework as the standard for cybersecurity, which offers a useful tool for 
understanding the scope of the effort [24].  REMAED follows the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework’s five Framework Core Functions definition of response: to “develop and implement 
the appropriate activities to take action regarding a detected cybersecurity event” [25, p. 46].  
Specifically, cyber response includes cyber-related mechanisms that are needed to restore power 
as a result of a cyberattack.  Figure 1.3 summarizes the activities within each of the five NIST 




Figure 1.3: NIST Cybersecurity Framework’s five Framework Core Functions 
1.3.6 Definition of Cyber Response Mechanism 
The term mechanism is used to capture a wide array of possible actions that the 
electricity sector takes or could take to respond to a cyberattack.  The NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework again offers useful cyber response mechanisms that include:  
• Response planning 
• Communication of response roles and responsibilities, incident reporting to 
internal and external stakeholders, and information sharing to the broader sector 
• Investigation of detected incidents, understanding of impacts from cyber 
incidents, and forensic analysis of malware 
• Containment of cyber incidents to prevent its spread and mitigation of the 
malware 
• Incorporation of lessons learned into response plans and updating response plans 
and strategies [24] 
While NIST Framework clearly articulates response mechanisms at the organizational 
level, it does not include the actions and support structures that enable effective response at a 
sector-wide level.  These include policy and legislation, sector-wide testing, and investment in 
technology, products, and services. 
Additionally, incident response and recovery mechanisms are strongly intertwined at 
every level of the public and private sector, and often, actions in both categories run concurrently 
and are difficult to distinguish.  The ambiguity between response and recovery is especially true 
for the electricity sector, in which widespread power outages response and recovery action 
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include rapid power restoration.  For this thesis, actions that involve power restoration following 
a cyberattack, such as black start generator capabilities or substation transformer replacement, 
are considered critical to sector-wide cyber resilience but classified as recovery mechanisms. 
1.4 Scope 
1.4.1 Energy Sector and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
The energy sector is considered “uniquely critical due to the enabling functions they 
provide across all critical infrastructure sectors” [27, p. 21].  Previous research has demonstrated 
that all other critical infrastructure sectors are highly dependent on the energy and information 
communications and technology sectors as backbones for their operation, and research into the 
cross-sector interdependencies and needs for comprehensive risk assessments [28], exist and will 
not be articulated here [4], [23]. [29], [30], [31].  Likewise, the electricity sector has similar 
dependencies on many other “lifeline” sectors, notably natural gas, telecommunications, 
transportation, and water, as shown in Figure 1.4 [32, p. 20], [21]. 
 
Figure 1.4: Interdependencies Between “Lifeline” Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
A cyberattack on the energy sector has a potential cascading effect into other critical 
infrastructure sectors.  Coordination of a response to a cyberattack requires a stakeholder to 
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reach across traditional sector boundaries to mitigate the impact, solve common problems, and 
share resources. 
1.4.2 Electricity Subsector and Other Energy Subsectors 
This paper recognizes that the electricity sector is a consumer of primary energy, relying 
on other energy sources to fuel generation, adding to the complexity of formulating effective 
cyber incident responses.  The scope must, however, be reduced to focus foremost on the 
electricity subsector to identify requirements within the center, which can then translate into 
requirements for resources, actions, and information external to the subsector.  From this 
foundation, future stakeholder and landscape analysis, inclusive of other sectors and subsectors, 
will be necessary to identify those gaps and further refine response mechanisms. 
1.4.3 Cyberattacks and Large-Scale Electrical Outages 
The vulnerability of the entire U.S. electric power system to cyberattacks is a source of 
much contention.  Many hypothetical cyberattack scenarios and real-world events of large-scale 
outages caused by cyberattacks used to motivate increased attention on cyber resilience fail to 
acknowledge the current reliability of the U.S. electrical system.  In turn, they dilute the 
probability of such an event occurring in the nation.  However, sufficient reports suggest that 
such an event is not impossible (more in this in Chapter 2).  This thesis does not take a position 
on the probability of a cyberattack successfully causing a widespread outage, only that it is more 
likely than currently perceived.  Neither does the paper articulate a specific threat vector that 
could be used to cause a widespread outage, only that their constant evolution demands 
corresponding evolution of cyber response mechanisms.  To that end, historical and potential 
future threats are presented to emphasize the importance of closing gaps in cyber response 
mechanisms and for better understanding of where those gaps are. 
1.4.4 Enterprise Cyber Response Mechanisms vs. Technological 
This thesis treats the electricity subsector as an enterprise to apply the Architecting 
Innovative Enterprise Strategy (ARIES) as discussed in section 1.5.  It is essential to distinguish 
the enterprise elements analyzed herein, from technological ones.  This paper asserts that ARIES 
enterprise elements, such as processes and organizational structures, have been neglected for 
technology-based solutions.  This paper acknowledges the vital role that technology plays in 
enhancing cyber resilience, and critical technology-related capability gaps are part of this 
research.  However, technology is merely one key component of a comprehensive cyber 
response mechanism.  An appropriate systems approach, including strategy, people, processes, 
services, information, organizations, and infrastructure, among other elements, must supplement 
technological solutions to be successful. 
1.4.5 Geographic Limits 
This thesis analyzes the electricity sector within the U.S.  Since the U.S., Canada, and 
parts of Mexico share the physical electric power system architecture, and supply bulk power 
across national borders, however, there are international consequences to a cyberattack on the 
sector.  Given the degree of interconnectivity between the electricity sectors and standard North 
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American regulatory agreements, one may assume any mechanisms proposed as a result of this 
thesis will also apply to the Canadian and Mexican grids interconnected with those of the U.S.  
The application of proposed mechanisms, namely amendments to international agreements, may 
be far more substantial and require significant effort to enact. 
1.4.6 Cyberattacks versus Physical Disruption 
Recent threat analysis suggests that cyberattacks would likely be perpetrated concurrently 
with a natural disaster or some other humanmade event that damages the physical infrastructure 
of the electric power system.  However, this thesis assumes that specific mechanisms for 
responding to cyber-related disruptions in the electricity sector need particular attention separate 
from physical damage or disruption.  Therefore, the scope of this work frames cyber response 
mechanisms as a complement to responses to physical attacks or for integration into a 
comprehensive incident response framework.   
1.5 Research Questions 
This thesis attempts to address three questions to support REMAED’s broader goal of 
transforming the EDS’s approach to responding to cyberattacks.  The answer to the first question 
is the primary aim of the thesis, while the answer to the final two support answers to the first: 
1. What existing mechanisms can be improved or new ones put in place to accelerate the 
electricity sector’s response to a cyberattack? 
2. How can diverse and disparate stakeholder interests be aligned to formulate and 
implement the mechanisms? 
3. What are the correct roles and responsibilities for the public and private sector entities in 
the energy delivery ecosystem for a cyber response? 
1.6 Approach 
This thesis studies obstacles to cooperation and collaborative response efforts by 
examining the historical context, existing conditions, and stakeholder perspectives in the 
electricity subsector.  Primarily, it gathers data through interviews with a representative cross-
section of the electricity sector and publicly available information.  Admittedly, the study is 
limited in that it did not gather all perspectives from the thousands of electricity sector 
stakeholders.  While surveying a broader sample size is worth additional effort, the trends that 
emerge through interviews and publicly available information are sufficient to assert the needs 
for better cyber response mechanisms.   
With that in mind, this thesis utilizes the Architecting Innovative Enterprise Strategy 
(ARIES) Framework to analyze the electricity subsector in the context of an enterprise.  While it 
is unusual to treat an entire industry as an enterprise, the ARIES Framework provides a robust 
methodology for analyzing the subsector that is compatible with the aim of this thesis.  The 
following sections describe the ARIES Framework and justification for its use to analyze the 
electricity subsector. 
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1.6.1 Electricity Subsector as an Enterprise 
The creators of ARIES, Nightingale and Rhodes (2015), do not limit the definition of an 
enterprise to more traditional constructs which consider an organizations size, e.g., a 
multinational corporation, or mission, e.g., a business unit within a firm.  Instead, they suggest 
that enterprises need only to have four fundamental characteristics: 
1. An enterprise consists of people who generate value for others by 
producing a product and/or performing a service of some kind 
2. An enterprise is a whole system that has a purpose 
3. An enterprise benefits from being part of its larger ecosystem, the living 
environment in which it operates 
4. Every enterprise must periodically undergo transformation as it evolves 
and adapts to an ever-changing world [33, p. 1] 
Given this thesis’s definition of the electricity sector in section 1.3.1 and comparing it to 
Nightingale’s and Rhodes’s four fundamental characteristics yields the following results: 
1. The electricity sector in North America is composed of tens of thousands of people that 
generate value by providing electricity to U.S. businesses and people. 
2. The electricity sector is a system dedicated to the purpose of providing reliable, resilient 
power to the residential and business customers throughout the U.S. to maintain public 
welfare and health, enable economic and governmental activities and achieve high 
standards of quality of life among others. 
3. The electricity sector exists within a broader ecosystem comprising other critical 
infrastructure sectors and energy subsectors, non-critical sectors, public and 
governmental entities, businesses, residential customers, and a host of other stakeholders 
who depend on or support its function. 
4. The energy delivery sector is undergoing rapid evolution of technology, business models, 
market structures, and cyber threats, and the sector-wide cyber response mechanisms 
must undergo transformation to keep pace. 
Given these similarities, this thesis treats the electricity sector as an enterprise in order to 
leverage the methodical, comprehensive approach of the ARIES Framework to identify gaps in 
its cyber response mechanism. 
1.6.2 What is ARIES? 
By its creators’ definition, ARIES draws from:  
[T]he fundamental theory and practice of multiple fields, including strategic 
management, stakeholder theory, systems architecting, innovation, scenario 
analysis, decision science, enterprise theory, and systems science…informed by 
work with over one hundred different enterprises of various types, sizes, and 
levels of complexity and maturity, the ARIES framework is designed to guide the 
exploratory phase of transformation [33, p. 13]. 
Pointedly, the exploratory nature of the ARIES framework is used to focus on finding the 
right components for an enterprise’s architecture, not necessarily designing them in detail.  That 
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makes ARIES uniquely suited to identify disparities between current electricity sector cyber 
response mechanisms and the ideal mechanisms. 
The ARIES Framework explores enterprises by applying three main components: the 
enterprise element model, the architecting process model, and techniques and templates [33].  
Given the Framework’s unique approach, it is worthwhile to provide a basic understanding of the 
components as discussed within this thesis. 
1.6.3 Enterprise Element Model 
The enterprise element model provides ten elements for systematically analyzing all 
relevant aspects of the electricity sector, as shown in Figure 1.5 [33, p. 14].  These elements 
originate from assessments and empirical research on over 100 different enterprises conducted 
by Nightingale and Rhodes.  While they acknowledge the existence of other factors and the 
dynamic nature of an enterprise, their research has revealed that these ten elements are 
fundamental to all enterprises and are sufficient for gaining insight into the entirety of an 
enterprise [33]. 
 
Figure 1.5: The Ten Enterprise Elements of the ARIES Framework  
The first element is the ecosystem defined explicitly as the external landscape in which 
the electricity sector exists.  Nightingale and Rhodes use factors such as geopolitics, regulation, 
economy, competition, market forces, technology, resources, environment to describe the context 
in which an enterprise exists [33], [34].  The process of analyzing and describing the ecosystem 
is critical to understanding the external influences that have created the electricity sector’s 
current approach to cyber response. 
The second element of the ARIES Framework is stakeholders, including those people and 
organizations, both internal and external to, the electricity industry.  Nightingale and Rhodes 
contend that enterprises exist to deliver value, defined by the stakeholders’ perceptions of it.  
Further, stakeholders are influenced by their perceived benefit from the enterprise in exchange 
for their contributions to it [33].  This thesis asserts that the diversity of stakeholders and their 
respective perceptions of the electricity sector have led to suboptimal response mechanisms, and 
thorough stakeholder analysis is necessary to understand where to make and sustain changes. 
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The final eight elements, which the creators collectively refer to as view elements, are 
used to describe the enterprise itself.  Nightingale and Rhodes offer the definitions for the view 
elements, along with their definitions for the first two elements, in Table 1-1 [33, p. 18]: 
Table 1-1: Description of the ARIES Framework’s Enterprise Elements[33] 
Element Description 
Ecosystem 
The external regulatory, political, economic, market, and societal environment in 
which the enterprise operates and competes/cooperates with other enterprises 
Stakeholders 
Individuals and groups who contribute to, benefit from, and/or are affected by the 
enterprise 
Strategy 
The strategic vision along with the associated business model and key strategic thrusts, 
goals, and performance management system 
Information 
Information the enterprise requires to perform its mission and operate effectively 
according to its strategy 
Infrastructure 
Enterprise enabling systems and information technology, communication technology, 
and physical facilities that enable enterprise performance 
Products 
Products the enterprise acquires, markets, develops, manufactures, and/or distributes to 
stakeholders 
Services 
Offerings derived from enterprise knowledge, expertise, and competencies that deliver 
value to stakeholders, including support of products 
Process 
Key leadership, lifecycle, and enabling processes by which the enterprise carries out 
its mission and creates value for its stakeholders    
Organization Culture, organizational structure, and underlying social network of the enterprise    
Knowledge 
Competencies, expertise, explicit and tacit knowledge, and intellectual property 
resident in and generated by the enterprise 
The authors also assert that the view elements cannot be considered separately, but that 
many of them can influence, drive, or depend upon others.  They refer to these relationships as 
an inherent “entanglement,” and the degree to which certain elements are entangled, if at all, 
varies from enterprise [33, p. 18].   
With that in mind, the view elements can be adapted to the electricity sector to 
demonstrate ARIES suitability for analyzing the entire electricity sector as shown in Table 1-2: 
ARIES Framework Enterprise Elements Adapted to the Electricity Sector below. 
Table 1-2: ARIES Framework Enterprise Elements Adapted to the Electricity Sector 
Element Description 
Ecosystem 
The external cyber threat, regulatory, political, economic, and market environment in 
which the electricity sector operates with other subsectors and critical infrastructure 
sectors 
Stakeholders 
Organizations who contribute to, benefit from, and/or are affected by the electricity 
sector's ability to provide reliable, cyber resilient power to the U.S. 
Strategy 
The strategic vision and key strategic thrusts and goals of electricity market 
stakeholders and the governments who regulate and provide existing incident 
response mechanisms 
Information 
Information that electricity sector needs to measure, prepare for, and respond to 
widespread malware attacks 
Infrastructure 
Physical and technological systems that enable cyber response mechanisms to 
operate efficiently and effectively 
Products 
Products that the electricity sector develops and uses to enhance cyber resiliency and 
cyber incident response capabilities 
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Services 
Services that the electricity sector develops and uses to enhance cyber resiliency and 
cyber incident response capabilities 
Process 
Processes through which the electricity sector manages cyber risk and 
communicates, coordinates, mitigates, and evaluates cyber response mechanisms 
Organization 
Organizational structure, cybersecurity cultural and relational values of the 
electricity sector that influence its cyber response mechanisms 
Knowledge 
Competencies, expertise, and explicit and tacit knowledge that the electricity sector 
stakeholders contribute to or require from the sector in order to enable cyber incident 
response 
The view elements provide a multifaceted approach to examining the electricity sector 
and its cyber incident response mechanisms.  Using the view elements prompts a complete gap 
analysis of the mechanisms.  Further, when proposing changes to, or creation of mechanisms, the 
view elements allow for a complete design of the mechanism which addresses the requirements 
for it to be implemented and sustained in the electricity sector.  Given the scope of this research 
and entanglement of the elements, this thesis will focus on the strategy, process, organization, 
information, products, and services view elements in Chapter 4. 
Nightingale and Rhodes also suggest that each of the eight view elements can be better 
assessed by examining the five parts of its “anatomy,” as shown in Table 1-3 [33, p. 24].  By 
dividing the elements up in this manner, it strengthens understanding of the electricity sector’s 
current mechanisms and helps to develop value propositions for future changes. 
Table 1-3: Five Parts of the Element Anatomy 
Element Anatomy Description 
Structure Configuration characteristics 
Behavior Response to certain conditions or triggers 
Artifacts Tangible Evidence 
Measures Quantitative information 
Periodicity Recurring cycles, both with pace and rate 
1.6.4 Architecting Process Model 
The architecting process model is the second component of the ARIES Framework and 
defines seven steps to exploring and re-architecting an enterprise, as shown in Figure 1.6 [33, p. 
22].  This thesis uses the first four steps of the model to explore the electricity sector’s response 
mechanisms to a cyber event at scale and then create holistic approaches to improving them.  
This analysis deliberately stops short of detailed mechanism development and implementation 
plans.  Subsequent phases of REMAED solicit feedback from electricity stakeholders to validate 
the results of presented herein, increase awareness of gaps in sector’s ability to respond to a 




Figure 1.6: Seven Steps in the ARIES Process Model 
1.6.5 Techniques and Templates 
The third component of the ARIES Framework is unique to enterprise analysis.  
Nightingale and Rhodes recommend the use of conventional analysis tools and processes to aid 
in the exploration and development of enterprise architectures.  Examples of recommended tools 
include the SWOT analysis, Pugh analysis, stakeholder value mapping, and ideation.  However, 
the Framework is sufficiently flexible to incorporate other tools and processes as the user sees fit.  
In particular, this thesis uses force field analysis, stakeholder saliency analysis, and stakeholder 
value mapping [35], [36]. 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of this thesis follows the first four steps of the ARIES process model.  
Chapter 2 presents the relevant literature review corresponding to the ecosystem (external) and 
internal landscape of the electricity sector and analyzes the potential motivations of the sector to 
change its approach to cyber response. Chapter 3 provides the results of the stakeholder 
interviews and research as part of a broader stakeholder analysis.  Chapter 4 analyzes the current 
state of the electricity sector’s response mechanisms using the eight view elements described in 
section 1.6.3.  Chapter 5 concludes the thesis with next steps in the REMAED project and future 
research that must be conducted to enhance the development of cyber response mechanisms. 
  
24 
2 Background and Landscape Analysis 
This chapter provides context for the remainder of the thesis by presenting a background 
of the essential electricity supply chain and the importance of electricity and energy security to 
the U.S.  An electricity sector landscape analysis presents a literature review of the factors that 
shape the sector and its approach to cyber response.  An analysis of the electricity sector’s cyber 
response, as the main subject of this research, is presented in detail in Chapter 4, but the effects 
of the factors to motivate change in the sector’s approach to cyber resilience and cyber response 
is discussed using a force field analysis. 
2.1 Background 
2.1.1 Electricity Supply Chain 
One of the best ways to understand the complexity of the electricity sector’s approach to 
cyber resilience and cyber response is to understand how it delivers electricity.  In short, there 
are four major components in the electricity supply chain, as shown in Figure 2.1 [37, p. 5].  
First, electricity generators produce power through multiple methods, including coal, natural gas, 
nuclear, hydroelectric dams, wind turbines, and solar panels.  Second, transmission lines carry 
wholesale power over inter- and intra-state distances.  Taken together, transmission and 
generation facilities make up the Bulk Power System (BPS). Third, distribution systems form the 
networks that deliver electricity to customers throughout a defined geographical area.  
Consumers make up the last of the components, and heavily influence the sector because of the 
demand they place on the system [38]. 
 
Figure 2.1: Major Components of the Electric System  
Figure 2.1 provides an accurate but oversimplified view of the electricity industry.  It is 
far more complex and dynamic [37, p. 5].  Appendix A more accurately reveals the complex 
nature through value streams of the four types of markets.  While these do not directly 
correspond to the stakeholder value exchanges related to cyber response, there is significant 
overlap. In many ways, these value exchanges are complementary to achieving an improved 
response. 
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2.1.2 Importance of Electricity Security 
The ubiquity and reliability of electricity in much of the Western world might lead 
consumers to take it for granted.  This paper would be remiss if it did not emphasize the 
significance of electricity on U.S. modern life, particularly the economic, public welfare, and 
political aspects.   
Throughout the world, access to electricity is increasingly viewed as a basic human need,  
used to cook food, operate healthcare facilities, or enable economic activity, and even directly 
correlated to national development [39], [40], [41].  For the U.S., energy security, particularly 
electricity security, is vital to national security, the welfare of its people, and economic 
prosperity.  As such, the U.S. Government labels the electricity sector as one of the 16 critical 
infrastructure sectors (see more in section 2.2.3.1). 
The importance of electricity to daily life in the U.S. is made evident by the nation’s 
consumption patterns.  In 2018 alone, the U.S. consumed 3.8 trillion kWh of electricity, and 
from Figure 2.2, it is easy to observe that electricity continues to grow increasingly significant to 
all aspects of modern life in the U.S. [42].   
 
Figure 2.2: Electricity Use by Each Consumer Sectors in the U.S., 1950-2018 
To accentuate this further, the per capita consumption of electricity depicted in Figure 2.3 
highlights electricity’s impact on the U.S. relative to other countries [42], [43].  In 2016, the per 
capita consumption was 12.8 MWh/person.  While only 11th in the world by that metric, the 
U.S. is four times more populous than the top ten countries combined.   
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Figure 2.3: Electricity Consumption Per Capita (2016) 
As many who have experienced a power outage for any length of time can attest, a 
disruption in electricity, at the very least, presents a nuisance.  An outage interferes with the 
ability to communicate, work on computers, cook, heat and cool an office, and light a residence, 
for example. By the most recent estimate, sustained power interruptions (greater than five 
minutes) regardless of cause, cost on average $44B annually (in 2015 $) for all electricity 
consumers, as shown in Figure 2.4 [44, p. 18].  Other estimates range from $18B to $164B, 
including costs of spoiled inventory, delayed production, infrastructure damage, lost wages, and 
unrealized output [45], [46]. 
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Figure 2.4: Cost of Sustained Power Interruptions for All Customer Types by Sector 
While there have been no reported large-scale outages caused by cyberattacks in the U.S., 
a study performed by Lloyd’s of London (2015) calculated the economic toll alone from an 
extreme cyberattack scenario could range from $243B to $1T [6].  All studies admit to the 
difficulty in accurately estimating costs of outages, and significantly, they omit injury and loss of 
life for the same reason, and they all conclude that much can and should be done to improve the 
resilience of the U.S.’s electric system.   
However, increasing resilience requires significant capital investment and endeavoring to 
eliminate every cyber vulnerability would be cost prohibitive.  Instead, risk management 
strategies provide the basis for tenets of electricity security investments, balancing cost with 
resiliency [47].  More to the point, there should be continued research and investment in 
determining acceptable risks, identifying reasonable tradeoffs between cost and resiliency, and 
finding ways to increase resiliency at decreasing costs. 
2.2 Landscape Analysis 
The following landscape analysis uses the ARIES Framework’s “enterprise ecosystem 
factors” to explore the external and internal factors that influence the electricity sector and its 
approach to cyber response [33, p. 30].  Specifically, the importance of cyber threats and 
political, economic, technological, and market factors are explained to provide context to the 
sector.  Exploration results from a synthesis of publicly available literature and integration of 
research interview results. 
All of the ecosystem factors are deeply entangled, and the categorization of influences on 
the ecosystem using within a specific factor is debatable.  In particular, regulatory factors 
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manifest the entanglement of political, economic, market, and technological factors, so much of 
the regulatory influence could be captured in any of the other factors.  Regardless of the category 
in which they appear below, the influences remain significant to the understanding of the 
electricity sector’s cyber response mechanisms and identification of the gaps therein.  
Additionally, the landscape factors that directly influence the electricity sector’s current response 
mechanisms are omitted in here because they require a closer examination and are discussed in 
Chapter 4.  
2.2.1 Cyber Threat Factor 
As previously stated in section 1.4.3, this thesis does not discuss the likelihood that a 
specific threat vector would be utilized to cause a widespread electricity outage, but it is 
interesting to note that the Director of National Intelligence has gone so far as to say that a 
cyberattack on U.S. infrastructure is imminent [48].  It is necessary, however, to provide the 
current perception of cyber-aggressors’ motivations and capabilities which drive the investment, 
actions, and risk management of the electricity sector.  As the factor of cyber threats so greatly 
entwines with all of the other factors, i.e., regulatory, political, economic, technological factors, 
it is presented separately.  Vulnerabilities exploited by cyber-aggressors to execute a cyberattack, 
conversely, are primarily a function of technology and the architecture and components of the 
electricity sector’s operational and business systems.  Section 2.2.4.3 presents further 
information on these elements. 
2.2.1.1 Motivation of Cyber-Aggressors 
Any attacker of the electric power system would have to conduct extensive research, 
possibly navigate interconnected information technology networks to get access to utility ICS, 
identify the right targets, and then determine how to attack them for the desired result [49].  
Consistent with recent threat intelligence and research, the most likely cyber-aggressor to have 
the necessary resources to do so would be state actors seeking a competitive advantage in case of 
a conflict.  Terrorist groups and cybercriminals may eventually pose a threat as the threat surface 
increases (see section 2.2.4.3) and as their capabilities increase with time and experience. 
However, Knake (2017) states that despite these impending risks, the “likelihood that an 
attack carried out by a determined and capable adversary would be thwarted by security 
measures is low” [49, p. 2].  Knake further postulates that it may not take a conflict for state 
actors to attack.  He points to three plausible scenarios:  
1. Discrediting Operations. Given the importance of electricity to the daily 
lives of Americans, an adversary may see advantage in disrupting service 
to undermine public support for a U.S. administration at a politically 
sensitive time. 
2. Distracting Operations. A state contemplating a diplomatic or military 
initiative likely to be opposed by the United States could carry out a 
cyberattack against the U.S. power grid that would distract the attention 
of the U.S. government and disrupt or delay its response. 
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3. Retaliatory Operations. In response to U.S. actions considered 
threatening by another state, such as the imposition of economic sanctions 
and various forms of political warfare, a cyberattack on the power grid 
could be carried out to punish the United States or intimidate it from 
taking further action with the implied threat of further damage [49]. 
Of particular note, Knake also elaborates on the potential for miscalculation should state 
actors cyberattack the electric power system.  First, because electricity supports many economic 
and public welfare institutions, any disruption in service, even if intended to be minor or 
accidental, might have drastic implications.  Second, cyber-aggressors may underestimate the 
capability of the U.S. to identify the actor responsible and its willingness to retaliate against 
them.  The ambiguity in both instances is significant because many in the industry assume state 
actors will have correctly estimated both of these factors. 
2.2.1.2 ICS Cyber Kill Chain 
The ICS Cyber Kill Chain was introduced by Assante and Lee (2015) as an adaption of 
Lockheed Martin’s Cyber Kill Chain to help ICS operators and defenders understand cyber-
aggressors’ requirements to attack their system [50].  The specific actions and technical 
requirements of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain are beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, the ICS 
Cyber Kill Chain describes a cyberattack process that has implications on how utilities and 
Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial (FSLTT) governments contextualize the threat to 
critical infrastructure. 
Specifically, the current mode of thinking, gathered through interviews, suggests that 
utilities expect cyberattacks to occur in a single, distinct, and deliberate action to disrupt 
electricity.  In reality, the mode of the ICS attackers is far more gradual, and as Knake has 
suggested, cyberattacks may be the result of probing efforts or incidental to other actions 
aggressors take [49].  Therefore, a deliberate cyberattack that causes an outage might be of low 
likelihood, but prudent cyber risk management strategies must seek to incorporate the increased 
likelihood of incidental actions.   
To provide more insight into this dynamic, Assante and Lee’s ICS Cyber Kill Chain 
(2015) demonstrates the complexity of an ICS cyberattack campaign, the many phases of which 
do not manifest in an outage but require proportionate levels of response.  The first of two stages 
in an ICS-specific cyberattack is characterized as an “intelligence operation” by the authors.  
During the first stage, the adversary plans, gathers data on defeating ICS defenses, and gains 
access to environments to exploit for an attack [50].  Stage 1 has five phases, and its culmination 
provides the most value in providing consistent access to the ICS for espionage and attack 
planning.  Figure 2.5 [50, p. 2] is taken from the authors’ original work and depicts the ICS 
Cyber Kill Chain.  An unintended attack, as described in the previous section, is considered to 
fall into the “Act” phase of Stage 1. 
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Figure 2.5: Stage 1 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain 
Stage 2 of the Kill Chain continues to demonstrate the measured and deliberate nature of 
an ICS cyberattack.  It contains four phases, the fourth of which requires the aggressor to decide 
between three generic options of attack, as shown in Figure 2.6 [50, p. 8].   
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Figure 2.6: Stage 2 of the ICS Cyber Kill Chain 
The options of the final phase also indicate that the aggressors may not seek a power 
outage as the ultimate goal.  A successful attack provides them with multiple options to disrupt 
power, obfuscate their actions, or use the grid to target downstream electricity consumers.  
Nonetheless, in pursuit of the aggressors’ intended effects, such actors encounter a range of 
challenging obstacles. Assante and Lee again provide insight into relative difficulty, and 
subsequent likelihood of success, of different attack options in Figure 2.7 [50, p. 10]. 
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Figure 2.7: Relative Difficulty of ICS Attack Effects 
Thus, the electricity sector cannot assume that cyberattacks will always be intentional, 
occur in some instant loss of operational control or power, or have catastrophic consequences.  A 
high potential for accidental, gradual, and regional cyberattack exists, and cyber response 
mechanisms need to be equally dynamic and have the flexibility and scalability to be effective in 
a wide range of scenarios. 
2.2.1.3 Overview of Malware Attacks in the Electricity Sector 
Malware has been used to disrupt computing functions since the 1980s [51], [52].  
However, it has only recently become a significant business risk for its use to steal or ransom 
financial data and intellectual property.  Public recognition of known breaches in many cases 
have been carefully controlled in order to mitigate damage to a business’s reputation, and the 
economic losses of malware can be calculated in the billions of dollars [53], [11].  Much of this 
loss is incurred by industries that utilize IT in collecting and storing data, which presents an 
opportune target for ransom, interference, or destruction.  Without the ability to monetize 
cyberattacks on industrial control systems (ICS) and other operational technology (OT), which 
focuses on process and control of the system it operates, there has not been a substantial record 
of attacks on those systems. 
Nonetheless, cyber-aggression towards ICS system has become increasingly prevalent.  
In 2009, STUXNET became the first piece of malware purpose-built for ICS, resulting in 
physical damage to equipment at an Iranian nuclear enrichment facility [54].  Many in the ICS 
and cybersecurity industry treated STUXNET as a harbinger of cyberattacks against critical 
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infrastructure that could cause physical damage to electric utility systems and widespread 
economic and public health issues [54], [55]. 
More recently, the BlackEnergy 2 and 3 malware attacks against the Ukrainian power 
grid in 2015 affected approximately 250,000 people. In 2016, the CRASHOVERRIDE malware 
campaign took down substations, again in Ukraine [9], [56].  Though the latter was less far-
reaching in terms of affected customers, it was more advanced and demonstrated the viability of 
using malware to disrupt service deliberately.  More disconcertingly, it revealed the fourth 
malware tailored specifically for ICS cyberattack. CRASHOVERRIDE, demonstrated that rather 
than inserting malicious code into the system, attackers gain access through ICT networks, 
collect information on the network systems and operations, and use automated legitimate ICS 
commands to disrupt service.  Further, CRASHOVERRIDE was designed to be scalable to any 
size network regardless of its configuration, communications protocol, or location.  Its creators 
modularized the ICS malware explicitly for other attackers to adapt its purpose and deliver yet-
to-be-developed payloads [8].  These types of advanced persistent threats have become the main 
threat to the energy sector. Cybersecurity companies unanimously regard them as indefensible 
with modern cybersecurity measures [57], [58], [59], [60].   
In August 2017, reports emerged of a cyberattack on a Saudi Arabian petrochemical 
plant.  The aggressors targeted the Schneider Electric Triconex safety instrumented system (SIS) 
and were able to affect the emergency shutdown systems of the plant.  The malware, called 
TRISIS, represented another in a series of ICS-targeting attack tools.  Though it reportedly did 
not result in any adverse effect, TRISIS demonstrated the potential to cause physical equipment 
damage, injury, and loss of life [61], [62].  Later forensic analysis showed that the attackers had 
access to the system since at least 2014, had gained intimate knowledge of the plant’s ICS, and 
took advantage of the end-user to create vulnerabilities.  It is also important to note that, by the 
requirement for a high degree of tailor and integration for an individual SIS, the TRISIS attack 
was not scalable like CRASHOVERRIDE.  Instead, the key takeaways are that aggressors are 
willing to invest time and resources in malware that can cause physical harm and that the 
evolution of threats must meet a constant refinement of cyber response measures. 
2.2.1.4 Geography of Cyberattacks vs. Other Incidents 
Unlike other natural and human-made incidents, cyberattacks can affect a potentially 
boundless area, and its impacts are not naturally constrained to a single geographical region [63], 
[64].  In the context of the electricity sector, a cyberattack at scale could affect multiple systems 
each with distinct, geographically distant impacts.  Further, the implications and impact of a 
cyberattack on the electricity that causes cascading failures is a subject of much research but still 
not well understood [10], [65]. 
2.2.1.5 Cyber Threat Factor Analysis 
Cyberattacks of all categories have increased rapidly in the energy sector.  In 2016, the 
most current year for which data is available, the sector saw a 77% rise in cyberattacks year over 
year and similar increases in their success [66].  The data from DHS and DOE in Figure 2.8 
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show that the energy sector is one of the most heavily targeted of the critical infrastructures, and 
both agencies admit that the data they collect comes only from reported incidents [3, p. 4].  
Unreported incidents or unrealized cyberattacks on the electricity subsector are likely far more 
numerous.   
 
Figure 2.8: Reported Cyber Incidents by Critical Infrastructure Sectors 
As malware and other capabilities continue to proliferate and become more accessible to 
malign actors, the risks to the electricity sector will grow.  The DoD and DHS expect that all 
classes of cyber-aggressors will continue to seek cyberattack capabilities that target critical 
infrastructure and find novel ways to benefit from those capabilities [67].  Therefore, there is an 
increased likelihood that an attack affects more than one utility, and the lack of predictable and 
homogenous geographical boundaries on the attack will make an effective response more 
complicated.  Further, the evolving nature of cyber threats to the energy sector requires that the 
sector develops the capability to respond to an attack immediately, if not pre-emptively, and in 
geographically separate areas to appropriately mitigate its effects.  Waiting for the sector to be 
attacked to identify precisely what response mechanisms are needed will waste valuable time, 
have harsher economic consequences, and may even endanger life. 
2.2.2 Regulatory Factor 
The regulatory factors that most significantly affect the electricity sector and its cyber 
response mechanisms fall into two broad categories.  The first stems from the regulations that 
govern commerce and, specifically, the utilities’ roles in delivering reliable power.  The second, 
from the regulations that dictate the states have primary responsibility for public health and 
safety over that of the Federal Government, including emergency management and incident 
response to cyberattacks on utilities.  Arguably, these aspects of government regulation are 
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tightly coupled with political and economic factors.  Because of this, the regulation of the 
electricity market generally remains a contentious issue and must be addressed as a combination 
of the two.  This section does not argue the validity of the U.S.’s approach to regulating the 
electricity sector but focuses instead on specific effects of regulation on the sector’s ability to 
respond to a cyberattack.   
2.2.2.1 Energy Sector Regulations Overview 
Between 1935 and the late 1980s, the majority of the energy sector was vertically 
monopolistic and tightly regulated at the state level by public utility commissions.  States closely 
monitored and permitted utilities to recoup the “cost-of-service” and a return on capital 
expenditures through rate structures.  In the 1990s, the electricity market began the process of 
deregulation towards a market-based structure driven by the goals of greater economic efficiency 
and lower electricity rates.  Under this proposed model, the distribution and transmission 
components of the electricity market, natural monopolies, were “unbundled” from the generation 
and retail components to enable competition in the market.   
For the most part, states retained the authority to regulate distribution through public 
utility commissions given distribution systems’ smaller scale and geographic reach.  To regulate 
transmission and the wholesale power market, i.e., generation, the Federal Government exerted 
its authority to govern interstate wholesale power transactions under the power granted by the 
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC) [68]. 
However, due to a variety of reasons, including the California Electricity Crisis of 2000, 
electricity sector deregulation has stalled. Even in deregulated states, electricity is not fully 
deregulated.  Many are waiting until the effects of deregulation can be more fully understood 
[69].  Figure 2.9 shows the electricity regulation by state as of 2017 [70].  The following sections 
elaborate on the influences of Federal and state regulations. 
36 
 
Figure 2.9: Electricity Regulation by State 
2.2.2.2 Federal Energy Regulation and Energy Reliability 
The Federal Government regulates grid reliability through NERC, which creates and 
enforces reliability standards for the BPS in the U.S. and Canada.  NERC traces its roots back to 
1962 when the need to coordinate the BPS between the U.S. and Canada rose from the 
interconnections of the two countries’ grids.  Gradually over time, and spurred in response to 
significant blackouts across the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s, NERC gained authority through 
Federal mandates and legislation to enforce reliability standards on the BPS, mainly through 
fining violators under FERC’s regulatory authority [71].  In 2003, NERC was established as the 
U.S.’s energy reliability organization (ERO).   
Born from the 2003 Blackout during which an estimated 55 million people in 
northeastern and midwestern U.S. and Canada lost power for up to two weeks, the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 established the concept of a reliability regulatory body to regulate the BPS [37], 
[72], [73].  NERC was granted its status as the ERO for both the U.S. and Canada in 2006 and 
created the first set of mandatory reliability standards.  The ERO regulatory model is considered 
audited self-regulation as defined under U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 1, Chapter III, 
Part 305.94-1.  In this construct, FERC delegated its power to regulate to NERC as a “private 
self-regulatory organization to implement and enforce laws” on regulated entities [74, p. 2].  
While the Code openly admits that audited self-regulation has shortcomings, it recognizes 
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specific instances where such a program is more effective than direct government control.  The 
electricity sector meets these criteria. 
Concurrent with NERC’s expanding authority and role in the reliability of the BPS, the 
need for resilience of the power grid arose from increasing attention on the subsector’s 
designation as a critical infrastructure sector and, ultimately, increasing threats from natural 
disasters and terrorism.  As one component of reliability, NERC developed, implemented, and 
now enforces 11 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards composed of 40 rules and 
nearly 100 sub-requirements related directly to cyber resilience [75], [76].  Relevant to cyber 
response, CIP-008-6 Cyber Security — Incident Reporting and Response Planning requires 
regulated entities to report cyber incidents and establish incident response plans for cyberattacks 
on “critical assets” [76, p. 218].   
2.2.2.3 State Regulation and Electricity Reliability 
As FERC and NERC have gained authority to regulate the electricity market, the states’ 
Public Utility Commissions (PUC), or their equivalent, have ceded that authority to them.  The 
withdrawal of state regulatory powers and imposition of Federal law onto states has been met 
with resistance.  However, in FERC v. Mississippi, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the power of 
FERC to regulate many aspects of states’ electricity utilities [77].   
Of the 18 states that have deregulated electricity markets, PUCs only regulate distribution 
utilities, which do not fall under interstate commerce regulated by the Federal Government.  In 
the regulated states which have vertically integrated electric utility monopolies (meaning they 
own generation, transmission, and distribution of electric utilities), the PUCs regulate all three.  
In all states, FERC regulates the wholesale transactions and transmissions that cross state lines 
[78]. 
PUCs are typically accountable for regulating other utilities within their jurisdiction as 
well, including water, natural gas, and transportation, and engage with different Federal 
regulatory agency and SSA for each sector.  Perhaps their most important, or at least highest 
visibility responsibility, is a PUC’s authority to approve utility rates.  Among other costs, most 
utilities must recoup the cost of cybersecurity within the capital expense of an asset or combine it 
with the other operating expenses.  However, they are often not permitted to recover 
cybersecurity investments as a direct line item, and because some investments have significant 
and recurring costs, it deters utilities from making adequate investments. 
Further, many PUCs have reportedly lacked the necessary workforce expertise to identify 
good cybersecurity investments.  PUCs must balance affordability for electricity consumers with 
business risk and profitability considerations for the utility when calculating rates.  Often PUCs 
reject proposed rate increases that utilities require to cover recapitalization costs regardless of 
their legitimacy, and they apply the same logic to cybersecurity investments.  However, PUCs 
are unable to discern prudent cybersecurity investments or their urgency due to a lack of trained 
workforce. 
State open records statutes often complicate matters further as they often require PUC 
hearings to be open to the public [79].  Since cybersecurity plans and information tend to be 
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confidential, utilities are often reluctant to provide PUCs with the very information they need to 
approve rate cases and make more informed cybersecurity policy decisions.  Nonetheless, PUCs 
are often the primary state resource for developing incident response plans for the energy sectors. 
2.2.2.4 Cybersecurity and Risk Management in the Electricity Sector 
Until very recently, NERC’s CIP reliability standards created a relatively “rules-
compliance” based system for cybersecurity investments.  In Figure 2.10, Massacci et al. [80, p. 
7] show the predominance of rules-based compliance in the U.S. electricity subsector relative to 
those of other countries.  The authors expound upon the limitations of purely risk-based and 
purely rules-based cybersecurity approaches sector and demonstrate that the U.S.’s has led to 
lower overall investment, resiliency, and preparedness [80].   
 
Figure 2.10: Phase Regions of Critical National Infrastructure Operator (CNIO) Behavior 
Depending on Regulatory Incentives. 
Arguably, the culture of compliance in the U.S. electricity sector exists to this day, but in 
2013, the Federal Government recognized the benefits of incentivizing risk-based security 
investments and developed policy to combine it with its traditional approach [81].  The DOE, 
regulators, such as FERC and NERC, and research institutes, such as NIST, encourage utilities to 
make risk-based cybersecurity investments [82], [83].  The results have been frameworks and 
guidelines for risk management of the cybersecurity of electric power systems, such as the 
DOE’s Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Risk Management Process, NIST’s Risk Management 
Framework for Information Systems and Organizations, Framework for Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity, and Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability 
Standards [83], [84], [85].  These publications notably do not require strict compliance and are, 
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instead, designed to be “a prioritized, flexible, repeatable, performance-based, and cost-effective 
approach, including information security measures and controls that may be voluntarily adopted 
by owners and operators of critical infrastructure to help them identify, assess, and manage cyber 
risks” [86, p. v].  The DOE’s Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model 
(ES-C2M2) is another manifestation of the shift in paradigm from rule-based to risk-based 
management.  The ES-C2M2 is a voluntary self-evaluation that “is presented at a high level of 
abstraction so that it can be interpreted by subsector organizations of various types, structures, 
and sizes. Widespread use of the model is expected to support benchmarking of the subsector’s 
cybersecurity capabilities” [87]. 
The lack of compulsory implementation of strict standards reflects the position that the 
resources and capabilities between each utility vary greatly, and one-size-fits-all regulations or 
guidelines will not work.  Even NERC CIP standards, specifically CIP-007-6 governing its 
IT/OT systems, provide wide latitude for individual interpretation [76].  Additionally, the detail 
of the controls, the sheer volume of them, and the definition of successful implementation as 
presented in the frameworks, guidelines, and standards are not clear. 
As Lipner and Lampson noted, cybersecurity risk management is unlike risk management 
in other domains [88].  For cyber risks, it is difficult to assess risk as precisely as, say, an 
insurance actuary can estimate the likelihood and severity of a fire.  The authors point to three 
main reasons that cyber risk determinations are so challenging which echo the information 
asymmetries interdependent security problems discussed in sections 2.2.4.1 and 2.2.4.2: 
1) Uncertainty in cyber-aggressors’ capabilities and resources 
2) Uncertainty in cybersecurity technologies 
3) Uncertainty in the consequences in the severity of an attack [88] 
The Lipner and Lampson and Langner and Pederson (2013) maintain that tradeoffs and 
risk-based decisions must remain [1], [88].  However, within the context of Federal Government 
cybersecurity policy for its systems, the authors advocated for mandatory but clear guidelines for 
critical systems.  Enacting baseline requirements to improve cybersecurity, in their mind, would 
overcome the issues state in sections 2.2.4.2 and 2.2.2.4. 
2.2.2.5 Emergency Management, Incident Response, and the Roles of the Federal and State 
Governments 
Under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the states retain the primary 
responsibility for public health and safety.  The Amendment has been interpreted to mean that 
states have a mandate to provide for emergency management and incident response.  While the 
Federal Government’s involvement in emergency management has grown over time, it maintains 
a secondary role.  That is, the Federal Government provides resources and assistance to states 
when they exceed their local capacity to respond.  The Federal Government also utilizes Federal 
funding, and sometimes the threat of withholding it, to establish national programs and standards 
for emergency management and cybersecurity within the states through the principle of 
cooperative federalism [89], [22], [90].  
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For the electricity sector specifically, 16 U.S. Code § 824o-1. Critical electric 
infrastructure security grants the Secretary of Energy authority to “issue such orders for the 
emergency measures as are necessary in the judgment of the Secretary to protect or restore the 
reliability of critical electric infrastructure” [91].  The statute applies to narrow definitions of 
emergency, including a cyberattack, and, then, only to the BPS, consistent with its authority 
under the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause.  In 10 CFR Subpart W, the actual procedures 
for an emergency declaration and issuance of an emergency order are articulated and include 
significant consultation with private and other public entities [92].  Additionally, 16 U.S. Code § 
824a. Interconnection and coordination of facilities; emergencies; transmission to foreign 
countries also grants FERC the authority to establish a temporary connection of transmission 
lines or operation of generation facilities for specific emergencies.  Fortunately, both statutes 
have yet to be used by the Federal Government, but the substance and timeliness of the orders 
and their ability to enable the necessary response remain untested.   
Chapter 4 further details the coordination between states and the Federal Government, the 
emergency statutes, and other incident response mechanisms already in place. 
2.2.2.6 Regulatory Factor Analysis 
In general, the electricity sector, both utilities and government, remains skeptical of the 
effectiveness of new regulations on improving reliable and resilient energy.  Regulations tend to 
impede the effectiveness of market mechanisms to produce efficient utility rates, deliver 
affordable electricity, allow for appropriate investments, and achieve a reasonable profit.  The 
sector’s status as a blend of natural monopolies and competitive market structures along with 
complicated Federal and state jurisdictional structures make it very difficult to regulate the 
electricity subsector in general, much less its cybersecurity.  Regulatory factors in the sector can 
be distilled down to six main effects on cybersecurity and cyber response: 
1. Inconsistent regulations at state and Federal levels 
2. Lack of access to cybersecurity knowledge 
3. Slow and reactive regulation making 
4. Inability to recognize or recoup prudent cybersecurity investments 
5. Compliance-driven cybersecurity practices 
6. Interference with critical information sharing 
Because of the inconsistent utility regulation and authorities across each state, there is no 
uniform state or Federal scheme for cybersecurity or cyber response requirements for utilities.  
Where there are competing state and Federal regulatory authorities, utilities must decipher how 
to comply with both, or if a utility serves multiple states, it may need to have different policies 
depending on the location of its assets [78].  For states, it is often difficult for them to keep track 
and harmonize state regulations and cybersecurity policies with Federal policies given the 
multiple agencies and SSAs.  Arguably, the Federal Government is in the best position to 
identify cyber threats and has the most resources out of any stakeholder to regulate cybersecurity 
in the sector, but it is disempowered both by statute and traditional approach to partnering with 
the private sector and state governments. 
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A state’s access to cybersecurity expertise is often limited because of a small pool of 
qualified personnel, breadth of sector-specific cybersecurity issues, and limited government 
investment in such a workforce.  Thus, their knowledge of cybersecurity may be strained, 
surpassing their ability to regulate a response within a sector, due to a lack of sufficient technical 
understanding of cybersecurity.   
Also, the creation and revision of regulations tend to be a slow process, sometimes taking 
years to develop and implement.  The emergence of new technologies, new vulnerabilities, and 
new threats far outpaces the ability for NERC or PUCs to respond equally.  The nature of 
cybersecurity that perpetuates reactive behavior towards current vulnerabilities and threats, 
rather than taking proactive measures, compounds the delays in rule-making. 
Currently, most PUC rate making algorithms do not permit recoupment of direct 
cybersecurity investments (the establishment of a cybersecurity workforce, for instance), nor do 
the PUCs typically have the technical knowledge to understand what a reasonable rate would be 
[78].  In recent years, PUCs have become more actively engaged in encouraging utilities to 
invest in cybersecurity measures.  However, there remains a dearth of expertise and precedence 
for regulators to evaluate the rate cases for cybersecurity investment [79]. 
Similarly, the NERC CIP regulations tend to be highly prescriptive, in part due to 
previous CIP standards allowing utilities to broadly interpret the classification of assets to be 
included in cybersecurity protocols using a Risk-Based Analysis Methodology.  The resultant 
autonomy led to NERC CIP standards becoming the most frequent violated, as shown in Figure 
2.11, before subsequent revisions implemented tighter controls [93, p. 4].  While this has the 
effect of raising cybersecurity of the electric power system across the board, it disincentivizes, 
and in some cases even interferes with, increased investment in cybersecurity. 
 
Figure 2.11: Violations of NERC Reliability Standards 
42 
Prescriptive cybersecurity regulations tend to provide utilities with the illusion that they 
are cyber secure.  However, “being compliant does not necessarily mean being secure” and 
combined with the thin margins, significant costs of typically associated with cybersecurity 
investments, difficulty recouping costs, and a diverse, sometimes conflicting set of Federal and 
state regulations, many utilities have adopted a culture of minimum compliance [15, p. 5]. 
Further, current regulatory mechanisms impose fines for failure to achieve resiliency 
standards.  NERC CIP are the most prominent of these mechanisms, but alone, they may not be 
enough to achieve proper investment because they do not proactively encourage cybersecurity 
preparation.  Instead, NERC CIP requirements contribute to some utilities developing a culture 
of minimum compliance rather than one which seeks to anticipate and keep pace with threats.  
Ultimately, utilities that develop a minimum compliance approach to cybersecurity becomes the 
weakest link in the interdependency of the electricity sector, and every utility and consumer 
suffers [94]. 
Finally, information sharing has been widely established as a critical component to the 
cybersecurity of critical infrastructure and is the subject of much research [95]–[97], [98], [99].  
Open sharing laws at the state level threaten proprietary, confidential business cybersecurity 
information, which could create vulnerabilities in its network, and its customers’ privacy 
information.  Both of these liabilities strongly dissuade utilities from promptly sharing relevant 
information, even though such information could be critical to formulating an adequate response, 
or even preventing, a cyberattack.  Information sharing processes and information sharing and 
analysis organizations (ISAOs) are discussed in greater detail in sections 2.2.4 and 4.3.3.3, 
respectively. 
2.2.3 Political Factor 
Politics play a prominent role in the electricity sector because of the U.S.’s reliance on 
power for economic growth and public welfare, as addressed in the previous section.  
Cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, on the other hand, is a less obvious but increasingly 
recognized aspect of the economy and public welfare.  As with other areas of the electricity 
sector, political influence and PPPs significantly affect the approach to implementing 
cybersecurity in the electricity sector. 
Though implementing new policies and adapting cybersecurity strategy is relatively easy 
due to the highly regulated nature of the energy sector, neither the state nor the Federal 
Governments’ approaches stimulate the optimal level of investment in cyber resilience. 
2.2.3.1 Cybersecurity as a Public Good  
Current cybersecurity “doctrines of prevention,” “risk management,” and “deterrence 
through accountability” [100] show that cybersecurity has not fully been viewed or managed as a 
public good.  Previous government policies reflect a corresponding inability to protect critical 
infrastructure.  That cybersecurity is a public good is not disputed.  It is both non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous, and as with most public goods, there is compelling evidence that cybersecurity 
without government intervention is underprovided for in the market [2], [99], [101], [102]. 
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However, there exists a unique intersection of cybersecurity as a private interest and as a 
national security interest.  Indeed, much literature investigates that very dynamic [2], [101], 
[103], [104].  Cavelty and Suter (2009) put it most succinctly: 
This creates a situation in which market forces alone are not sufficient to provide 
security in most of the [Critical Infrastructure] sectors. At the same time, the state 
is incapable of providing the public good of security on its own, since an overly 
intrusive market intervention is not a valid option either; the same infrastructures 
that the state aims to protect due to national security considerations are also the 
foundation of the competitiveness and prosperity of a nation.  Therefore, any 
policy for [critical infrastructure protection] must absorb the negative outcomes 
of liberalization, privatization, and globalization, without canceling out the 
positive effects [105, p. 1]. 
Therefore, the Federal Government’s approach to cybersecurity in the critical 
infrastructure sectors focuses on guiding and incentivizing private sector behavior for the benefit 
of the nation.  This approach manifests as collaborative constructs referred to as public-private 
partnerships (PPP). 
2.2.3.2 Overview of U.S. Government and Critical Infrastructure Sectors’ Approach to 
Cybersecurity: Public-Private Partnerships 
Since 1996, the U.S. Government designated the energy sector as one of 16 critical 
infrastructure sectors, defined as: 
[S]ystems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that 
the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, 
or any combination of those matters [27, p. 12]. 
So designated, the sectors formed the nexus between the government’s responsibility to 
protect the nation’s and private sector’s ability to operate these industries efficiently. 
Beginning with the Clinton Administration, the Government has been wary of the 
economic impact of overregulation of the critical infrastructure sectors.  Due to the implications 
on state laws, there are untested limits on how much the Federal Government can compel states 
to enact or enforce laws that uniformly regulate all utilities outside of Federal jurisdiction [90].  
Impacts on the critical infrastructure sectors include slower innovation, reduced competition, 
more costly software, more expensive products, and potentially contradictory effects of 
enforcing strict cybersecurity measures on private entities, electric utilities included.  
Additionally, the Government has been unwilling to incur an unfunded mandate to provide 
cybersecurity for the private sector networks as it would have for national defense, law 
enforcement, and other emergency services [103], [106].  It asserts that the “Government has 
neither the responsibility nor the expertise to act like the private sector’s system administration” 
[107, p. 24].  In turn, this implies that the Government has a marginal, potentially passive role in 
providing cybersecurity and that the private sector is best placed to provide for the security of 
critical infrastructure networks. 
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This implication effectively shifts the responsibility and liability for the national security 
aspect of cybersecurity onto the private sector.  However, the private sector seeks to minimize 
cybersecurity as an expense.  Raising expenditures to the level necessary for national security 
would be significant.  Further, the private sector is resistant to accepting the liability for national 
security in America’s litigious society [2].  In other words, what is best for society may not be 
the most profitable or even sustainable for a utility provider.  As a barrier to forming and 
sustaining effective cyber response mechanisms, private sector participation, and the 
Government's policies towards it, must be framed with this in mind.   
Unfortunately, the Government’s approach has not embraced the critical dynamic 
between national security and business sustainability.  The National Infrastructure Advisory 
Council’s Critical Infrastructure Resilience Final Report and Recommendations (2009) noted 
this fact: 
Current market mechanisms may be inadequate to achieve the level of resilience 
needed to ensure public health, safety, and security. Even with a strong business 
case, there are low-probability, high-consequence events for which investments in 
resilience by private companies cannot be justified. In these cases, stronger 
government involvement is warranted to ensure adequate functioning of critical 
infrastructures during disasters [20, p. 10]. 
The result has been the formation of partnerships between public entities and private 
ones.  These partnerships manifest in a multitude of ways.  The government offers services of 
law enforcement, technical, security and risk experts, and intelligence, among others (see 
Chapter 4 for more details).  However, it also heavily regulates many of these sectors in order to 
achieve critical infrastructure sector goals.  On the other hand, the private entities within the 
critical infrastructure sector own and operate their infrastructure, advise on regulations, and in 
some cases, self-regulate. 
For the electricity subsector, in particular, Federal policy on cybersecurity has been a 
complex political, economic, and technical issue.  Strategies have primarily revolved around two 
main efforts.  The first effort has used electricity service reliability and reporting standards 
enforcement [76] policies administered through NERC (see section 2.2.2 for more information 
on regulations).  Second, the Government encourages participation in information sharing and 
analysis organizations (ISAOs) consisting of voluntary exchange of cyber-related incident 
information with energy sector stakeholders [108].  ISAOs participants are better able to prevent, 
mitigate, and respond to service disruptions as ISAOs consolidate cyber threat information, 
analyze it, and promulgate mitigation strategies. 
Additionally, as a business risk management issue, there are strong indications that the 
electricity subsector understands the importance of cyber resilience.  Its constituent stakeholders 
have invested in cyber resilience and incorporated cyber risk management into their business 
models, albeit to varying degrees.  The relatively recent development of cybersecurity 
frameworks specifically for critical infrastructure sectors, such as the NIST’s Cybersecurity 
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Framework, enabled this transformation and aided in the standardization of cyber resilience 
practices [86].   
Twenty years after the U.S. Government designated the Nation’s critical infrastructures, 
the cybersecurity landscape has evolved significantly.  In parallel, there have been calls for 
renewed collaboration in the U.S.’s public-private approaches to managing the critical 
infrastructure [109].  The Executive Branch has stipulated that new approaches must transcend 
the previous focus on cybersecurity as a tangential effort to reliability or treatment of 
cybersecurity as a solely private sector issue [27]. 
2.2.3.3 Cybersecurity and Energy Security in the Political Domain 
As a vital component to national security, economic prosperity, and the environment 
policies, the discussion of energy security has traditionally been dominated by political interests 
to gain independence from foreign primary energy sources, such as oil and petroleum products.  
However, cybersecurity of the electric sector has increasingly moved to the forefront of the 
conversation [89], [110].  As Figure 2.12 demonstrates, cyber threats dominate the energy 
security dimension of OECD national energy transition agendas according to the 2018 World 
Energy Council’s Issues Monitor [111, p. 9]. 
 
Figure 2.12: Cyber Threats as an Energy Security Issue for OECD Countries 
Additionally, the DOE’s most recent report on the Valuation of Energy Security for the 
United States (2017) discusses the international redefinition of energy security to incorporate 
broader energy security paradigm, and it prominently features the cybersecurity of the energy 
sector with particular emphasis on the electricity subsector [89].  The report indicates the 
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increasing political recognition of the importance of the electricity sector’s cyber resilience and 
future policy direction. 
2.2.3.4 State Government Investments in Cybersecurity 
Regardless of the level of government, government spending is subject to the priorities of 
the political parties in power.  While Federal Government spending on cybersecurity initiatives 
for critical infrastructure sectors has picked up in recent years under both parties, state 
governments have not made it an equal priority.  As discussed in section 2.2.2.3, state 
governments are responsible for an equivalent breadth of cybersecurity challenges as the Federal 
Government.  However, they also have regulatory power over and responsibility for distribution 
systems which fall outside of the requirement for NERC CIP compliance but make up, by some 
estimates, 80%-90% of electric power system assets [78].   
Despite this fact, only 1%-2% of states’ IT budgets on average were spent on 
cybersecurity measures, and of that, only 21% of the $160 million of the combined IT budgets 
for 24 states funded initiatives directly related to cyber resilience and the cyber responses of 
critical infrastructure sectors [112].  A 2018 joint report from Deloitte and the National 
Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO) also point to a revealing cause: 
“almost half of states do not have a separate budget line item for cybersecurity” as depicted in 
Figure 2.13 [113, p. 8]  
 
Figure 2.13: Percentage of States with a Separate Budget Line Item for Cybersecurity 
(Based on 50 responses from State chief information security officers or equivalent to the question “Does your 
state have a cybersecurity budget line item.  Source: 2018 Deloitte-NASCIO Cybersecurity Study) 
Deloitte and NASCIO (2018) also point to stagnant mostly stagnant or marginal increases 
in cybersecurity budget growth for the same states and have not kept pace with current or 
anticipated cybersecurity challenges [113].  Similarly, states have difficulties finding and 
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retaining qualified cyber workforce due to noncompetitive pay structures nor have many 
established career paths for their cyber workforce [113]. 
2.2.3.5 Political Factor Analysis 
With the increasing number of cyberattacks and the likelihood of a significant cyber 
incident, the Government may have been forced to change its approach, and such a drastic 
change is not without precedent.  As Knake (2017) noted, aviation security was taken over by the 
Federal Government following the 9/11 attacks [49].  He asserts that Congress would empower 
the executive branch with increased authority over the electricity sector if a similar event were to 
occur.  While such authority might decrease the efficiency of the grid and open the door for 
greater Federal Government involvement in other sectors, the political mandate would be met.  
Geopolitically, the second order consequences to such an attack might include the exposing of a 
vulnerability that inhibits the U.S. from action abroad. 
Thus, the real motivation for the electricity sector should be the maintenance of the status 
quo, i.e., that cybersecurity is the responsibility of utility owner/operators with support from the 
Federal Government.  In order to do this, the risk profile of cyber resilience investments may 
need to shift drastically in some cases but might be made harder by the need to appease 
shareholders and regulators.  However, incident response mechanisms, that is the processes, 
policies, expertise, and technology, that facilitate reaction to a cyber-attack remain some of the 
most immature capabilities in the cyber resilience spectrum [114].   
Fortunately, as of 2018, current Federal Government directives take a strategic approach 
to cybersecurity and point out the need for the “ability to go across sectors, go across agencies to 
understand true national risk, set priorities together, plan jointly, train, and exercise alongside 
each other” [4, p. 38].  These directives affirm that the traditional policies on energy sector 
cybersecurity are necessary but are no longer sufficient.  Among the gaps identified was the lack 
of capability to consolidate public and private sector resources in response to a malware-based 
cyberattack on the energy operational technology control systems.  To that end, the Department 
of Energy has sought and obtained increased authority from Congress to regulate the energy 
sector under the Federal Power Act [115], [116].  The Government's policy on responding to a 
cyber incident affecting a private entity remains monitoring and offering assistance, and approval 
of the desired increases in authority remains uncertain [117], [118]. 
Finally, state CISOs acknowledge that insufficient resourcing presents the most 
substantial barrier to supporting the cybersecurity of their respective critical infrastructure 
sectors.  The effects of underfunding resound through all facets of the states’ responsibilities 
towards the electricity sector. Regulations and rate-making suffer from the lack of experience in 
the workforce, processes, products, and services to support private sector cyber resilience are not 
in place, and governments tend to struggle with understanding how to foster private sector 
involvement in cybersecurity to the most efficient degree possible. 
2.2.4 Economic Factor 
Discussion of the regulatory and political factors have addressed some economic issues 
affecting the electricity sector as well and are not covered again in this section.  Instead, attention 
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must be paid to specific economic attributes of cybersecurity that influence the behavior of the 
sector.  The information asymmetries, that is “where one party has more or better information 
than another party,” inherent to industries such as the electricity sector create significant barriers 
to implementing cybersecurity measures [119].  Additionally, both positive and negative 
externalities arise from cybersecurity’s nature as a public good, as discussed in section 2.2.3.1.  
This paper will approach those negative factors that have the most significant potential to impede 
the effectiveness of current and future cyber response mechanisms. 
2.2.4.1 Trust and Information Asymmetry  
One of the more well-known impediments to building cooperation and collaboration 
among disparate stakeholders of an industry is the level of trust among them and in the sector's 
ability to operate effectively and fairly.  As applied to critical infrastructure, the importance of 
trust, mechanisms to instill it, and processes to sustain it, has been exhaustively studied [120], 
[121], [121]–[124] and are further addressed within the context of the electricity sector in section 
4.3.2.  However, this section presents the importance of external factors and transactions costs 
that erode trust and cause trust imbalances between sector stakeholders. 
In order to respond to a cyberattack at scale, cyber response mechanisms must make trust 
a central priority as a high level of information asymmetry characterizes the nature of the 
problem.  Information asymmetries are a significant barrier to the success of the sector’s cyber 
resilience and exist between multiple parties within the sector, such as between utility operators 
and cybersecurity vendors, between regulators and utility owners, and even between the sector 
and cyber-aggressors.  These asymmetries may outright deter participation in collaborative 
public-private efforts because if costs are too high, erode confidence in the organization’s ability 
to create value, or lead to overconfidence in a provider’s own cyber defenses among others 
[125]. 
To better form an organizational structure that effectively mitigates the impact of 
information asymmetry, it bears clarifying its sources which this paper classifies into three broad 
categories: quality of information, continuous evolution of the cybersecurity ecosystem, and 
risks to competitive advantage. 
Quality of Information 
Asymmetries in this category are those that have both been shown empirically to exist 
through economic theory and reported by participants in organizations such as ISACs [65], 
[100], [101], [120], [126], [127].  The following is a brief list of issues with the electricity 
sector’s cybersecurity caused by the poor quality of information. 
• Cyber threat information may be “oversold,” e.g., doomsday cyberattack scenarios, by 
cybersecurity vendors to utility providers 
• Cybersecurity product and services are not verifiably “cybersecure” and lead to 
overconfidence in cybersecurity or, conversely, mistrust in the ability to achieve an 
appropriate level of cybersecurity 
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• Cyber threat information may not be relevant to all vendors and cause information 
saturation 
• Utility providers may not understand the impact of a cyber threat to their business 
• Utility providers may not know if a cyber threat applies to their systems 
• Utility providers lack the expertise to verify if cyber defenses are adequate 
• Utility operators may lack the expertise or technological capability to detect cyberattacks 
or understand how to mitigate it 
• Cyberthreat mitigation may be very technical, affect operation technology, and 
challenging to put in place 
• Information may lack sufficient details to act upon or be classified by the government 
• Delay in reporting information  
• Governments may not understand their role or the resources required to enable the private 
sector to invest in cybersecurity properly or, more relevantly, to respond to and recover 
from a cyberattack  
Continuous Evolution of the Cybersecurity Ecosystem 
Many aspects of cybersecurity continuously change and an ever more rapid pace.  The 
high rate of change creates significant difficulty for utility providers, ICS vendors, cybersecurity 
vendors, and other critical infrastructure sector stakeholders to stay ahead of cyber threats.  They 
are as follows: 
• Continual development of new digital (OT, IT, IoT, etc.) technologies installed on the 
electric power system which create new vulnerabilities 
• Constant expansion of the electric power system which creates more access points 
• Increased focus on smart grid technology and networking architecture of the grid which 
increases vulnerabilities and access for attackers 
• Relentless cyber-aggressors who continuously search for vulnerabilities and create new 
threat vectors 
Risks to Information Security and Competitive Advantage  
The interests of the public and private sectors are most divergent in this category of 
information asymmetry.  As a condition of participating in the organization, the government 
would naturally want the energy sector stakeholders to share their information maximally.  Such 
a practice would improve cybersecurity for all group members by highlighting threats and 
tangentially act as a source of information it could use to enhance national security in other 
areas.  The government would simultaneously want to retain its classified data to avoid 
compromise to intelligence activities despite the ability to help mitigate the threat [105].   
Conversely, the private energy sector stakeholders would naturally want the government 
to provide as much intelligence as possible to enable them to respond better.  However, they 
would simultaneously want to retain any information surrounding a cyber incident, which could 
damage their reputation as a provider or vendor.  Further, NERC Critical Infrastructure 
Protection regulations require a certain level of cybersecurity, and such an incident could also 
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result in a fine.  Additionally, sharing information amongst private sectors competitors, a vendor 
could run afoul of anti-trust laws or divulge valuable intellectual property. 
2.2.4.2 Cybersecurity as an Interdependent Security Problem 
Moore (2010) posits that externalities stemming from insecurity, interdependent security, 
and free-riding externalities collectively represent the primary economic barriers that inhibit 
investment in cybersecurity and much work has been dedicated to understanding cybersecurity 
investment strategy, [104], [127], [128], [129], [130].  These can be directly translated into 
barriers to an effective cyber response but must be contextualized. 
A variety of authors, including Anderson (2001) and (2002), Varian (2001), Kunreuther 
and Heal (2003) and Heal and Kunreuther (2004), have framed the problems associated with 
cybersecurity in terms of economics.  In their seminal works on security in networks, such as 
electrical grid control systems, they classify these externalities into a set called interdependent 
security problems [129].  Specifically, Varian (2000) first describes the problem of insecurity, as 
illustrated when a cyberattack using a botnet launched from a university’s network attacks a 
major internet company’s network.  The university suffers little from the infection, but the 
company’s costs are severe [131].  In later work (2001), he demonstrates that when security is 
dependent on the weakest link (one who invests least in cybersecurity), that firm determines the 
security of everyone else.  In turn, he shows that the result is that those that do not participate 
will receive the advantages of everyone else’s investments regardless, and a free rider problem 
results  [130].   
More generally, Kunreuther and Heal (2003) contend that these problems share a 
common trait, namely that a utility’s decision to invest (or not) in security will impact other 
utilities’ welfare and incentives to invest.  They model firms’ security investment incentives and 
apply them to the Prisoner’s Dilemma [129].  Later Rowe and Gallaher (2006) provide an 
empirical analysis that supports the same conclusion [127].  The research shows that for 
interdependent, complex systems like cybersecurity of the electrical grid, utility’s investment in 
cybersecurity improves others’ security and disincentivizes others from investing in their own 
[128].  The authors do provide more generalized models for a variety of situations where firms 
cost and benefits are not congruent with a range of implications, including suboptimal 
investment in cybersecurity rather than a complete lack.  Similarly, Gordon et al. (2015) present 
an economic model that demonstrates that firms’ socially optimal cybersecurity investment rises 
to by no more than 37% of the loss of a cybersecurity breach and that underinvestment is 
“essentially a given” [132, p. 29].  These researchers conclude that stronger incentives are 
needed to reach a higher level of investment.   
Further, Honeyman, Schwartz, and Van Assche (2007) assert that collaboration between 
cybersecurity vendors and ICS vendors to provide better products is inherently disadvantageous 
[94].  The authors show that due to the inability of firms, e.g., electrical utility operator, to 
quickly identify the source of failures in their control system environment and distinguish 
between a fault in a control system and a failure in cybersecurity systems, i.e., caused by a 
cyberattack, results in free-riding problems.  Further, utilities may find the financial burden of 
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determining the source of failures or distinguishing it from a cyberattack to be prohibitive.  
Ultimately, the reliability and security of the utility’s control system suffer [94]. 
2.2.4.3 Economic Factor Analysis 
High barriers to trust characterize the cybersecurity industry and, for similar but separate 
reasons, the electricity sector, [133].  Because of the underlying risks, the severity of 
consequences, and misinformation, stakeholders have developed skepticism in the processes, 
products, services, and other stakeholders that make up the sector.  Matching cyber response 
investments with realistic risks, collaboration among stakeholders, prioritization, and pooling of 
limited resources, and information sharing among others are necessary to effectively mount a 
response to a widespread attack and rely upon trust. 
Likewise, the interdependent security problem, applied to the cyber response 
mechanisms, indicates that changes to the electricity sector’s cyber response mechanisms would 
have to overcome barriers caused by interdependent security externalities.  For example, Gordon, 
Loeb, and Lucyshyn (2003) apply this concept to ISACs and ISAOs, demonstrate the 
ineffectiveness of voluntary, collaborative organizations and contend that incentives are needed 
to reach the optimal level of participation [134].  Thus, the electricity sector is not intrinsically 
motivated to invest in cyber resilience to an optimal level, and current mechanisms and potential 
improvements to them must encourage participation through incentivization.   
2.2.5 Technology Factor 
Technology is both a key enabler of and a hurdle to increased cybersecurity and better 
response mechanisms in nearly every sector, including electricity.  Advances in technology 
increase the ability to achieve greater cybersecurity because of advancements, such as network 
monitoring.  Conversely, by its nature, new technology, such as smart grid systems, which make 
the system more efficient to operate and potentially improve the electricity market, introduce 
new cyber vulnerabilities. 
Many critical infrastructure sectors are particularly susceptible to this dynamic because 
the cybersecurity of their industrial control systems has only relatively recently become the 
target of cyber-aggressors.  Combined with aging systems and electricity grid assets with 
relatively long lifetimes, the maturity and capabilities of cyber resilience in the electricity sector 
are behind that of other sectors.  Vulnerabilities introduced by a globalized supply chain have 
also recently come to light and become a source of scrutiny of the sector’s cybersecurity posture.  
The use and impact of cybersecurity technology and tools for utilities also demonstrate the 
challenges the sector phases when formulating appropriate response mechanisms for a large-
scale attack. 
2.2.5.1 Physical Infrastructure of the Electric Grid and its Role in Cybersecurity 
The electrical grid is geographically dispersed across the entire North American continent 
and composed of 200,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines, 55,0000 substations, and 5.5 
million miles of distribution lines [49].  Even though these are purely physical components of the 
power grid, the complexity of the infrastructure and its interdependence with digital systems 
52 
contributes to the vulnerabilities of the system.  Referred to as cyber-physical systems, treating 
the physical systems separately from the digital is difficult when examining their cybersecurity.  
However, the physical architecture of the grid is the driver for the creation of its digital systems.  
It almost exclusively dictates the requirements for digital systems performance, how they are 
designed and operated, and, consequently, how secure the grid is from cyber threats. 
Few grid components are physically supervised or monitored, and the grid operates over 
a large geographic area.  Therefore, electrical grid operation relies upon automation, remote 
control, and data acquisition technologies.  The decentralization of physical components and 
their control systems create innumerable physical access points for cyber-aggressors to leverage 
to gain access to networks or exploit the reliance on remote monitoring [110].   
At a grid-wide scale, as alluded to in section 2.2.4.2, the interdependent network of 
power transmission through interconnections and the increasingly networked configuration of 
generation and distribution systems also represent a vulnerability to the entire grid.  Because the 
grid architecture has been established to enable utilities to support one another, a cyberattack on 
one utility can have consequences for the supporting utilities.  Likewise, an attack on a 
generation plant can have consequences on transmission and distribution systems [6], [135]. 
In the past, the components of electrical systems could be treated independently, or at 
least, constructed, operated, improved, and maintained without the level of planning required of 
today’s complex power grid, and the industry has recognized the need to take a systems of 
systems approach towards grid architecture [13], [136] [137].  However, traditional mindsets 
regarding cybersecurity of the complex systems continue to prevail.   
Part of the reason for the stall in adopting a better cybersecurity technology is the age and 
cost of electrical equipment.  Seventy percent of transmission systems components, i.e., power 
lines and transformers, are over 25 years, and the average age of generation plants is over 30 
[138].  Naturally, most of the digital systems that operate and support them are of similar ages 
and come from a time before cyber threats to the grid were capable.  Previously, the security of 
these cyber-physical systems took advantage of their unique, proprietary nature or lack of 
interconnectivity with other devices and the internet.   
Complete replacement of both physical, and consequently their digital systems, before 
the end of their useful life, was and remains cost prohibitive.  Therefore, as control systems have 
advanced, utilities have added layers to these legacy systems, incrementally increasing efficiency 
and security [139].  As these systems become increasingly interconnected to more advanced 
devices added for greater electricity sector efficiency, however, the legacy systems, which may 
no longer be supported by their manufacturer, become easily exploitable targets for cyber-
aggressors [65].   
2.2.5.2 Digital Technologies and Their Role in the Electricity Sector Cybersecurity 
The cybersecurity of the grid is, obviously, not purely driven by the physical 
infrastructure, and as its digital systems have advanced in capability, so too has its need for and 
ability to provide cybersecurity. 
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The role of digital technologies in the electricity sector almost exclusively follows the 
evolution of the introduction of automation into the electricity grid.  The very first automated 
systems were installed to control generation and transmission of newly interconnected grids in 
the 1930s.  Over the last 90 years, industrial control systems (ICS) has evolved to include 
advanced OT such as Supervisory Control & Data Acquisition (SCADA), Energy Management 
Systems (EMS), and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs).  These key technologies managed 
nearly all aspects of grid operations, including remote control of breakers, monitoring of alarms 
located distant substations, control generation plants over a wide geographic area, and 
transmission of electricity between regions [140].   
Likewise, the impact of ICS on the cybersecurity of the grid follows the evolution of ICS 
capability and can be traced to cyberattacks on natural gas plants, electric utilities, and 
telecommunications systems in the early 2000s.  ICS cyber vulnerabilities truly came to the 
forefront of the electric sector and critical infrastructure protection in 2008.  In January of that 
year, the Federal Government reported that multiple U.S. utility companies had been extorted by 
the threat of cyberattack from foreign entities and that many non-U.S. utility companies had 
actually been cyberattacked resulting in power disruptions [140].   
In addition to varying ages of equipment and ICS systems within the grid mentioned in 
the previous section, many ICS vendors typically utilize proprietary software.  While initially a 
benefit to legacy systems’ security, proprietary ICS created significant difficulty for the utility 
operators who had to deploy, operate, maintain multiple variants of ICSs and digital systems 
operating on the network [141], [140].  As the proprietary ICS proliferated on the network, 
International Society of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) led an effort to standardize 
the ICS environment to increase interoperability between electricity system components.   
However, the standards that IEEE championed still did not mature at a time when 
cybersecurity was an issue.  Due to their low security and commonality among the majority of 
networks, standard protocols eroded the “unique” nature of proprietary systems and made it 
easier for cyber-aggressors to exploit [65], [140].  Distributed Network Protocol version 3 
(DNP3), International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 60870-5-101 and Modbus, for 
instance, are used widely throughout the power system but could be used to access utilities’ ICSs 
[65].  In aggregate, as ICS reached increased levels of sophistication and integration with the 
physical systems of industrial plants, they became prime targets for cyber-aggressors.   
2.2.5.3 Convergence of Information Technology and Operational Technology 
Once separate networks, IT and OT systems have become increasingly connected.  
Initially, OT systems were purpose-built, proprietary, and highly-specialized to achieve the level 
of capability required to operate the grid and were characteristics not found in early IT systems.  
Much like the physical plant equipment, OT systems were the domain of engineers and system 
operators, not IT professionals, and were used to control all facets of the grid. 
However, as IT systems leaped forward in capability, became less expensive, and 
generally ubiquitous, the value of integrating IT and OT emerged.  The convergence of these two 
networks was initially prompted by the requirement for OT systems to help achieve increased 
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competitiveness in the marketplace.  Specifically, utilities wanted to expand capabilities for OT 
data generation, including “billing, customer service, forecasting, and other responsibilities” [79, 
p. 9].  Even newer technologies and concepts, such as Smart Grid, have increased the integration 
of these systems. 
IT standards are now being used on OT devices and systems to increase compatibility 
with less expensive IT hardware integrated into the OT environment [142].  As older proprietary 
OT system components are phasing out, standard processors, e.g., Intel, and operating systems, 
e.g., Windows, are being incorporated [143].  In addition to increased efficiency from easily 
operated and interoperable components, combining the networks also realizes cost savings in 
bulk pricing from operating and maintaining standardized networks.  Nonetheless, the 
convergence between the systems produces increased attack vectors for cyber-aggressors.  Figure 
2.14 reveals how threat vectors, shown in gray, have increased as the electricity sector has 
become more digitized, and the IT and OT systems converge [3, p. 5].  The figure also implies 
that cybersecurity of the grid will continue to become more complicated and attacks more likely 
as connected network devices multiply and cultural and human issues more strongly influence 
the security of systems. 
 
Figure 2.14: Electric Utility Cyberattack Vectors due to IT/OT Convergence 
2.2.5.4 The Smart Grid and Cybersecurity 
As the IT and OT systems have converged in many electric utilities’ operating models, 
the merger has enabled drastic advancements in the management and capabilities of the grid to 
provide reliable, renewable, high quality, and less expensive electricity.  Collectively, these 
advancements have become vital components of the Federal Government’s initiative to 
modernize the power grid and are referred to as the smart grid [144].   
Under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, NIST is charged with 
developing the smart grid standards and protocols, including cybersecurity guidelines [85].  
NIST defines seven domains, each of which encompasses the roles, services, and requirements 
that enable the functionality of the smart grid [85], [145].  The seven domains are shown in 
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Figure 2.15 and demonstrate the interconnected nature of the various systems associated with 
each domain [85, p. 128].   
 
Figure 2.15: NIST Conceptual Model of the Seven Smart Grid Domains 
The implications for cybersecurity are enormous.  From the conceptual model, the radical 
shift in the electricity sector and its cybersecurity may not be apparent.  Instead, Figure 2.16 
shows more succinctly the required changes to legacy electricity sector systems as the grid 
becomes smarter [85, p. 139]. 
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Figure 2.16: Model of Legacy Electricity Sector Systems Mapped onto NIST’s Smart Grid 
Domains 
An in-depth description of all smart-grid technologies and systems is outside the scope of 
this paper, but the summary of critical technologies that follows provides insight into how new 
are affecting the cybersecurity of the grid [85]. 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) 
AMI provides real-time monitoring of energy consumption for commercial, industrial, 
and residential consumers.  These “smart meters” communicate between consumers, utility 
providers, and other third parties, and using meter data management systems (MDMS), advanced 
capabilities, such as enable demand response, can be realized. 
Demand Response 
Programs established between utilities and consumers wherein consumers reduce energy 
consumption during peak times or when reliability is at risk in exchange for a level of 
compensation.  Demand Response Management Systems (DRMS) ties together AMI, MDMS, 
and other IT/OT systems to provide levels of automation to control enrolled consumers assets, 
transmit and collect data on loads, perform measurement and verification to establish 
compensation, among others. 
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) 
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DERs in the form of solar, small generators, or combined heat and power (CHP) have 
existed in as local generation sources in the grid for decades.  Due to recent advances in 
technology and government energy policies, DERs have reached a high level of penetration into 
power grids, causing utilities to reconsider the most effective means to manage their place within 
the grid [146].  Benefits of DER penetration include aggregation into virtual power plants, 
creation of capacity and ancillary service markets to increase grid reliability, and the creation of 
microgrids that can operate as an island when the larger grid is disrupted [85].  Distribution 
Energy Resource Management Systems (DERMS) are those automated and digital systems that 
enable the benefits from DERs to be realized. 
Distribution Management System (DMS) 
As major physical components of the BPS and distribution systems are upgraded, 
improved with smart devices, and networked, DMS provides wide-area situational awareness of 
grid components and performance using data from DERMS, MDMS, Distribution SCADA, and 
other systems that utilities use to operate their systems and manage their enterprise such as 
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) and Outage Management Systems (OMS) [85]. 
All of these systems are increasingly incorporated into electric utilities’ operating models, 
and as technology continues to develop, these systems will likely add capability but also 
complexity.  The requirement for physical infrastructure and network capabilities in order to for 
them to operate correctly, and as previously explained, the convergence of IT and OT systems, 
old and new systems, and advanced technologies create significant cyber vulnerabilities. 
2.2.5.5 Supply Chain Issues 
Past cyber incidents have been perpetrated as utilities installed or connected new devices 
which were delivered with cyber compromises already installed [140].  In recent years, the risks 
associated with OT and IT supply chain have come to the forefront as one of the most significant 
cyber threat vectors to the electricity grid.  As these systems increase in complexity, vendors are 
increasingly reliant upon multiple third-party manufacturers spread across multiple countries to 
design, assemble, and deliver a single product.  Supply chain risk is significant enough that in 
2016 FERC issued Order No. 829 for NERC to develop reliability standards that addressed 
supply chain risk management and approved them in Order No. 850 in October of that same year 
[147], [148].  FERC cited that cyber supply chain risk could arise from: 
[I]nsertion of counterfeits, unauthorized production, tampering, theft, insertion of 
malicious software and hardware, and poor manufacturing and development 
processes.  Even well-designed products may have malicious components 
introduced in the supply chain, and it may prove difficult to identify these 
components before they are deployed [149, p. 1]. 
To counter the new threat vector, NERC and the electricity sector have responded with a 
profusion of best practices and techniques to mitigate the risk posed from the supply chain [142], 
[148], [149].   
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2.2.5.6 Cybersecurity Technologies for the Grid 
Further adding to the challenge of eliminating malware vulnerabilities and potentially 
inhibiting effective cyber response is the status of cybersecurity technology in the electricity 
sector.  Investment in cybersecurity technologies for ICS in the electricity sector follows the risk 
management frameworks outline in section 2.2.2.4.  Technologies and tools include data diodes, 
encryption, firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention systems, malware and anti-virus 
software, and vulnerability assessment tools.  Managed security service providers (MSSP) also 
provide tiered services that include constant monitoring, evaluation, response, and forensics 
using these technologies [82]. 
While the technologies have proven to increase the cybersecurity of ICS, they also 
contribute to information asymmetries present in the sector.  Many utilities must use multiple 
cybersecurity systems and manufacturers throughout their network.  Each of these must be 
managed, monitored, and updated appropriately.  Even with some measures in place, utility 
owners and operators question if they have sufficient defenses or, conversely, have misplaced 
confidence in the cybersecurity of their systems [126], [125].  Further analysis of these 
technologies and their effect on the electricity sector’s cyber response is presented in Chapter 4. 
2.2.5.7 Technology Factor Analysis 
The electricity sector’s adoption of new technologies into their ICS environments brings 
added vulnerabilities and new threat vectors too numerous to go into detail here.  In summary, 
Glenn et al. (2016) put it best: 
The growing presence of so many peripheral components and expanded 
interconnectedness and interdependence of systems used by utilities in 
conjunction with or to add capabilities to their production control systems has 
contributed to the changing nature of cyber attacks against the energy sector [65, 
p. 14]. 
Further, unlike purely digital or information systems which most often seek to capture 
data, cyberattacks most frequently target the disruption of the grid’s cyber-physical elements.  As 
such, coordinating an attack on complex cyber-physical systems such as the electricity grid is 
substantially more complicated than one on an IT system, but the severity of the consequences, 
which can include injury and equipment damage, is also higher.  The required sophistication of a 
cyberattack also means that the cyber response must be equally, or more sophisticated, to be 
effective [65]. 
The introduction of standard, non-proprietary components provides cyber-aggressors 
with commercially available, familiar, and easily exploitable attack vectors.  The proliferation of 
new networked devices on ICS increases the difficulty of keeping track of connectivity, and the 
use of legacy systems with them compounds the difficulty of determining a system’s 
vulnerabilities, diagnosing cyber incidents, and responding accordingly.   
The rapid pace of change in IT systems is asynchronous with capital intensive ICS and 
OT systems.  IT life-cycles are measured in years, whereas OT systems are measured in decades.  
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Maintaining the compatibility and cybersecurity of OT firmware on perhaps hundreds of devices 
on a utility’s network is all the more difficult and costly. 
Additionally, the integration of IT and OT systems has not been followed by equal 
integration in the career fields.  Even as the networks are interconnected and would be difficult 
to separate, IT and OT professionals may be unfamiliar with the operation and cybersecurity of 
devices and software on their networks.  The lack of familiarity with network configuration is 
compounded by the relative separation of IT professionals in one department and OT engineers 
and operators in another.  Vulnerabilities “due to misconfiguration, poor administration, lack of 
perimeter awareness, communication shortcomings, among others,” arise as a result [65, p. 12]. 
Interconnectivity with each other is the foundation of smart grid technologies.  While the 
smart grid capabilities increase efficiencies and provide benefits as outlined above, it also 
drastically increases the cyber threat surface.  Billions of new sensors, most of which will be 
outside of utilities’ firewalls and other cybersecurity measures, will be installed each year to 
enable smart grid functions and modernize the electric power system.  Likewise, as the grid 
continues to modernize and grow, technology advances, and competition for electricity system 
components increases, the supply chain risk for the billions of additions will grow as well. 
Finally, risk management strategies in the electricity sector favor flexibility to allow 
utilities to navigate the complicated regulatory environment and tailor investments to their 
resource and capability constraints.  However, the lack of regulations which require utilities to 
apply tested technologies and continually seek enhancement of their cybersecurity postures leads 
to degraded security across the sector.  No technology or set of technologies can completely 
mitigate risks, and investments to reduce risk to that degree would be prohibitive.  Still, 
sufficient evidence exists which suggests that the sector chronically underinvests in technologies, 
such as intrusion detection systems, capabilities, such as whitelisting, and services, such as 
response and forensic capabilities, that demonstrate the need for clear but mandatory 
cybersecurity requirements. 
2.2.6 Market Factor 
2.2.6.1 Wholesale Power Market and Cybersecurity 
The wholesale power market has already been discussed within the regulatory context in 
section 2.2.2.  However, it is worth noting that while bulk generation of electricity is competitive 
within market participants, usually overseen by RTOs or ISOs, many other features, particularly 
distribution and transmission services, are mostly non-competitive due to their natural monopoly 
over a geographical area.  The lack of competition has two main effects on the cybersecurity of 
the U.S. electricity sector.   
First, utilities are generally more willing to work together to address mutual challenges 
by pooling or exchanging resources, advocating for policy, and sharing best practices.  A good 
example is the ESCC’s Cyber Mutual Assistance (CMA) program in which participating utilities 
agree to share services, personnel, and equipment in response to a cyber incident [150].   
Second, as discussed in section 2.2.2.4, the lack of market competition between 
electricity providers may mean that utilities, particularly ones that do not fall under NERC CIP 
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regulations, are not directly incentivized to invest in cybersecurity.  Because consumers cannot 
switch between utilities due to the electricity companies’ natural monopoly, there is no incentive 
for companies to provide better, more reliable service than other competitors.  If competition 
existed, utilities might fear loss of revenue from customers switching to more reliable and cyber 
resilient providers [80].  More specifically, a distribution utility might not invest in cybersecurity 
measures to a level that corresponds to the risks it faces.  Regulatory fines or loss of business to a 
competitor following a cyber incident is not a motivating factor for a distribution utility, and it 
may even be able to pass along the cost of the attack to its customers through increased 
electricity rates. 
2.2.6.2 Transactive Energy 
Smart grid technology, as described in section 2.2.5.4, directly enables transactive energy 
markets.  Unlike the traditional single flow of power from the utility to consumer, transactive 
energy harnesses DERs, ADMS and other smart grid technologies to enable the buying and 
selling of electricity and direct control of loads between end consumers and utilities [151].  
Figure 2.17 is the transactive energy conceptual model developed by GridWise, the entity that 
the DOE chartered to “enable all elements of the electric system to interact,” that demonstrates 
the complexity of the transforming electricity market [151, p. v], [152]. 
 
Figure 2.17: Interactions of Transactive Energy at the Transmission, Generation, 
Distribution, and Consumer Levels 
The formation of GridWise and the penetration of smart grid devices demonstrates that 
the commitment towards adopting the transactive energy market is apparent and unavoidable 
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[151].  The IEEE Power & Energy Society Smart Buildings, Loads and Customer Systems 
working group called Meshing Smart Grid Interoperability Standards to Enable Transactive 
Energy Networks is another such example [153].  
However, the implications for cybersecurity of the power grid cannot be overstated, and a 
literature review reveals that most current research focuses on the control systems and 
infrastructure aspect of the management systems [154].  Krishnan et al. (2018) reviewed multiple 
approaches for transactive energy to take shape and demonstrated ways for smart devices to 
encounter a cyberattack.  Balda et al. (2017) perform a similar review of transactive energy’s 
impact on the cybersecurity of electronics that support it and make the case that new solutions 
comprising “both hardware- and software-based mechanisms providing many layers of defense 
against cyberattack” are required [155, p. 42].   
2.2.6.3 Market Factor Analysis 
Based on interviews with key stakeholders, the wholesale power market, and specifically, 
the RTOs and ISOs in it, have started to recognize the role of market mechanisms to encourage 
proper cybersecurity investments.  However, they remain without explicit support from 
regulatory bodies.  In other markets, such as in the U.K., market mechanisms are used to 
encourage greater cybersecurity investment by allowing cost recovery and providing allowances 
for cyber resilience investments [156].   
Additionally, the cooperative advantages of the non-competitive electricity markets have 
proven to work well for natural disasters.  During Hurricanes Katrina and Sandy, for example, 
tens of thousands of restoration workers from unaffected utilities were quickly sent to repair 
downed systems.  By nature, however, cyberattacks do not have geographic boundaries, and in 
those circumstances, it would be difficult for companies to determine if they were under attack or 
in danger of an imminent.  The willingness to commit resources in another utility’s response in 
the face of such uncertainty would likely be very low [157]. 
Finally, the overwhelming trend towards transactive energy is a complete paradigm shift 
in the energy market, and the impact will resound through every facet of the electricity subsector.  
Given the potential for extreme changes in profit, regulations, and investments, cybersecurity 
might become deprioritized or not properly incorporated as the market develops.  Indeed, the 
GridWise Architecture Council’s Transactive Energy Systems Research, Development and 
Deployment Roadmap (2018) fails to mention cybersecurity as a priority issue for its “Physical 
and Cyber Technologies and Infrastructure” track [158].  The work of Balda et al. (2017) and 
Krishnan, et al. (2018), however, implies that cybersecurity of these systems cannot be an 
afterthought, and must happen concurrently with the re-architecting and redesigning of the 
systems that support transactive energy.  Given the shortage of research in the area, it is evident 
that cyberattacks may be likelier during the initial stages of the shift to transactive energy. 
2.3 Motivations for Change 
The need for better cyber resilience in the electricity sector is evident from the landscape 
analysis.  However, the need exists to emphasize improved cyber response mechanisms, 
distinguished from other capabilities in the cybersecurity framework, such as preventative 
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capabilities, which tend to supplant investments in cyber response.  This thesis uses force field 
analysis, first proposed by Lewin (1951) and widely applied across multiple industries, to 
understand the forces that can drive change in response mechanisms and those drivers that 
restrain it [159], [160]. 
2.3.1 Force Field Analysis 
The force field analysis depicted in Table 2-1 consolidates the analyses of the factors 
described in section 2.2 and results from key stakeholder interviews.  The drivers are presented 
without priority and only according to the order in which the factors were explored.  The drivers 
for change identify the problems and opportunities that motivate changing the cyber response 
mechanisms.  Drivers against change are those factors that are barriers to change or indicate that 
change may not be necessary.  Where similar problems existing in both categories, they are 
juxtaposed in Table 2-1. 
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Table 2-1: Force Field Analysis of the Drivers For and Against Changing the Cyber 
Response Mechanisms in the Electricity Sector 








Rapidly increasing cyber-aggressor capabilities Confidence that cyber-aggressor capabilities can 
be defended against 
Lower requirement for resources as malware 
increases in capability and becomes more 
accessible 
Confidence that cyber-aggressors require 
significant resources to attack 
Increased likelihood of an "accidental" 
cyberattack caused by cyber-aggressor testing in 
complex ICS environment 
Confidence that cyber-aggressors' motivations 
support nation-state actions and a widespread 
attack would only be executed as a declaration of 
war or another major international incident 
Complex regulatory environment that diminishes 
the ability to achieve consistent cyber resilience 
standards and drives towards compliance-based 
cybersecurity 
Confidence that regulatory compliance means a 
system is "cybersecure" 
 
Lack of experienced, qualified cybersecurity 
workforce with ICS specialty in both public and 
private sectors  







Importance of reliable, resilient power to the U.S. 
economy and public welfare 
 
Increased Federal oversight or partial 
nationalization of electricity systems 
 
Recognition in Federal Government that past 
strategies are no longer sufficient 
Lack of clear insight into the role of the Federal 










High barriers to trust between electricity sector 
stakeholders  
Lack of incentives to cooperate, collaborate, and 
invest in cyber resilience and cyber response  
Paradigm shifting in the regulatory environment 
between risk-based & rules-based cybersecurity 
approaches  
Unknown costs to increase the cyber resilience of 









 Product evolution of IEDs, ICS, & IT/OT systems 
 
A mix of legacy and new systems in grid that 
creates unknown vulnerabilities 
 
Rapid convergence of IT/OT technologies 
 
Proliferation of smart grid technologies 
 
 
Confidence in continually evolving and 






Recognition by BPS operators of need for market 




Confidence in untested cyber mutual assistance 
programs based on dissimilar disaster mutual 
assistance programs 
Confidence in inevitable adoption of transactive 
energy markets which require orders of 
magnitude more cyber-physical infrastructure and 
create corresponding vulnerabilities  
Focus on control systems technology to enable 
transactive energy market without incorporating 
cybersecurity as a priority 
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A few trends emerge from studying the force field analysis.  First, almost all of the 
drivers against change can be framed to indirectly create vulnerabilities which, in turn, become a 
driver for increasing cyber respond mechanisms.  For example, a lack of experienced, qualified 
cybersecurity workforce with ICS specialty in both public and private sectors is a driver against 
change because it limits the ability of the sectors to identify cyber resilience issues and have 
advocacy for improving cyber response mechanisms, among others.  However, the lack of 
cybersecurity personnel may also lead to the creation of vulnerabilities in misconfigured IT/OT 
systems, suboptimal investment in cybersecurity technologies, or a weak culture of 
cybersecurity, and ultimately, cyber response mechanisms (perhaps even more resource-
intensive ones) are needed to counteract the reinforcing behavior of vulnerability creation.  To 
fully explore the impact of this reinforcing behavior on cyber response mechanisms, it is 
necessary to account for other influences. 
Another trend that emerges from the force field analysis is that many of the drivers 
against change are informational.  Specifically, they are based on widely-held (but not 
universally-held) perceptions on the state of cybersecurity and cyber response in the electricity 
sector.  This further implies that information asymmetries deeply influence the behavior of the 
sector. 
Together, these trends begin to depict critical system dynamic of the electricity sector.  
Namely, the reinforcing behavior of vulnerability creation caused by differing perspectives, the 
accuracy of the information, trust among stakeholders, and other information asymmetries.  
Further examination of the specific effects of this dynamic on current cyber response 
mechanisms is necessary and is discussed in chapter 4. 
2.4 Chapter 2 Summary 
Predictably, analysis of the six factors in this chapter confirms that the electricity sector 
faces the same challenges with cyber resilience as do all other critical infrastructure sectors.  
Comparably, the same challenges apply to all of the “cybersecurity core functions,” i.e., identify, 
protect, detect, respond, and recover [24].  However, these factors affect cyber response 
mechanisms in the electricity sector in unique ways. 
First, the cyber threat analysis demonstrates that a large-scale cyberattack may not be an 
act of war by a nation-state cyber-aggressor.  Instead, as threats and capabilities evolve, 
cyberattacks may become political tools for all types of cyber-aggressors to wield.  Thus, the 
sector must be prepared to respond to a cyberattack as an eventuality. 
Even though a large-scale cyberattack is inevitable, the degree to which it impacts the 
sector is in question.  The nature of grid architecture, reliability, and robustness of cyber 
prevention mechanisms may stymie cyber-aggressors’ ambitions for a catastrophic power failure, 
but the chore becomes determining what impacts to the sector can reasonably be expected and 
how to respond and mitigate them. 
Second, political and regulatory approaches to governing the electricity sector can be 
characterized as passive.  When threats to the electric grid were largely non-cyber related, such 
an approach was feasible and even beneficial.  As cyber threat vectors rapidly evolve and threat 
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surfaces quickly expand, the same approach has become obsolete and must shift from 
encouragement of preventive measures to preparation of robust response mechanisms at the 
regional and sector-wide levels. 
Finally, the information asymmetries that plague the sector’s ability to build cyber 
resilient must be addressed authoritatively.  The current mode of thinking is to create market 
mechanisms that govern cybersecurity.  However, this premise is built upon the assumption that 
cybersecurity practices by utility companies will adapt to minimize risk.  Unfortunately, the 
information disparities discussed in section 2.2.4.1 prevents the market from adjusting 
accordingly.  Reinforcing this behavior, the culture of cybersecurity (discussed in greater detail 
in 4.3.1) has created an environment where stakeholders’ perspectives about the likelihood of an 
attack, definitions of cyber resilience, and proper cybersecurity investments have diverged, 
entrenched themselves, and obstructed adaptions to present-day threats. 
Collectively, these factors reveal the expansive scope of the problem with cyber response 
in the electricity sector and require a broader interpretation of influences on it.  In particular, the 
definition of electricity sector stakeholders exceeds the bounds of traditional definitions.  Thus, a 
thorough stakeholder analysis is necessary to understand why and how to change the sector’s 
cyber response mechanisms. 
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3 Stakeholder Analysis 
As of 2017, there were over 3,300 utilities which provided generation, transmission, and 
distribution to consumers across the U.S.  As one of the most heavily regulated industries in the 
nation, Federal, state, and local governments play a significant role in cyber response 
mechanisms of the electricity subsector.  Additionally, the supply chain that provides physical 
and digital assets and services to utilities make up another critical dimension of the electricity 
sector.  Indeed, there are thousands of stakeholders in the electricity sector most of which have 
distinct perspectives, risk management strategies, resources, capabilities, and requirements when 
it comes to appropriate response mechanisms for a cyberattack at scale. 
This paper asserts that the underlying gaps in the sector’s response mechanisms are 
primarily born from differing perspectives and interests that need to be more fully aligned.  
Whether consensus can be reached on the nature of cyber threats or how to best respond to 
cyberattacks, the fact remains that the diversity of the stakeholder perspectives dramatically 
inhibits the ability for the sector to be able to respond.  Thus, a thorough analysis must be 
performed in order to bring perspectives into the open, find ways to align interests, and 
ultimately, formulate the best cyber response mechanisms. 
Chapter 3 presents the results from stakeholder interviews and open source research on 
electricity sector stakeholders to understand their diversity in the industry.  It applies techniques 
to identify and analyze stakeholder needs for competent individual and sector-wide response to a 
malware attack.  It also identifies which stakeholders can influence and change cyber response 
mechanisms to close any gaps discovered in the analysis. 
3.1 Interview Methodology 
Key stakeholders were identified as those entities which could represent broad categories 
of electricity sector stakeholders and could provide insight on behalf of their peers.  This thesis 
used the categories of stakeholders established in REMEDYS research.  A minimum of three 
stakeholders in each category was identified and contacted for interviews.  Subsequent 
stakeholders were identified through interviews and leveraged relationships built through the 
interview process.  National laboratories, universities, and researchers were combined into a 
single category because they performed the same roles in the electricity sector.  A total of 28 
interviews were conducted with the breakdown and stakeholder description by category listed in 
Table 3-1.  In all cases, interviewees requested to remain anonymous, so perspective gained from 
the interviews is not attributed to a single entity herein. 
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Table 3-1: Initial Categorization for Stakeholder Interviews 






Producers of programs used to operate cyber-physical assets in 
the electricity sector 2 
Utility Companies 
Companies involved in the electricity market, including 
generation, transmission, distribution, and wholesale and retail 
sales of power 
9 
Cybersecurity Companies 
Companies that supply cyber resilience and cyber response 
products and services to utility companies 
2 
National Laboratories, 
Universities, & Researchers 
Organizations that develop frameworks, standards, guidance, 




Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government entities 
who make policy, regulate, and support the electricity sector, 
particularly those in formal government response plans 
10 
It is important to note that this thesis does not assert that the stakeholder analysis is 
complete, and unless tens of thousands of interviews were conducted, a full picture of 
stakeholders’ needs and value propositions could not be formed.  Instead, the stakeholder 
interviews sought to identify trends in the sector that could indicate gaps in its ability to respond 
to a widespread malware attack and direct the research.  Future phases of the REMAED project 
intend to validate the findings of the stakeholder analysis through multi-stakeholder events and 
additional interviews. 
Interviews generally lasted 45-60 minutes and questions focused on the interviewee’s 
perspectives on limited topics, including: 
• Cyber threats to the electricity sector which could have widespread consequences 
• Interviewee’s (or their organization’s) role in electricity sector response mechanisms 
• Current cyber response mechanisms 
• Perceived adequacy, barriers to improvement of, and gaps in current electricity 
sector response mechanisms to large scale malware attacks 
• Potential solutions to close gaps in the sector’s cyber response mechanisms 
3.2 Stakeholder Descriptions and Roles 
The historically fragmented nature of the electricity sector and its sheer size has produced 
a convoluted network of stakeholders.  Deregulation, while arguably improving market 
performance, instigated further fragmentation as each state deregulated in different manners, and 
the effects of deregulation on the industry have yet to arrive at a steady state [161].  As a result, 
many of the roles that comprise grid operation and regulation, as shown in Figure 3.1, may be 
consolidated under one organization in a given geographic area while they may be performed by 
multiple entities in another [13, p. 4.4].  Additionally, past consolidation and the complexity of 
stakeholders has led to conflicts of interest which remain today [162], [163]. 
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Figure 3.1: Electricity Sector Delivery Functions  
What has emerged is a set of electricity sector stakeholders that are broadly characterized 
as decentralized, redundant, and incoherent with heterogeneous business models, interests, and 
priorities for cyber resiliency.  For example, Figure 3.2 is the Electricity Information Sharing and 
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Analysis Center’s (E-ISAC, see below) Grid Exercise (GridEx) IV communications plan which 
reveals the complexity of communicating across the electricity sector’s stakeholders [164, p. 17]. 
 
Figure 3.2: GridEx IV Communications Plan 
The impact of such a complex and complicated ecosystem has diluted the ability to 
achieve industry consensus and form unity of action to increase cybersecurity, particularly cyber 
response, of the grid.  Stakeholder perspectives and their real challenges are central to improving 
cyber resiliency, and this paper builds upon interviews from representative stakeholders to 
include both real and perceived challenges to an effective cyber response. 
To better understand the relationships between stakeholders, especially as it applies to 
cyber resilience, it is necessary to catalog the sector’s stakeholders. The cataloging begins, 
somewhat arbitrarily, with the regulatory bodies because they drive many of the cybersecurity-
related facets of the other stakeholders.  Stakeholders from the initial categories and other 
stakeholders discovered through interviews and research follow in no particular order. 
3.2.1 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
FERC is the independent Federal regulatory agency that: 
• Regulates the transmission and wholesale of electricity in interstate commerce; 
• Protects the reliability of the high voltage interstate transmission system through 
mandatory reliability standards; 
• Monitors and investigates energy markets; 
• Enforces FERC regulatory requirements through imposition of civil penalties and 
other means [165] 
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The Energy Policy Act of 2005 granted FERC the authority to develop and enforce 
reliability standards on the BPS inclusive of cybersecurity standards.  It develops cybersecurity 
requirements through the North American Reliability Corporation (NERC).  FERC has openly 
acknowledged that the drivers of change mentioned above, particularly the incorporation of 
information technologies into grid operations, pose threats to the reliability to the BPS.  Through 
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, FERC coordinates the development and 
adoption of guidelines and standards to address the drivers [166].   
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
The process for incorporating regulatory changes tends to be slow, and there is an 
increasing concern that FERC will not be able to keep pace with how quickly the drivers are 
evolving and being implemented.  Additionally, there is a widely held perception that the 
electricity sector is overregulated, and support for additional regulations, even for the benefit of 
cyber resilience, is generally lacking. 
3.2.2 North American Energy Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
NERC is “a not-for-profit international regulatory authority whose mission is to assure 
the effective and efficient reduction of risks to the reliability and security of the grid” [167].  
NERC was initially established as a voluntary organization by the industry itself to promote the 
reliability of the BPS in Canada, the U.S., and Mexico.  Prompted by the Northeast Blackout of 
2003, FERC designated NERC as the Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) as called out by 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005.  NERC’s status as ERO gave it authority for the following: 
• develops and enforces Reliability Standards;  
• annually assesses seasonal and long‐term reliability;  
• monitors the bulk power system through system awareness;  
• and educates, trains, and certifies industry personnel [167] 
NERC’s Reliability Standards are broken down into 13 categories, as shown in Table 3-2.  
These standards include all of the functions necessary to reliably operate the BPS.  In particular, 
the Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) standards include stringent regulations on the 
cybersecurity of assets and infrastructure that form the power grid.  CIP standards are the 
primary mechanism by which cyber resilience is promoted by NERC.   
Table 3-2: Categories of NERC Reliability Standards for the Bulk Electric Systems of 
North America [76] 
NERC Reliability Standards 
Resource and Demand Balancing Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) 
Communications between BPS entities Emergency Preparedness and Operations 
Facilities Design, Connections, and Maintenance Interchange Scheduling and Coordination 
Interconnection Reliability Operations and 
Coordination 
Modeling, Data, and Analysis  
Personnel Performance, Training, and Qualifications Protection and Control 
Transmission Operations Transmission Planning 
Voltage and Reactive Control  
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Additionally, NERC has identified 16 reliability functions as part of its Reliability 
Functional Model [168].  Recently, NERC has added cybersecurity requirements for nearly all of 
these functions.  NERC also assigns the roles of the responsible party for that function.  As was 
previously mentioned in 3.2, many of these roles are performed by the different entities in 
different areas of the country which adds to the difficulty in identifying consistent requirements 
for cyber response and existing gaps in the ability to respond.  Relevant reliability roles are 
discussed in subsequent sections of this paper. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
There is a perception that CIP standards enforce only a minimal amount of cybersecurity 
protocols on electricity assets.  CIP standards are prescriptive by nature in order to facilitate 
enforcement and in response to regulated entities’ past actions which have interpreted ambiguity 
in the standards to avoid the required investment to comply.  The prescription has the effect of 
disincentivizing compliance above those standards or, in some cases, does not permit higher 
standards of cybersecurity because it does not meet the specific standards.  As with FERC, there 
is a concern that reliability standards will not maintain pace with industry evolution and changes 
in the cyber threat landscape.   
3.2.2.1 Regional Entities 
NERC delegates its ERO authorities to seven Regional Entities, as shown in Figure 3.3, 
which monitor and enforce compliance of reliability standards and, thus, have the mandate to 
enforce cybersecurity-related CIP standards [169].   
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
The regional entities work closely with the BPS operators and reliability coordinators 
within their jurisdiction.  Regional Entities have a more intimate understanding of the unique 
requirements, specific structure of the regional electricity sector, and trusted interpersonal and 
organizational relationships with regional stakeholders. 
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Figure 3.3: Seven NERC Regional Entities  
3.2.2.2 Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) 
According to the NERC website, the E-ISAC: 
• Gathers, analyzes, and shares cyber and physical threat alerts, warnings, 
advisories, notices, and vulnerability assessments security information provided 
by members; 
• Provides an electronic, secure capability for E-ISAC participants to exchange 
and share information on all threats to defend critical infrastructure; 
• Coordinates incident management; 
• Communicates mitigation strategies with stakeholders across sectors; and 
• Serves as a central point of coordination and communication for members [170]. 
Additionally, it collaborates with the Department of Energy and Electricity Subsector 
Coordinating Council to serve “as the primary security communications channel for the 
Electricity Subsector and enhances the subsector's ability to prepare for and respond to cyber and 
physical threats, vulnerabilities, and incidents” [108], [170].  While E-ISAC membership is free, 
it is open only to vetted electricity asset owners and operators and affiliates, government 
partners, and cross-sector entities.  In addition to its stated mission, E-ISAC also conducts the 
biennial Grid Security Exercise (GridEx) which tests individual response plans and coordination 
measures in the event of a reliability failure.  It provides reports to its members and hosts 
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conferences.  It also manages the Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program (CRISP), a 
subscription-based service that allows Pacific Northwest National Lab to monitor BPS 
stakeholders’ networks for potential cyber intrusions and fuses it with threat intelligence.  
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
E-ISAC was formed with separation protocols from NERC and chartered in a way so that 
any information shared with E-ISAC would not be reported to NERC and potentially lead to a 
violation of CIP requirements.  Despite these measures and a concerted effort by E-ISAC, 
industry stakeholders remained distrustful.  This attitude initially slowed E-ISAC participation 
and the speed of incident reporting and information sharing, severely limiting its effectiveness.  
Only recently has E-ISAC begun to overcome the stigma of its attachment to NERC, and the 
dynamic continues to inhibit the speed and effectiveness of information sharing. 
Similarly, GridEx III and IV, held in 2015 and 2017 respectively, revealed capability 
gaps in this response mechanism involving overwhelmed communications systems, difficulty 
integrating recovery resources between the public and private sector, and the challenge of 
prioritizing where to focus recovery efforts [171], [172].  Arguably, these issues arise at the 
limits of E-ISAC’s authority to direct cyber response efforts.  
3.2.3 Reliability Coordinators 
According to the NERC Glossary of Terms, Reliability Coordinators are defined as: 
The entity that is the highest level of authority who is responsible for the Reliable 
Operation of the Bulk Electric System, has the Wide Area view of the Bulk 
Electric System, and has the operating tools, processes and procedures, including 
the authority to prevent or mitigate emergency operating situations in both next-
day analysis and real-time operations [173, p. 26]. 
Per NERC guidelines, they have a requirement to “appropriate security protections for 
cyber assets and physical assets, and their related support systems and data” [168, p. 13].  There 
are 16 reliability coordinators for the regions of North America regulated by NERC, as shown in 
Figure 3.4 [174]. 
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Figure 3.4: NERC Reliability Coordinators  
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Reliability coordinators, perhaps more than any other regulatory entity in the ecosystem, 
can improve cyber resilience and cyber response.  Their roles were explicitly created to handle 
routine, abnormal, and emergency operations of the grid, and during a widespread cyberattack 
would likely be directing many, or perhaps all, response and recovery efforts. 
3.2.4 Regional Transmission Operators / Independent System Operators (RTOs/ISOs) 
Among many other stipulations of FERC 888, electric utilities engaged in electricity 
transmission were required to form operational authority of an electrical power system with the 
responsibility to monitor, coordinate, and control the electricity within their given grid.   
In many cases, ISOs provide open access to their transmission assets independently of 
financial interests, decision-making, and tariff-setting for the use of their equipment.  As shown 
in Figure 3.5, ISOs tend to administer an electrical grid within a single state but often operate in 
multiple states [175].  RTOs are similar to ISOs varying only in that they encompass a broader 
geographic region and have been designated as such by FERC [176], [177].  However, RTOs and 
ISOs do not exist in every region and serve about two-thirds of U.S. consumers [178].  In the 
regions they do exist, they may also have roles as interchange coordinator and balancing 
authority to approve flow of power throughout the grid, as shown in Figure 3.6 [169]. 
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Figure 3.5: RTOs and ISOs in North America 
 
Figure 3.6: NERC Balancing Authorities  
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
76 
Pertinent to cyber resilience, NERC CIP standards significantly impact ISOs and RTOs 
approaches to the grid.  Figure 3.4 reveals that in many instances, RTOs and ISOs serve as 
reliability coordinators in their geographical region.  As such, RTOs and ISOs are in a unique 
position to oversee elements cybersecurity within their region.  Further, their status as not-for-
profit, independent entities and responsibility for grid reliability suggests that their actions are 
focused on balancing cybersecurity with the market forces. 
3.2.5 Investor-Owned Utilities (IOUs) 
Investor-owned utilities are privately held by shareholders or investors, and in many 
cases, these businesses include either or both of the components of electricity distribution and 
generation.  There are approximately 63 investor-owned utilities in the U.S. nearly all of which 
have subsidiaries that serve over 220 million Americans.  Of those 63 utilities, 20 of them 
provide 80% of the generation and distribution to the population they serve.   
Due to IOUs size and interdependence on the BPS, particularly from their power 
generation, NERC CIP standards also apply to them.  However, some investor-owned utilities do 
not own generation assets or are sufficiently small so as not to need to comply with CIP 
standards. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Compared to Publicly Owned Utilities and Cooperative Utilities, IOUs tend to have the 
resources necessary to invest in cybersecurity measures and are motivated to invest because they 
profit from the provision of reliable service.  In turn, the largest IOUs invest in research and 
development, have large, dedicated cybersecurity staff, and employ leading-edge cybersecurity 
measures.  They often can extend cyber resilience programs to smaller utilities that engage with 
them.  Nonetheless, cybersecurity investments remain a cost center for their business model, a 
cost not currently recoverable in electricity rates allowable under FERC and most public utility 
commissions guidelines [78]. 
3.2.6 Publicly Owned Utilities (POUs) 
In contrast to IOUs, POUs include municipal utilities (munis) and Federal power 
programs, e.g., Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), and are organized at the local levels 
along district, city, county, or another service area.  POUs are often governed by local 
government bodies or specially established commissions.  They are typically smaller than IOUs 
serving between 1,800 and 100,000 customers.  There are approximately 2,000 POUs that 
provide power to 49 million people in the U.S.[179], [180].  Ninety percent of the power 
provided by POUs comes from one-third of the POUs.   
Similar to IOUs, many POUs have transmission and generation assets and must comply 
with NERC reliability and cybersecurity standards.  They also foster cyber resilience by 
extending resources to smaller utilities that might not otherwise be able to afford it. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
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A large portion of POUs do not own assets that trigger NERC regulation.  While POUs 
are motivated to provide reliable power, their smaller size usually limits their ability to invest in 
cyber resilience measures.  Trade associations and joint action agencies fill this void by pooling 
resources between members.   
3.2.6.1 Cooperative Utilities 
Cooperative utilities, or co-ops, are a subset of POUs that usually exist in rural areas 
where IOUs or POUs would likely be unable to sustain service because of the limited customer 
base.  There are nearly 900 co-ops in the U.S., most of which provide distribution with limited 
transmission and generation activities.  Co-ops provide power to 42 million people in the U.S., 
and their mandate is often focused on minimizing the cost of reliable electricity service.  Their 
capital expenditures are usually funded through Federal loans from the Rural Utility Service, and 
operating costs are paid for by members [181].   
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Co-ops represent the least resourced of the types of utilities, which manifests in limited 
staffing, outreach, and advocacy.  These factors inhibit the ability for co-ops to access resources, 
such as information and cybersecurity professionals.  Instead, they rely heavily on pooled 
resources, mutual assistance programs, and, in particular, the National Rural Electric 
Cooperative Association to help formulate cyber response [182]. 
3.2.7 Joint Action Agencies 
Joint action agencies “procure and supply wholesale power and a range of advocacy, 
operational, and business services for groups of POUs, to leverage economies of scale” [179].  
There are over 100 joint action agencies, one in almost every state.  These agencies are often 
deeply involved in CIP compliance and other risk management and reliability issues affecting 
their constituents. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Joint action agencies enjoy mutual trust and strong relationships with their members, 
which facilitates development and implementation of effective cybersecurity measures. 
3.2.8 Power Marketers 
Power marketers obtain status by applying to FERC.  By FERC’s definition, a power 
marketer is a “business entity engaged in buying and selling electricity. Power marketers do not 
usually own generating or transmission facilities. Power marketers, as opposed to brokers, take 
ownership of the electricity and are involved in interstate trade” [183].   
There are hundreds of power marketers engaged in the buying and selling of wholesale 
electricity, and as of 2018, they supplied approximately 21% of the retail electricity in the U.S.  
They provide retail buyers with choices in suppliers of electric power by acting as 
intermediaries, in turn, creating a more competitive marketplace [184], [185]. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
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While not directly involved in cybersecurity or cyber response, power marketers may 
have economic incentive to trade electricity from more cyber resilient sources of power, much as 
they do with renewable energy sources.  
3.2.9 Electricity Consumers 
Electricity consumers are typically separated into residential and industrial segments 
based on the amount of power and energy they consume.  Herein, they will be treated 
equivalently since their interests closely align.   
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Electricity consumers’ roles in the sector as it currently operates is clear.  As DERs, such 
as solar panels and batteries, for example, IoT, and other smart grid technologies mature, the 
electricity sector will become more transactional.  Consumers will become “prosumers” in the 
transactive energy market, capable of selling energy back to the grid, storing locally, and 
controlling demand in real-time among other things.  The effect is presumed to increase the 
reliability of the grid as it decentralizes the sources of generation and reduces reliance on the 
many single points of failure in the larger grid [153].  However, it may simultaneously increase 
the cyber threat surface for the electricity sector, whereby new access points for malware can be 
injected, and the physical characteristics of grid operation may be more easily exploited [186].   
3.2.10 U.S. Federal Government 
In this context, the Federal Government consists of the Executive, Legislative, and 
Judicial branches, as outlined in the U.S. Constitution.  Despite its role as provider for the 
nation’s defense, including critical infrastructure security, the Federal Government has limited 
authority to direct private sector stakeholders or states’ actions during cyber event response.  
However, the Constitution grants the Federal Government the ability to regulate aspects of the 
electricity sector involved with interstate commerce.  Concerning response to a malware attack 
on the electricity sector, 16 U.S. Code § 824o-1. Critical electric infrastructure security grants 
the Secretary of Energy authority to direct BPS operators during a declared emergency caused 
by, in addition to other types of attacks, a cyberattack [91].   
More traditionally, the Executive Branch has been charged with and granted significant 
authority by Congress to enable close partnering with the private sector and deliver significant 
Federal incident response resources, which it does through the Cabinet Departments, advisory 
councils, and other mechanisms that are discussed in Chapter 4. 
The implications of cyberattacks on the Federal Government and for its responsibilities is 
significant, and a good indicator of its responsibilities is the number of agencies and their 
respective cybersecurity roles.  Figure 3.7 indicates the complexity of the nation’s cybersecurity 
and an overview of the roles of the different types of agencies.  Note that none of the agencies 
lead response efforts for cyberattacks, but all provide some level of support to private entities or 
state governments [187]. 
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Figure 3.7: Federal Responsibilities for Cybersecurity 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Under the War Powers Clause, Congress and the President could exert its authority to 
direct private enterprise if the cyber event were declared an act of war, i.e., from a nation-state 
actor [188].  However, this power has not been exercised to date, nor is there any framework that 
governs what would happen in that event.  Subsequently, all subordinate Federal agencies lack 
authority to direct cyber response efforts of private sector stakeholders short of a national 
emergency. 
3.2.11 National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) 
The NIAC was formed by Presidential order in 2001 to advise the President on the 
security of the critical infrastructure sectors and is the only executive council to do so.  Members 
consist of up to 30 senior executives from the different sectors and state, local, tribal, and 
territorial (SLTT) governments who research physical and cyber threats to the critical 
infrastructure, study the impact across sectors, and advise the President of Federal Government 
action [189]. 
3.2.12 Department of Homeland Security (DHS)  
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD)-21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 
assigns DHS the lead role for critical infrastructure security and resilience.  Specifically, DHS 
has the following eight overarching responsibilities: 
1) Identify and prioritize critical infrastructure, considering physical and cyber 
threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences, in coordination with SSAs and 
other Federal departments and agencies; 
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2) Maintain national critical infrastructure centers that shall provide a 
situational awareness capability that includes integrated, actionable 
information about emerging trends, imminent threats, and the status of 
incidents that may impact critical infrastructure; 
3) In coordination with SSAs and other Federal departments and agencies, 
provide analysis, expertise, and other technical assistance to critical 
infrastructure owners and operators and facilitate access to and exchange of 
information and intelligence necessary to strengthen the security and 
resilience of critical infrastructure; 
4) Conduct comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the Nation's 
critical infrastructure in coordination with the SSAs and in collaboration with 
SLTT entities and critical infrastructure owners and operators; 
5) Coordinate Federal Government responses to significant cyber or physical 
incidents affecting critical infrastructure consistent with statutory authorities; 
6) Support the Attorney General and law enforcement agencies with their 
responsibilities to investigate and prosecute threats to and attacks against 
critical infrastructure; 
7) Coordinate with and utilize the expertise of SSAs and other appropriate 
Federal departments and agencies to map geospatially, image, analyze, and 
sort critical infrastructure by employing commercial satellite and airborne 
systems, as well as existing capabilities within other departments and 
agencies; and 
8) Report annually on the status of national critical infrastructure efforts as 
required by statute [27, p. 3].  
In general terms, DHS has the responsibility for national emergency management, 
including cyberattacks on the electricity sector among other natural and human-made disasters.  
Its role in response is heavily focused on delivery government resources and coordinating across 
the government and with the private sector.  DHS has created the National Response Framework 
(NRF), National Incident Management System (NIMS), National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
(NIPP), the NIPP Energy Sector-Specific Plan, and National Cyber Incident Response Plan 
(NCIRP) to facilitate understanding and assign clear roles for stakeholders in order to respond to 
a cyberattack on the electricity sector[117], [190], [191], [192], [32].  DHS executes its 
responsibilities for electricity sector security and resilience through a variety of subordinate 
agencies. 
3.2.12.1 Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 
The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is “the Nation’s risk 
advisor,” replacing the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) in 2018 [193].  
CISA reduces risk to critical infrastructure by identifying risks; disseminating threat, 
vulnerability, and consequence information; developing risk mitigation strategies, and 
overseeing the development of the NIPP [194].  CISA provides support to the electricity through 
two centers described below. 
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3.2.12.2 National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) 
As part of CISA, NCCIC acts as a communications and coordination hub between law 
enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial 
(FSLTT) governments, and private sector owners, operators, and vendors in critical 
infrastructure industries for cyber-related issues.  The NCCIC was created under PPD-21 and 
operates a continuously monitored watch floor to perform the roles of: 
• Responding to and analyzing control systems related incidents 
• Conducting vulnerability, malware, and digital media analysis 
• Providing onsite incident response services  
• Providing situational awareness in the form of actionable intelligence 
• Coordinating the responsible disclosure of vulnerabilities and associated 
mitigations 
• Sharing and coordinating vulnerability information and threat analysis 
through information products and alerts [195, p. 1]. 
Key Perspectives and Insights:  
The evolution of cybersecurity and communications security in the U.S. can be 
traced back to NCCIC’s origins.  This evolution not only parallels the advent of the 
internet and information technology but also corresponds to the increasing integration of 
public and private concerns with the need for cybersecurity.  Figure 3.8 shows the path 
from the National Communications Systems in 1963 to the NCCIC in present-day [196]. 
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Figure 3.8: Evolution of Communications and Cybersecurity in the U.S.  
NCCIC’s incident response capabilities, while essential to an effective cyber 
response, remain untested particularly for cyber events at scale.  There is also a 
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perception that NCCIC will have a limited role in any real-time response.  While it is 
charged with maintaining a common operating picture of a cyber event, the data that 
NCCIC collects during a cyber-attack is limited and unlikely to enable a focused and 
coordinated Federal response.  
3.2.12.3 NCCIC Hunt and Incident Response Team (HIRT) 
HIRT provides free, onsite incident response services to organizations that need them.  
As Figure 3.8 implies, US-CERT and ICS-CERT functions were combined into NCCIC, and 
HIRTs were formed under NCCIC purview.  HIRTs are fly-away teams that can meet with 
affected organizations to respond to cyber events.  HIRTs are perceived to be valuable, 
particularly to under-resourced utilities, but potentially under-skilled to assist with more 
advanced and sophisticated systems that larger utilities operate. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
During a large-scale event, HIRTs’ unique resources and capabilities will be in high 
demand, but its capacity to respond to all affected organizations may not be sufficient.  A 
prioritization mechanism is necessary, which the industry presumes will place the utilities with 
the most extensive affected customer base first, regardless of the internal capability of the 
organization to respond. 
3.2.12.4 National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC) 
In addition to the NCCIC, PPD-21 created the NICC to serve as a “clearinghouse of 
information to receive and synthesize critical infrastructure information and provide that 
information back to decision-makers at all levels to enable rapid, informed decisions in steady 
state, heightened alert, and during incident response” [192, p. 39].  The NICC, in contrast to the 
NCCIC, focuses on physical threats to critical infrastructure, but PPD-21 created an integration 
function between the two centers to ensure proper coordination [192]. 
3.2.12.5 National Operations Center (NOC) 
The NOC functions like the integrated operations center for DHS and comprises five sub-
entities: NOC Watch, Intelligence Watch and Warning, FEMA’s National Watch Center and 
National Response Coordination Center, and the NICC.  It is the central hub for the Federal 
Government and SLTT entities in the event of natural or human-made disasters and ensures 
critical terrorism and disaster-related information is communicated to appropriate government 
officials. 
3.2.12.6 National Risk Management Center (NRMC) 
As part of the CISA, the NRMC plans, analyzes, and collaborates to identify and address 
risks to critical infrastructure [197].  Compared to the NCCIC, the NRMC focuses on future 
threats to critical infrastructure [198].  It partners with DHS, DOE, and the Department of the 
Treasury to work closely with the financial services sector, the communications sector, and the 
electricity sub-sector through the Tri-Sector Executive Working Group. 
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The NRMC plays a critical role in the Joint National Priorities for Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resilience and aims to advance reduction of risk to national critical functions, 
enhance incident response and recovery capabilities, improve information sharing, and protect 
critical infrastructure against nation-state cyber threats [199].   
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
The NRMC has a stated goal of turning identified risks into collective action by 
leveraging PPP.  However, the relatively new organization, which stood up in mid-2018, has 
unproven value but demonstrates a promising capability for the electricity sector [200]. 
3.2.12.7 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
As an agency within the DHS, FEMA is commonly associated with emergency and 
disaster response, and collateral damage and secondary threats to the public from a cyberattack 
would FEMA’s primary concern.  It would also be a key enabler for cyber incident response, for 
instance, by providing backup power to operational facilities, from issues that would arise from a 
prolonged and widespread outage regardless of cause.  However, CISA would maintain the lead 
role for a cyber response that FEMA would typically provide in other types of physical disasters 
and human-made emergencies. 
3.2.13 Department of Energy (DOE) 
The DOE is the sector specific-agency (SSA) for the electricity subsector per PPD-21.  
As such, PPD-21 sets out the DOE’s role regarding critical infrastructure protection: 
1) As part of the broader national effort to strengthen the security and resilience 
of critical infrastructure, coordinate with the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) and other relevant Federal departments and agencies and 
collaborate with critical infrastructure owners and operators, where 
appropriate with independent regulatory agencies, and with SLTT entities, as 
appropriate, to implement this directive; 
2) Serve as a day-to-day Federal interface for the dynamic prioritization and 
coordination of sector-specific activities; 
3) Carry out incident management responsibilities consistent with statutory 
authority and other appropriate policies, directives, or regulations; 
4) Provide, support, or facilitate technical assistance and consultations for that 
sector to identify vulnerabilities and help mitigate incidents, as appropriate; 
and 
5) Support the Secretary of Homeland Security's statutorily required reporting 
requirements by providing on an annual basis sector-specific critical 
infrastructure information [27, p. 4]. 
The DOE executes its SSA mission by investing in cybersecurity initiatives, such as 
REMEDYS, partnering with industry to formulate legislation and standards of practice, hosting 
preparedness and response exercises, such as Liberty Eclipse, and participating in information 
and intelligence fusion with other agencies.   
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3.2.13.1 Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) 
CESER “leads the Department of Energy’s emergency preparedness and coordinated 
response to disruptions to the energy sector, including physical and cyberattacks, natural 
disasters, and man-made events” [201].  CESER’s role in cyber incident response is limited to 
coordination across the government and with the electricity sector and provision of Federal 
resources consistent with the NIPP, NRF, NIMS, and NCIRP [117], [190], [191], [192], [32].  
Specifically, CESER is responsible for Emergency Support Function #12 of the NRF and 
maintains trained emergency responders with technical expertise who can rapidly deploy to 
locations where the electricity sector is being compromised.   
CESER also maintains dedicated personnel at each of FEMA’s regional officers to 
facilitate rapid response and coordinate activities on behalf of the DOE [202]. Along with other 
Federal agencies, CESER conducts training with the private sector to facilitate preparedness and 
communication in the event of a cyber event on the electricity sector. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Because CESER recently emerged from a DOE restructuring, its role in the sector may 
not be fully formed.  However, CESER recently established standing request documents between 
industry partners to facilitate rapid access to critical electrical infrastructure components in the 
event of the response and indicates their increased prioritization of cyber response. 
3.2.13.2 National Laboratories & Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
(FFRDCs) 
Supported by the government, national laboratories and FFRDCs fuse Federal resources, 
particularly funding and intelligence, with dedicated facilities to advance science and 
technology.  The DOE leverages its 17 national labs to directly address the requirements for EDS 
cybersecurity, including performing research on the technical and organizational requirements 
for increasing cyber response capability in the electricity sector.  The National Infrastructure 
Simulation and Analysis Center, for instance, is a combined effort between three of the national 
labs and the DHS to advance research into critical infrastructure issues [203]. 
3.2.14 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
Through its Cyber Division and specially trained cyber squads located at each of the 56 
FBI field offices, the FBI heads the national effort “to address cybercrime in a coordinated and 
cohesive manner” [204].  Within the electricity sector, the FBI strictly performs a law 
enforcement role.  It typically requires forensic analysis of systems immediately following a 
cyber event in order to investigate the crime. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Many in the industry maintain reluctance to partner with the FBI because their 
investigative authorities permit intrusive control of private businesses systems.  Some perceive 
that the FBI might override the need to destroy forensic data in order to respond quickly to a 
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cyber event.  While this is likely accurate when systems need to be erased, rebooted, and 
restored, the industry understands the priority to restore system operation as quickly as possible 
regardless of the potential for evidence destruction. 
Additionally, some electricity sector stakeholders perceive that each FBI field office 
prioritizes cybercrime differently and have varying levels of ability with cyber systems.  These 
perceptions leave stakeholders reluctant to notify the FBI and ask for assistance in response to a 
cyber event. 
3.2.14.1 Cyber Action Team (CAT)  
CATs are the primary unit of action for the FBI to provide a rapid incident response in 
major cyber-related emergencies.  Members of the CAT are located throughout the field offices 
and have specialized training to perform malware analysis and forensic investigations.  Their 
primary focus remains on attributing crimes and catching cybercriminals [204]. 
3.2.14.2 National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) 
NCIJTF is the primary U.S. government agency responsible for coordinating cyber threat 
investigations and liaisons with the intelligence community, DHS, and DOD [117], [205].  Since 
information sharing and intelligence fusion remain one of the most substantial gaps in the EDS, 
the NCIJTF performs a valuable role in the electricity sector.  However, it remains focused on 
“placing cybercriminals behind bars and removing them from the nation’s networks” and 
reinforces the perception that the FBI’s incident response may not prioritize restoration of 
electricity service [204]. 
3.2.14.3 InfraGard 
InfraGard is a partnership between the FBI and members of the private sector that 
promotes public-private information sharing relevant to the protection of critical infrastructure, 
including the electricity sector.  It also provides access to FBI and DHS threat advisories, 
vulnerability assessments, and analytical reports [206], [207].   
3.2.15 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
The FTC is an independent agency of the Federal Government that protects consumers 
and promotes competition.  The FTC has increasingly focused on electricity sector competition 
as deregulation and technology advances have eroded its monopolistic nature.  It also has 
prosecuted companies for failing to maintain reasonable cybersecurity protections for data. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
With the new technologies, such as DERs and IoT, driving the electricity sector towards a 
revolutionary change in the marketplace, i.e., transactive energy, the FTC’s role in protecting 
consumers may grow to encompass cyber resilience [208], [209]. 
3.2.16 Department of Defense (DOD) 
Through its various units, the DoD monitors cyber threat intelligence and performs 
defensive and offensive cyber operations.  The EDS has been designated one the primary targets 
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of nation-state actors, and through NCIJTF and other platforms, the DoD partners with the 
electricity sector to provide information, intelligence, and defensive cyber capabilities. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
However, some in the industry view partnering with the DoD as provoking adversaries 
and increasing the likelihood of cyber-attack. 
3.2.17 State governments 
Similar to the U.S. Federal Government, some state governments retain authority to 
regulate segments of the electricity sector, typically the distribution systems, within their 
jurisdiction, and state constitutions may grant the state governor and legislatures powers like 
those the Federal Government has to regulate the sector. 
State and local governments’ approaches to incident response and cyber resilience are too 
numerous and heterogeneous to describe in sufficient detail, and the variety of the approaches 
and inconsistency of regulation between states contributes to dynamics which negatively affect 
the sector’s cyber response capability.  However, states share many common issues with 
cybersecurity and cyber response [113].  There are a few organizations that all states maintain 
that are relevant to cyber response. 
3.2.17.1 State Chief Information Security Officers (CISO) 
Each of the 50 states has a CISO by statute or executive order.  These professionals 
advocate for cyber resilience measures at the state level. Disconcertingly, a 2018 study found 
that state cyber resilience programs, both internal government operational and external 
regulatory and support functions, are insufficiently resourced and organized to comply with 
Federal and their state regulations [113].   
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Evidence suggests state CISO concerns reflect an increased focus on state-level 
cybersecurity measures inclusive of electricity sector cyber response [113].  However, their 
concerns are not being prioritized, or resources do not exist to implement the measures.   
3.2.17.2 State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers 
According to Masse and Rollins (2007), a fusion center’s value proposition is to 
integrate: 
various streams of information and intelligence, including that flowing from the 
Federal Government, state, local, and tribal governments, as well as the private 
sector, a more accurate picture of risks to people economic infrastructure, and 
communities can be developed and translated into protective action [210, p. ii]. 
In other words, they act as a hub to receive threat information from FSLTT and private 
entities within their area, synthesize it through the lens of their specific environment, and 
disseminate back to the FSLTT and private communities.  The fusion center concept was 
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established in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack as a formalization of the functions that many 
state’s criminal intelligence bureaus conducted which were considered key to combating foreign 
and domestic terrorism [210].  As of 2017, 78 fusion centers exist and provide cyber threat 
information analysis and dissemination throughout their jurisdictions.  However, each state has 
taken individualized approaches to establish and run the fusion centers, and given the variation in 
each state’s resources, criminal focus, physical environment, and political landscape, no two 
fusion centers are alike [210].  
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Fusion centers provide an invaluable resource to the electricity sector but have incurred 
significant criticism since their inception in the early 2000s.  Critics have cited ineffectiveness in 
sharing information, abuse of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties, and ambiguity of authority 
[211], [212], [213]. 
3.2.17.3 National Guard 
National Guard units remain at the disposal of state governors and typically train for 
responding to state-wide disasters.  While some maintain extremely robust cyber defensive and 
offensive capabilities, other states have not invested in their Guards’ personnel, training, and 
resources to develop the capability to respond to a widespread cyberattack. 
3.2.17.4 Public Utility Commissions / Utility Regulatory Commissions / Public Service 
Commissions (PUCs) 
PUCs are governing bodies that regulate the rates and services of electric utilities (almost 
exclusively distribution systems) within their service areas, typically at the state level.  Each state 
and the District of Columbia have a PUC or equivalent.  PUC set many regulations which 
influence the behavior of the electric sector in their state, including cyber resilience and response 
measures.  These regulations vary from state to state and are enforced inconsistently even then 
[214] 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Since distribution systems are outside the purview of NERC, state utility commissions 
provide oversight and regulation for the distribution system within their borders.  In this way, 
they function much like NERC by providing reliability and cybersecurity standards for utilities 
within the state.  However, as one study shows, the perception that PUCs have inadvertently put 
in place barriers to increasing cyber resilience and response measures, specifically in the areas of 
information sharing, cost recovery options, and improvements to system performance.  In total, 
these actions are considered to increase the risk of a cyber event rather than minimize it [215]. 
3.2.17.5 State and Territory Energy Office (SEO) 
The 56 State and Territory Energy Offices generally advise on and advocate for state-
related energy issues, emphasizing energy education; economic development; energy research, 
innovation, and demonstration; and energy legislation and policy [216].  There is no standard 
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model for SEOs, and in many cases, they are subsumed in state utility commissions and 
regulators, environmental quality and protection agencies, or more extensive state government 
departments.  However, they partner closely with DOE and, through state Energy Emergency 
and Assurance Coordinators (EEACs), help respond to energy disruptions or emergencies in 
their respective states.  SEOs work with their respective State Offices of Emergency 
Management to create and execute State Energy Assurance plans to prepare for and enable a 
response to energy emergencies. 
3.2.17.6 State Office Emergency Management (OEM) 
A state OEMs, alternatively named Emergency Management Department, Division, or 
Agency, is the state entity responsible for planning for, responding to, and recovering from 
human-made and natural disasters.  All states, territories, and commonwealths in the U.S. have 
some variant of an OEM.  Unlike FEMA, which is primarily focused on the response to physical 
disasters and emergencies and taking a secondary role to other Federal agencies to respond to 
cyber threats, OEMs are at an appropriate level to combine both cyber and physical emergency 
response.  However, like other government agencies, OEMs focus on providing the necessary 
support to the utility providers rather than outright disaster response as in an emergency with 
physical consequences.  Thus, most OEMs have a critical role in cyber response in the electricity 
sector. 
3.2.18 Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC) 
The ESCC was formed at the recommendation of the National Infrastructure Advisory 
Council (NIAC), DOE, and DHS with support from a group of electricity industry CEOs.  Along 
with the Oil and Natural Gas Subsector Coordinating Council, the ESCC is a component of the 
Energy Sector Coordinating Council that is part of the Sector Partnership Structure (see Chapter 
4).  It includes electricity company CEOs and trade association leaders to represent every 
segment of the industry.  Its stated mission is to serve “as the principal liaison between the 
Federal Government and the Electricity Subsector with the mission of coordinating efforts to 
prepare for and respond to national-level disasters or threats to critical infrastructure” [217, p. 1].  
The ESCC coordinates directly with the Energy Sector Government Coordinating Council 
(EGCC) and other stakeholders, as shown in Figure 3.9 [217, p. 3]. 
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Figure 3.9: ESCC Stakeholders 
The ESCC focus has been to communicate the industry’s perspectives and 
requirements to the dozens of disparate organizations in all branches the Federal 
Government that handle the national response to threats to critical infrastructure.  It does 
this mostly through outreach and coordination in the following areas: 
• Threat Information Sharing: Improve and institutionalize the flow of, and 
access to, actionable information among public- and private-sector 
stakeholders.  
• Industry-Government Coordination: Establish unity of effort and unity of 
messaging between industry and government partners to support the missions 
of the ESCC both during crises and in steady state. 
• Research & Development: Coordinate government and industry efforts on 
strategic infrastructure investments and R&D for resilience and national 
security related products and processes. 
• Cross-Sector Liaisons: Develop strong partnerships at all levels of the 
Electricity, Communications (Telecommunications), Oil and Natural Gas 
(Downstream Gas), Financial Services, Transportation Systems, and Water 
and Wastewater Systems (Water) sectors to plan and respond to major 
incidents, to better understand and protect our mutual dependencies, and to 
share information effectively and efficiently to improve cross-sector 
situational awareness. [217, p. 2] 
Additionally, the ESCC formed the Cyber Mutual Assistance Program (CMA) to 
bring together industry partners and cybersecurity experts to share resources during a 
cyber event. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
ESCC is highly regarded within the industry because of the influence it has been able to 
bring to bear with the Federal Government.  However, there is a perception that ESCC initiatives 
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and information, while valuable to cyber response, take too long to consolidate, gain momentum, 
and trickle down to the industry. 
3.2.19 Energy Sector Government Coordinating Council (EGCC) 
The EGCC is the Federal Government’s counterpart to the ESCC under the Sector 
Partnership Structure.  It serves to “address initiatives to include policy considerations, program 
goals, and communication across government as well as between the government and the private 
sector to support the Nation’s energy security and resilience mission” [218, p. 1].  More 
pointedly, its membership of public power administrators, state energy officials, and ten of the 
Cabinet Departments seek to serve as the single touchpoint between government and private 
sector to address threats to the energy sector.   
3.2.20 Critical Infrastructure Cross-Sector Council 
The Critical Infrastructure Cross-Sector Council is one of four cross-sector councils.  It is 
comprised of the chairs and vice chairs of the Sector Coordinating Councils and serves as a way 
to identifying common and cross-cutting critical infrastructure issues, disseminating best 
practices, and collaborating to enhance the security of their sectors [192]. 
3.2.21 Federal Senior Leadership Council (FSLC) 
The FSLC is the Federal Government’s counterpart to the Critical Infrastructure Cross-
Sector Council.  It comprises officials from the SSAs and other agencies who together develop 
and promote Federal Government programs, policies, and goals within and across sectors [192]. 
3.2.22 State, Local, Tribal, & Territorial Government Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC) 
The SLTTGCC serves as a forum to promote SLTT entities participation in the Federal 
Government’s Sector Partnership Structure.  It coordinates across the different levels of 
government to advance critical infrastructure issues of mutual concern between the Federal 
government and other SLTT entities [192]. 
3.2.23 Regional Consortium Coordinating Council (RC3) 
Much like the SLTTGCC, the RC3 unites existing regional organizations to assist with 
the protection of critical infrastructure across sectors but at the regional level.  It focuses 
fostering awareness and promoting the importance of critical infrastructure protection through 
collaborative activities among its members including, education and communication, 
incorporating incident response and recovery exercises into their outreach programs, identifying 
and disseminating best practices for infrastructure protection [192].  The RC3 currently has 34 
member organizations coming from 47 states and major urban areas [219]. 
3.2.24 Cybersecurity Platforms 
Cybersecurity platforms provide a wide variety of services to the electric sector, 
including threat intelligence, network monitoring, vulnerability assessments, and threat 
modeling, compliance consultation, incident response, forensics, and threat hunting [220], [221].  
Utilities typically hold cybersecurity companies on retainer to provide regular services, or in case 
a cyber incident exceeds internal capacity or expertise.   
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Key Perspectives and Insights: 
There are a limited number of platforms that specialize in industrial control systems and 
the electricity sector.  During a widespread cyberattack, many in the industry expect that the 
platforms will not have the reserve capacity to respond to all affected utilities.  Similar to HIRTs, 
many believe the platforms will respond to the utilities with the most extensive affected customer 
base or the company with the best likelihood of being able to execute a rapid recovery.   
3.2.25 Electrical Equipment Manufacturers & Industrial Control System (ICS) Vendors 
Electrical equipment manufacturers and ICS vendors are limited in number in the U.S.  
Only a few specialized companies provide the majority of equipment to the electricity sector, and 
they have made concerted efforts to upgrade software with innovative cybersecurity features.  
While their equipment includes ICS, they are rarely responsible for installation and configuration 
of the physical and digital networks.  
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
As network malfunctions are usually caused by operational error or physical damage to 
equipment, and network monitoring is not prevalent in the sector, installers and integrators – not 
cybersecurity experts or equipment manufacturers – are the first to respond.  When a cyber-
attack is finally suspected, equipment manufacturers and ICS vendors are typically the last to be 
notified.  Not only does this delay the response and potentially allow attackers to continue 
network penetration, but it also prolongs the diagnosis of the actual cause.  For instance, the 
TRITON attack was caused, in part, by the integration of original equipment manufacturer ICS 
with a safety system [222].   
In sum, electrical equipment manufacturers and ICS vendors believe that not being 
included in network configuration or incident response activities creates vulnerabilities and 
slows the response process.  Further, they are motivated to assist in both efforts because their 
involvement might limit reputational damage from cyber events.  Given the current number of 
noncyber-related incidents, however, such involvement would be cost-prohibitive. 
3.2.26 American Public Power Association (APPA) 
The APPA is a service organization that represents over 2,000 POUs that serve over 49 
million consumers.  Their members also include joint action agencies, rural electric cooperatives, 
and other public power utilizes in the U.S. and Canada.  The APPA provides a venue to leverage 
POUs collectively to support mutual interests and share best practices.  For instance, the 
association offers a variety of programs tailored to their unique needs that they might otherwise 
not be able to afford.  The APPA’s services include employee education and certification, 
reliability, safety, and disaster preparation programs, and news and information publications 
[223], [161]. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
The APPA prioritizes Federal advocacy on legislation that supports its members.  
Specifically, the association routinely advocates before government and regulatory agencies 
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against “one-size-fits-all” policies which are typically focused on larger utilities and fights for 
inclusion in reliability standards development.  The Association perceives federally mandated, 
blanket regulations as obstacles to its members’ abilities to achieve cyber resiliency.   
3.2.27 National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association (NRECA) 
NRECA is another membership organization that “represents over 900 co-ops, public 
power districts, and public utility districts in the United States” [224].  Much like the APPA, 
NRECA offers educational, business, reliability, safety, and disaster preparedness programs in 
addition to serving as a hub to share best practices and leverage common interests for unity of 
action.  Nearly identical associations supporting energy cooperatives exist at the state level.   
Additionally, NRECA created the Rural Cooperative Cybersecurity Capabilities Program 
(RC3) to support cybersecurity among its members.  RC3’s goal is to provide cybersecurity tools 
and resources to co-ops, which typically have few or no information technology or cybersecurity 
personnel and limited access to cybersecurity technology [225]. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
 NRECA shares APPA concerns about Federal policies that inhibit co-ops ability to tailor 
their risk management and cybersecurity measures to its unique geographic, resource, and 
business constraints.  Additionally, it advocates for legislative change to Federal funding 
initiatives on which its members rely for research and development, cyber resilience, and 
recovery efforts [182], [226]. 
3.2.28 Touchstone Energy Cooperative 
Touchstone was created as a national branding organization to improve recognition for 
co-ops [227].  Over time, their services have grown to include much of what NRECA does with 
greater emphasis on business strategies that enable the provision of cost-effective, reliable 
electrical service [228]. 
3.2.29 State and Regional Public Power Associations 
State and regional public power associations are local variants of the APPA and NRECA 
which advocate for local and state public power issues, including cyber resilience measures, with 
SLTT government entities.  They also offer training and education and other ancillary services to 
their member utilities.  As of 2019, there are 61 of these associations [179]. 
3.2.30 Large Public Power Council (LPPC) 
The LPPC is a non-profit organization formed in 1987 consisting of 27 of the largest 
public power systems in the U.S. It advocates for policies surrounding reliability, including cyber 
resilience, affordability, and environmental stewardship on behalf of the 30 million consumers. 
3.2.31 National Governors Association (NGA) 
The NGA is a public policy organization whose members include the governors from the 
55 states, territories, and commonwealths.  It advocates on behalf of states for policies at the 
state, national, and international levels.  It Resource Center for State Cybersecurity helps states 
“address the consequences of the rapidly evolving and expanding technological threats now 
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faced by law enforcement agencies, public works and energy agencies, private financial and 
communications sectors and the general public” [229].  The NGA advocates for national and 
state policies that support cyber resilience of critical infrastructure and provide resources, tools, 
and strategic recommendations to the government and private sector to that end [229].  NGA is a 
participant in the DOE’s Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinators’ (EEAC) Agreement that 
enables mutual assistance to energy disruptions such as an outage caused by a cyberattack [230]. 
3.2.32 National Association of State Energy Officials (NASEO) 
NASEO is the non-profit association composed of each of the 56 states and territories 
energy officials who are designated by their respective governors.  Their stated mission is to 
“facilitate peer learning among state energy officials, serve as a resource for and about state 
energy offices, and advocate the interests of the state energy offices to Congress and Federal 
agencies” [231].  NASEO maintains multiple committees, including one for energy security 
which covers cybersecurity of the state energy critical infrastructure.   
Of note, NASEO and DOE first implemented the EEAC program in 1996 before 
expanding it to include NGA, NARUC, and NEMA [230].  NASEO also maintains a formal role 
in national cyber response plans for the energy sector [23]. 
3.2.33 National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) 
NARUC is a national association that represents PUCs from all 50 states, the District of 
Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands before the Federal Government, particularly 
FERC.  As with other associations, they provide a venue for their members to pool resources and 
share best practices, and it provides access to a variety of operational, educational, research, and 
business programs to its members [232].  NARUC also hosts conferences which discuss, among 
other topics, issues of recoverable costs and rate design.  Through its Cybersecurity Strategy 
Guide and other publications, NARUC promotes utility commissioner integration in the state 
utilities’ cyber resilience measures [233].  NARUC is a participant in the DOE’s EEAC 
Agreement and has formal roles in national cyber response plans and has formal roles in national 
response plans for electricity outages [230], [23]. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
NARUC provides training for utility commissioners including rate setting and 
cybersecurity.  This organization’s training of personnel is uniquely essential, given the 
relatively higher turnover due to the many officials who are elected or appointed by the state.  
Due to the different states’ approaches to rate recovery, NARUC is positioned to increase 
awareness of cost recovery barriers to cyber response measures. 
3.2.34 National Association of State Chief Information Officers (NASCIO) 
NASCIO is a national association that represents each state’s Chief Information Officer 
or equivalent.  According to their website, NASCIO:  
[P]rovides state CIOs and state members with products and services designed to 
support the challenging role of the state CIO, stimulate the exchange of 
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information and promote the adoption of IT best practices and innovations. From 
national conferences, peer networking, research and publications, briefings and 
government affairs, NASCIO is the premier network and resource for state CIOs 
[234] 
They heavily advocate for CIO-related interests, and primarily, for more significant resources to 
support cybersecurity initiatives within state governments’ IT systems and for programs to 
support private entities. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Unlike NARUC and NASEO, NASCIO is not included in the EEAC or formal national 
electricity sector cyber response plans [23]. 
3.2.35 National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) 
NEMA is a professional association of the emergency management directors for 59 states 
and territories.  Like many other professional associations, NEMA is a forum for state 
emergency managers to exchange best practices and educate the wider public, advocating on 
public policy on levels that supports improved emergency management, and sponsor research 
and development of solutions to emergency management issues [235].  NEMA is also a 
participant in the DOE’s EEAC Agreement [230]. 
3.2.36 Edison Electric Institute (EEI) 
EEI is a trade association that represents all IOUs in the U.S. and some international 
utilities.  It provides “public policy leadership, strategic business intelligence, and essential 
conferences and forums” similar to APPA and NRECA [236].  Relevant to cybersecurity, EEI 
promotes industry involvement and investment in cyber resilience measures, advocates for 
pertinent legislation, and facilitates the integration of government cybersecurity stakeholders, 
primarily through the ESCC which was formed out of EEI initiatives.  
3.2.37 Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) 
In response to Executive Order 13691, DHS through NPPD (now CISA) encouraged the 
formation of ISAOs to share information related to cybersecurity risks among both critical 
infrastructure to all other types of organizations [193].  Before EO 13691, industries and 
organizations found it difficult to develop adequate information sharing organizations.  DHS has 
helped establish the ISAO Standards Organization (ISAO SO) to combat this and encourage the 
growth of ISAOs. 
Further, sector-based ISAOs are referred to as Information Sharing and Analysis Centers.  
The E-ISAC is one such ISAO. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Currently, there are over 60 registered ISAOs, all of which provide access to each other’s 
cyber information and can collectively participate in Federal information sharing programs to 
enhance their cybersecurity [237].  E-ISAC, for example, is one of many registered ISAOs that 
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collects and analyzes threat information relevant to the electricity sector and aids in mitigation 
and response o threats.  Not all ISAOs have the same functions or capability, but they are 
evolving into significant cyber response resources. 
3.2.38 National Council of ISACs (NCI) 
The NCI was formed in 2003 to coordinate and encourage collaboration between the 
sector-based ISACs and FSLTT entities.  According to its mission statement, the NCI is “true 
cross-sector partnership, providing a forum for sharing cyber and physical threats and mitigation 
strategies among ISACs and with government and private sector partners during both steady-
state conditions and incidents requiring cross-sector response” [238].  Outside of incident 
response, NCI is integrated into the Sector Partnership Structure and coordinates with the 
SLTTGCC and other councils.  During significant incidents, NCI members are integrated into 
the NCCIC watch floor and can be deployed to national, regional, and SLTT response centers 
[238]. 
3.2.39 Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
The MS-ISAC is a division of the non-profit Center for Internet Security.  Much like E-
ISAC, it aims to function as a hub for “cyber threat prevention, protection, response and recovery 
for the nation’s state, local, tribal, and territorial (SLTT) governments” [239].  Its stated mission 
is to provide “real-time network monitoring, dissemination of early cyber threat warnings, 
vulnerability identification and mitigation, along with education and outreach aimed at reducing 
risk to the nation’s SLTT government cyber domain” [239].  MS-ISAC focuses on building, 
trusted relationship among its members and can provide direct assistance for cyber incident 
response. 
MS-ISAC maintains a security operations center in New York City and field offices in 
select cities across the country.  It organizes around engagement teams of 8 to 10 people each 
that are assigned to stakeholders within defined geographical regions of the U.S. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Unlike the risk management trend within the electricity sector, which focuses on the 
largest utilities and customer bases, MS-ISAC focuses on the inclusion of as many stakeholders 
as possible.  It makes a concerted effort to include smaller utilities, i.e., municipal and rural 
cooperatives, to ensure they can reach the broadest possible area and mitigate threats and attacks 
accordingly. 
3.2.40 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
EPRI is an independent non-profit organization that focuses on research, development, 
and demonstration projects supporting electricity generation, delivery, and use.  Its members 
include 90% of the U.S. utility market and 35 other countries, government agencies and 
regulators, and other ELECTRICITY SECTOR stakeholders.  Through its Cyber Security 
Program, EPRI conducts research supporting industry resilience, including developing security 
metrics, risk assessment techniques, and incident management tools.  Its guidelines for creating 
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an Integrated Security Operations Center focus on and enable incident management within a 
single business. 
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Following trends in cybersecurity, EPRI’s research and development focuses on technical 
and technological approaches to managing cyber events.  However, there is a concern that such 
solutions fail to address the cultural and organizational issues that are required to realize 
improved cyber response and may even provide a false sense of progress. 
3.2.41 National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) 
NIST is part of the Department of Commerce and focuses on measurement science and 
standards development [240].  NIST’s Cyber Security Framework is a foundational process by 
which many electricity sector stakeholders formulate their approaches to cybersecurity [24].  
Additionally, the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 charges NIST with “developing 
cybersecurity risk frameworks for voluntary use by critical infrastructure owners and operators” 
[24, p. v]. 
3.2.42 Cyber-aggressors 
Hackers are malign actors who perpetrate cyberattacks.  Their goals and capabilities are 
varied but greatly influence cybersecurity and cyber response approaches, particularly in the 
energy delivery sector.  This thesis uses Fischer et al.’s (2014) classification of cyber-aggressors 
in addition to the motivations described in section 2.2.1.1 to understand the motivations and 
capabilities of different actors.  It is important to note that these classifications are not mutually 
exclusive, i.e., an actor may be motivated by goals that fall into more than one category [56]. 
3.2.42.1 Cyberwarriors 
State-sponsored agents who conduct cyberattacks to advance a country’s strategic 
objectives are currently the likeliest source of a cyber threat to the U.S. EDS.  The complex grid 
and control system architecture requires significant resources and expertise that few other types 
of hackers possess.   
Key Perspectives and Insights: 
Presumably, the resources, planning, and long-time horizon of a widespread attack would 
pre-empt or be part of a more comprehensive act of war.  Thus, the industry is reasonably 
assured that, unless an actor wants to declare war on the U.S., such an attack will not occur.  
However, as the threat surface increases and grid architecture changes with the incorporation of 
new technologies, the barrier to accessing operational networks will lower.   
3.2.42.2 Cyberterrorists 
Open source threat intelligence suggests that terrorist groups do not possess the ability to 
successfully attack the electricity sector at scale due to capability and resource constraints.  
However, should the threat surface or the groups’ expertise sufficiently increase, electricity 
delivery disruption would be a primary way of attacking the U.S. 
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3.2.42.3 Cyberspies 
This class of cyber-aggressor engages in espionage to gain a competitive advantage over 
its victim.  Whether motivated by corporate, national policy, or financial goals, they aim to steal 
information.  Cyber-spies present a direct threat to utility companies’ business systems but only 
an indirect threat to grid operations in that they can collect information on grid configuration or 
operations to be used to develop cyberattack capability. 
3.2.42.4 Cyberthieves 
As with the terrorist groups, cyberthieves cannot cause widespread electrical service 
disruption.  More commonly referred to as cybercriminals, these organizations are most 
numerous in the cyber threat landscape and often target utilities’ business IT systems.  Again, as 
the hacker capabilities and sector’s technology evolve, these actors may become more significant 
threats to the electrical system. 
3.2.42.5 Cyberhacktivists 
These cyber-aggressors execute cyberattacks “for pleasure, or for philosophical, or other 
nonmonetary reasons” [56, p. 4].  Cyberhacktivists also cannot attack the electrical system and 
cause a widespread outage but could develop it in the future. 
3.3 Stakeholder Salience 
Having identified 68 stakeholders, determining their abilities to improve cyber response 
mechanism is useful for two reasons.  First, such an analysis permits future resources and effort 
to build cyber response mechanisms around stakeholders with the appropriate power, legitimacy, 
and urgency to create and sustain an effective mechanism.  Second, it also reveals to other 
stakeholders where they are limited or empowered to make changes in the sector’s response 
mechanisms and drive collectively towards consensus on gaps and solutions.  To this end, 
stakeholder saliency can be assessed, which then informs the stakeholders with the authority and 
ability to develop and implement cyber response mechanisms. 
3.3.1 Salience Methodology 
Salience can be determined using Mitchell et al.’s approach to stakeholder saliency.  In 
their work, the authors classify stakeholders according to three attributes, i.e., power, legitimacy, 
and urgency [35].  For this evaluation, the three attributes of power, legitimacy, and urgency 
must be defined.  Rhodes provides clear explanations of each: 
• Powerful stakeholders possess power in their relationship to the [sector], and 
may be capable of imposing their will on the [sector] 
• Legitimacy is the perception that the actions of a stakeholder are desirable, 
proper, or appropriate within norms, values, and beliefs of the enterprise. 
• Urgency exists when the stakeholder’s relationship with the [sector] is time-
sensitive in nature, and/or is of importance to strategy and operations [241, p. 
49] 
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In order to apply these definitions correctly, the stakeholders must first be considered in 
the context of their ability to improve the electricity sector stakeholders’ abilities to respond to a 
cyber event at scale.  In that context, the definitions become: 
• Power – the ability to hold sector entities accountable to develop and implement cyber 
response preparations in both the public and private sectors and the ability to direct and 
prioritize public and private response efforts and resources at the sector-wide level during 
a cyber event 
• Legitimacy – the legal authority or legal obligation to provide for reliable electricity 
delivery and cyber resilience, including cyber response, of the electricity sector 
• Urgency – the desire to improve cyber response by nature of a stakeholder’s underlying 
mission or responsibility 
Given these definitions, saliency may be analyzed using Mitchell et al.’s typology for 




Figure 3.10: Stakeholder Typology 
3.3.2 Stakeholder Salience Analysis and Results 
Applying the refined definitions of the three attributes and typology reveals stakeholder 
saliency, as shown in Figure 3.11 with an accompanying key in Table 3-3. 
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Figure 3.11: Electricity Sector Stakeholder Salience Analysis 
From this, only four types of stakeholders emerged: demanding, dependent, discretionary, 
and definitive.  Cyber-aggressors, though influential in the electricity sector, obviously do not 
directly contribute to the improvement of cyber response in the industry. 
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Table 3-3: Stakeholder Key for Figure 3.11 
# Stakeholder # Stakeholder 
1 Investor-Owned Utilities 35 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association 
(NRECA) 
2 Publicly-Owned Utilities 36 Touchstone Energy Cooperative 
3 Cooperative Utilities 37 American Public Power Association (APPA) 
4 
Regional Transmission Operators 
Independent Systems Operators 
38  
5 Joint Action Agencies 39 State and Regional Public Power Associations 
6 Balancing Authorities 40 
National Association of State Chief Information 
Officers (NASCIO) 
7 Regional Entities 41 National Governors Association (NGA) 
8 Power marketers 42 
National Association of State Energy Officials 
(NASEO) 
9 Reliability Coordinators 43 National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) 
10 Consumers 44 Large Public Power Council (LPPC) 
11 U.S. Federal Government 45 
Electricity Information Sharing & Analysis Center 
(E-ISAC) 
12 National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC) 46 
Multi-State Information Sharing & Analysis Center 
(MS-ISAC) 
13 Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 47 
Information Sharing & Analysis Organizations 
(ISAOs) 
14 




National Cybersecurity & Communications 
Integration Center (NCCIC) 
49 State Fusion Centers 
16 NCCIC Hunt & Incident Response Teams (HIRT) 50 
Federally Funded Research & Development Centers 
(FFRDCs) 
17 National Infrastructure Coordination Center (NICC) 51 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
18 National Operations Center (NOC) 52 SANS Institute 
19 National Risk Management Center (NRMC) 53 National Institute of Science & Technology (NIST) 
20 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 54 State Governments 
21 Department of Energy (DOE) 55 State Chief Information Security Officers (CISO) 
22 
Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, & 
Emergency Response (CESER) 
56 National Guard 
23 
Energy Sector Government Coordinating Council 
(EGCC) 
57 State and Territory Energy Office (SEO) 
24 Federal Senior Leadership Council (FSLC) 58 State Office of Emergency Management 
25 
State, Local, Tribal, & Territorial Government 
Coordinating Council (SLTTGCC) 
59 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
26 Regional Consortium Coordinating Council (RC3) 60 Cyber Action Team 
27 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 61 
National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force 
(NCIJTF) 
28 Department of Defense (DoD) 62 Threat Analysts 
29 Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC) 63 Monitoring Platform Vendors 
30 Critical Infrastructure Cross-Sector Council 64 Response & Forensics Vendors 
31 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 65 Cybersecurity Software & Other Product Vendors 
32 
North American Energy Reliability Corporation 
(NERC) 
66 Electrical Equipment Manufacturers 
33 Public Utilities Commissions (PUCs) 67 Operational Technology (OT) Producers 
34 




3.3.2.1 Demanding Stakeholders 
Demanding stakeholders are characterized by the attribute of urgency and are the most 
numerous.  In this context, they are characterized by the desire to improve electricity sector 
response mechanisms because of their stated mission, inherent interest, or direct liability for 
cyber incidents, but they simultaneously lack authority and are not in a place to effect any 
changes.  They fall into five categories: 
• Advisory bodies who are formally established within government constructs to advise on 
policy and government action 
• Law enforcement or security agencies whose responsibility it is to protect national 
interests but do not have a direct responsibility to the electricity sector 
• Trade associations and advocacy groups which provide cybersecurity programs to 
members for reliability and compliance purposes and advocate for government policies 
on behalf of their members 
• Research and Development entities charged with developing technology and process to 
increase cyber resilience and cyber response in the electricity sector 
• Business interests who sell cybersecurity products and services and facilitate cyber 
response 
3.3.2.2 Dependent Stakeholders 
Dependent stakeholders are characterized by both urgency and legitimacy and fall into 
two categories: 
• Electricity market entities include generation, transmission, and distribution entities and 
electricity market participants, charged with providing reliable power to consumers 
• FSLTT Government critical infrastructure support agencies who are charged with 
executing its policies for sector support and providing incident response resources 
• Energy and electricity regulatory agencies at Federal, regional, and state levels who are 
responsible for enforcing compliance with reliability, i.e., cybersecurity standards. 
3.3.2.3 Discretionary Stakeholders 
Discretionary stakeholders are characterized by their legitimate concern in the cyber 
response process.  They are removed from any direct control over cyber response mechanisms 
and are only focused on access to electricity, not necessarily how cyber secure it is. 
3.3.2.4 Definitive Stakeholders 
Definitive stakeholders are fewest in number.  This paper asserts that the only definitive 
stakeholder is the one with power, legitimacy, and urgency: the U.S. Federal Government, i.e., 
the Executive and Legislative Branches.  Though the U.S. Constitution grants the Federal 
Government power to regulate the electricity sector under the commerce clause and charges it 
with providing for the national defense, it has yet to establish primacy for a cyber response.  
Currently, the Federal Government only has authority to direct utilities in instances of “grid 
security emergencies,” and even then, it is limited to the BPS [91]. 
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State utility commissions, unlike, FERC, have more consolidated power and can 
influence the utilities under their jurisdiction to a higher degree.  Likewise, state governments 
have power similar to the Federal Government within their borders, especially over distribution 
systems.  However, the BPS crosses state lines and remains mainly under the purview of the 
Federal Government, so state governments lack power over the entire sector. 
Finally, the ESCC is increasingly influential in that it has earned expert, referent, and 
informational power, not based on positional authority, as the liaison between the government 
and industry [242].  Given its unique and influential position in the electricity sector, the ESCC 
likely has the potential, however indirect, to direct response preparations and efforts. 
3.3.3 Stakeholder Salience and Cyber Response 
With a more detailed understanding of the salience of the stakeholder categories, it is 
clear that the definitive stakeholders must play an active role in the creation and sustainment of 
any response mechanisms.  However, the landscape analysis in chapter 2 reveals a lack of 
willingness on the part of the government to assert their authority and take a more active role in 
cyber response mechanisms.  Similarly, most of the sector lacks any meaningful authority to 
make changes or improvements where they see fit.  Thus, either the definitive stakeholders need 
to assert their authority prudently or delegate it to stakeholders that have a higher degree of 
urgency. 
3.4 Stakeholder Value Exchange 
3.4.1 Stakeholder Value Exchange Methodology 
Another essential step in the stakeholder analysis process is the identification of 
stakeholder value exchange [33].  This process includes classifying stakeholders and then 
examining their needs from the sector to enable cyber response and their contributions to the 
sector’s response mechanisms.  Finally, the stakeholder values are examined to identify 
disparities between the importance of needs and how well they are being fulfilled.  The insight 
gained from this process is used to develop the value proposition necessary for crafting a cyber 
response mechanism that meets stakeholders’ needs for responding to a large scale malware 
attack [33]. 
3.4.2 Stakeholder Classification 
Next, it is necessary to categorize the stakeholders in order to simplify value exchange 
analysis and align it with a whole-of-sector perspective.  The stakeholder salience analysis 
produces a feasible way of classifying stakeholders using their salience typology because it 
groups stakeholders according to their functions and interests in the electricity sector’s cyber 
response mechanisms.   
For instance, many of the stakeholders perform the same roles in the ecosystem in 
different locations, e.g., state public utilities commissions, investor-owned utilities, and can be 
presumed to share similar interests.  Specific entities are enumerated because they occupy a 
unique role within the ecosystem, separate from any other organization.  Many of these are 
Federal Government agencies which, by their nature, are the only bodies granted appropriate 
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authority relevant to the analysis.  Similarly, there are few trade associations and research & 
development organizations which should be discussed together.   
Because of the size of the sector under analysis, the process of classification in this 
instance also had the effect of quasi-prioritization.  The categorization generalizes the 
stakeholders into the critical functions necessary for responding to a malware attack, and it 
diluted the effects such as an organization’s size or resources which tended to overweight their 
importance to the sector’s mechanisms.  For instance, state governments, arguably, have more 
critical infrastructure within their jurisdiction, yet they lack the resources of the Federal 
Government to regulate them adequately [113].  Thus, observers might weigh the contributions 
of the Federal Governments more heavily and potentially focus the improving response 
mechanisms by empowering it to a higher degree.  However, the classification process is 
informed by the saliency analysis, which suggests that state governments are equal or near equal 
stakeholders to the Federal Government. 
In many instances, the stakeholders fall into more than one classification based on their 
functions.  In order to simplify the analysis, they are categorized by their explicit authority or the 
category by which they exert the most considerable influence on the sector.  Appendix B shows 
the classification of stakeholders, but a list of the ten identified classifications follows: 
• Electricity Market Entities 
• Federal Government Critical Infrastructure Advisory Bodies & Support Agencies 
• State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Critical Infrastructure Support 
Agencies 
• Regulatory Bodies 
• Trade Associations & Advocacy Groups 
• Information Sharing Entities 
• Standards, Research, & Development Organizations 
• Law Enforcement 
• Cybersecurity Vendors 
• Electricity Cyber-Physical Asset Manufacturers 
• Cyber-Aggressors (omitted in value analysis) 
3.4.3 Stakeholder Value Exchange Assessment 
A value exchange analysis identifies what each category of stakeholder needs or expects 
from an enterprise.  The ultimate goal of the analysis is to identify gaps and create a value 
proposition for potential mechanism improvements [241].  In this case, the analysis determined 
what the electricity sector stakeholders needed to respond to a large-scale malware attack.  
Concurrently, it identified the value each stakeholder provides to cyber response mechanisms in 
the sector. 
Stakeholder value was determined through interviews with representative members in 
each category and augmented with open source analysis of stated missions and values.  The 
interviews and research yielded the value exchange shown in Table 3-4. 
Table 3-4: Stakeholder Value Exchanges 
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Value CONTRIBUTED TO Sector Cyber 
Response Mechanisms 
• Response frameworks, processes, and 
prioritization from FSLTT support 
agencies 
• Threat information and intelligence to 
support investment and risk management 
• Clear roles for public and private entities 
• Trusted relationships with supporting 
stakeholders 
• Autonomy to manage risk and incident 
response measures 
• Malware mitigations 
• Clarity on cyber resilience best practices 
and metrics 




• Expertise on grid and equipment 
operations 
• Mutual assistance to peer stakeholders 
• Local leadership of response efforts  
• Trusted relationships with business 
partners 
• Advising FSLTT policy formation 
• Integration into private sector response 
plans and efforts 
• Compliance to legislation, regulation, and 
policies 
• Information sharing from private sector 
entities 
• Recommendations and advice on cyber 
response policy, frameworks, and 
government action 









• Valuable national and regional response 
resources 
• Research & development funding 
• Legislation and regulation that supports 
cybersecurity investment 
• Intelligence collection, fusion, and 
sharing 
• Large-scale risk assessments and 
management frameworks 
• Offensive and defensive cyber capabilities 
targeted at cyber threats 
• Information and intelligence sharing 
• Coordination between public and private 
entities 







• Valuable regional and local response 
resources 
• Research & development funding 
• Legislation and regulation that supports 
cybersecurity investment 
• Trusted relationships with local public 
and private partners 
• Compliance with incident reporting, 
response preparations, and other CIP 
measures as required by regulations 
• Recommendations for rule-making of new 
and updated regulations 
Regulatory 
Bodies 
• Regulations that support compliance with 
critical infrastructure protection standards 
• Support to rate cases that allow for 
recoupment of prudent cybersecurity 
investments 
• Information and intelligence sharing 
• Integration into private sector response 
plans and efforts  
• Consensus and support of membership for 
cybersecurity initiatives 






• Pooled resources for investment in 
research and development and shared 
cyber technologies 
• Coordination of mutual assistance 
programs 
• Consensus building for cyber response 
mechanisms among members 
• Advocacy for regulatory and legislative 
changes that permit better cybersecurity 
investment and improved processes 
• Coordination of industry-government 
incident response plans at all levels 
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Value CONTRIBUTED TO Sector Cyber 
Response Mechanisms 
• Timely cyber incident reporting from 
utilities 
• Collaborative participation in information 
sharing programs 




• Incident notification processes and 
anonymization 
• Limited coordination of relevant entities 
for cyber response 
• Information sharing from electricity 
market entities and government agencies 






• Long term cyber threat, vulnerability, and 
technology analysis to feed policy 
decisions and inform the sector 
• Innovative cybersecurity tools, processes, 
frameworks, guidelines, and technologies 
that keep pace with cyber threats, 
vulnerabilities, and technology 
• Timely cyber incident reporting from 
utilities 
• Preservation of evidence and facilitation of 
investigation, forensic analysis 
Law 
Enforcement 
• Cyber forensic analysis capability through 
fly away teams or local field office 
support 
• Intelligence and information sharing 
• Trusted relationships with supporting and 
supported stakeholders 
• Business opportunities to provide cyber 
incident response services 
Cybersecurity 
Vendors 
• Specialized cybersecurity expertise 
• Information sharing with public and 
private stakeholders 
• Cyber incident response services tailored 
to supported customers 
• Business opportunities/feedback to 
provide cutting edge cyber technologies 
that increase cyber resilience and ability to 
respond 





• Development and sales of ICS-tailored 
cyber technologies and increasingly 
hardened cyber-physical assets 
• Specialized equipment and software 
expertise to identify and mitigate cyber 
threats 
3.4.4 Stakeholder Value Map 
Following a value exchange assessment, stakeholder value mapping can identify 
disparities between the needs of stakeholders and the sector’s current ability to deliver or 
perform to fulfill them.  Thus, the results of individual stakeholder value mapping may indicate 
where gaps in sector-wide cyber response mechanisms may exist.  In this instance, value 
mapping identified the importance of each value to the stakeholder’s ability to respond or 
support a response to a large-scale cyber event.  Then the sector’s current quality of value 
delivery or performance was measured.  The examination was performed qualitatively based on 
interview responses and existing studies.  Both the importance and delivery were measured for 
each classification of stakeholder, as shown in Appendix C.  The corresponding results were 
plotted on a stakeholder value map in Figure 3.12.  On the value map, every point represents a 
need listed in the “Expected From” column of Table 3-4. 
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Figure 3.12: Current Stakeholder Value Map for the Electricity Sector 
Despite the number of stakeholders and their diverse values and perspectives, common 
interests emerged.  Pointedly, the bottom right quadrant of Figure 3.12 shows the values for each 
category of stakeholder, which are of high importance but which the sector struggles to deliver or 
perform.  The needs for stakeholders had in common that appeared in the bottom right quadrant 
were: 
• Trusted relationships between stakeholders, especially from different categories 
• Clear roles for response processes 
• Integration of external entities into Electricity Market Entities response plans  
• Information sharing and access to intelligence 
Collectively, these four shared needs indicate gaps in the sector’s ability to respond to a large-
scale malware attack. 
3.5 Chapter 3 Summary 
In summary, because the electricity sector is large and fragmented, stakeholder analysis is 
essential to identifying the gaps in cyberattack response mechanisms.  The number of roles and 
responsibilities needed to respond to a widespread cyber incident is significant.  However, that 
realization provides only a small indication of the complexity of the environment and the 
mechanisms required to reach the goal of improved cyber response.  As demonstrated by the 
stakeholder saliency analysis, the electricity sector has many stakeholders who perform the same 
function, has many interested but disempower parties, and lacks definitive stakeholders at the 
right locations within the sector who capable of making critical incident response decisions. 
The looming threat of consistently evolving hackers and a growing threat surface indicate 
the sector must make preparations to rapidly respond and recover from a cyberattack that affects 
more than one utility.  As is evident from the stakeholder analysis, there are four areas for future 
work: establishing trusted relationships between sector stakeholders, clearly defining roles and 
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responsibilities for a coordinated response, maturing integrated incident response plans, and 
sharing information and intelligence across the sector. 
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4 Current Architecture of Electricity Sector Cyber Response 
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework’s definition described in sections 1.3.5 and 1.3.6 
broadly capture the functions required to respond to a cybersecurity event; identify protect, 
detect, respond, and recover.  They are useful to simplify complex response mechanisms that 
must be planned for, resourced, and executed throughout an entire sector, at all levels of 
government, and across an entire continent.  Chapter 4 endeavors to offer a thorough analysis of 
these complex functions using the ARIES Enterprise Element Model discussed in section 1.6.3.  
Additionally, this chapter assesses the current state of the sector’s ability to respond to a large-
scale malware attack informed by the landscape analysis and electricity sector’s drivers for 
changing cybersecurity in Chapter 2 and analysis of the stakeholder value exchange in Chapter 3.   
Chapter 4 analyzes the sector’s cyber response mechanisms using the six of the ten 
ARIES “view elements.”  Table 1-2 is presented below again with the six view elements 
discussed in Chapter 4 emphasized. 
Table 4-1: ARIES Framework Enterprise Elements Adapted to the Electricity Sector 
Element Description 
Ecosystem 
The external cyber threat, regulatory, political, economic, and market environment in 
which the electricity sector operates with other subsectors and critical infrastructure 
sectors 
Stakeholders 
Organizations who contribute to, benefit from, and/or are affected by the electricity 
sector's ability to provide reliable, cyber resilient power to the U.S. 
Strategy 
The strategic vision and key strategic thrusts and goals of electricity market 
stakeholders and the governments who regulate and provide existing incident 
response mechanisms 
Information 
Information that electricity sector needs to measure, prepare for, and respond to 
widespread malware attacks 
Infrastructure 
Physical and technological systems that enable cyber response mechanisms to 
operate efficiently and effectively 
Products 
Products that the electricity sector develops and uses to enhance cyber resiliency and 
cyber incident response capabilities 
Services 
Services that the electricity sector develops and uses to enhance cyber resiliency and 
cyber incident response capabilities 
Process 
Processes through which the electricity sector manages cyber risk and 
communicates, coordinates, mitigates, and evaluates cyber response mechanisms 
Organization 
Organizational structure, cybersecurity cultural and relational values of the 
electricity sector that influence its cyber response mechanisms 
Knowledge 
Competencies, expertise, and explicit and tacit knowledge that the electricity sector 
stakeholders contribute to or require from the sector in order to enable cyber incident 
response 
Products and services are combined because their roles in the sector’s response 
mechanisms are nearly identical to one another.  Knowledge has been omitted because 
preliminary analysis revealed the only knowledge deficiency relevant to electricity sector cyber 
response mechanisms was a shortage of qualified personnel.  This shortage affects all industries, 
has been widely documented, and is currently being addressed [32], [133], [3], [243].  
Infrastructure is omitted because, at this level of analysis, the infrastructure that enables large-
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scale cyber response falls into another critical infrastructure sector, e.g., telecommunications, 
transportation, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.  However, further study of the cross-
sector implications of a large-scale malware attack is necessary to identify other gaps in the 
electricity sectors response mechanisms. 
Another critical aspect of the ARIES Element Model is the concept of entanglement.  
Nightingale and Rhodes (2015) assert that the view elements cannot be viewed in isolation 
because they are inherently connected and changes to the one element may propagate to others in 
varying degrees [33], [244].  The authors point to the element of strategy as being a “key driver 
of the architecture of the process, organization, knowledge, and information elements,” and in 
the case of the electricity sector, this observation holds [33, p. 18].  Strategy, process, 
organization, and information elements of the sector’s response mechanisms are deeply 
entangled, and often, the interactions bidirectionally influence one another.  Each section in this 
chapter identifies these interconnected relationships in the context of the existing response 
mechanism and determines how the relationships contribute to gaps in the electricity sector’s 
cyber response mechanisms.  The elements are presented in order of the amount of influence 
they have over the sector’s response mechanisms. 
Finally, each element is broadly assessed according to the five parts of its anatomy 
(structure, behavior, artifacts, measures, periodicity) as shown in Table 1-3, and the more 
prominent parts of the element anatomy are described and analyzed. 
4.1 Strategy  
The electricity sector’s strategy for cyber response most closely reflects the influences of 
the regulatory and political factors described in Chapter 2.  The need for energy security in the 
U.S. and cybersecurity’s position as a public good require significant involvement from FLSTT 
governments, and the PPP approach drives many of the other elements of a cyber response.  
Within the cyber response mechanism itself, strategy directs the processes used for response, the 
way information is created and disseminated, and the empowerment of entities and organizations 
to manage response efforts.  Strategy also indirectly influences the ability of the sector to 
acquire, develop, and maintain knowledge and expertise in cybersecurity.  In the same manner, 
national cybersecurity standards and organizational interests drive strategy development and 
implementation. 
The strength and influence of these interactions emerge when one examines the element 
anatomy of the sector’s cyber response mechanism strategy.  In particular, the structure of the 
strategy dominates the other parts of the anatomy and drives variation in how segments of the 
electricity sector develop and implement their strategies.  Notably, the structure of the response 
mechanism strategies can be generalized into three groups: the electricity market entities’ 
approaches to cyber response, the state’s policy on the sector’s cyber response, and equivalently, 
the Federal Government’s policy on critical infrastructure incident response.  The remaining 
subsections in section 4.1 explore the strategy element anatomy within the three groups using the 
policy artifacts as evidence and highlight the other element anatomy parts that contribute to gaps 
in the response mechanism. 
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Additionally, because response functions to a malware attack are process-oriented and 
focused on quick action, the strategy is difficult to distinguish from the process, and many of the 
artifacts are the same for both elements.  In this analysis, the strategy element conveys the 
general approach that stakeholders and the sector take towards cybersecurity and cyber response.  
Conversely, processes refer more to the procedures that the sector takes to respond or enable a 
response to a cyberattack.  Often, strategy and processes are captured in the same artifact, such 
as a response plan, rather than separate documents, making the distinction even more 
challenging. 
4.1.1 Electricity Market Entities Approaches 
Industry surveys have shown that utilities and other energy industry entities place cyber 
risk in their top five business concerns[110], [245].  A 2018 survey conducted by Ernst and 
Young, however, revealed that cyber incident response remained a critical weakness in 
investment priorities for private companies from all sectors [114].  The same survey showed that 
half of the companies polled are not confident in their ability to conduct forensics on a cyber 
incident, i.e., determine the nature of the cyberattack in order to develop and apply mitigations 
[114, p. 17].  What the survey does not call out is the impact on operations and exigency with 
which utilities must be able to react, contain, and mitigate a malware attack.  However, it does 
report that the sector recognizes the growing cyber threat and has made investments and taken 
steps to protect themselves, though at levels far lower than the researchers recommend [114]. 
Another trend that emerged from both the Ernst and Young survey and stakeholder 
interviews was that of the divide between utility companies’ approaches to cyber response based 
on their size.  Smaller utilities, such as municipal utilities and cooperatives, lack the resources 
that large IOUs have to invest in cyber resilience measures, including response mechanisms.  
Because of their small size, they are also generally excluded from regulatory requirements that 
demand formal incident response programs.  These dynamics can drive small utilities to seek to 
reduce the burden of investments in cyber response mechanisms to the lowest level practicable.  
Such an approach cannot keep pace with threat evolution or provide adequate cyber incident 
response. 
On the other hand, large utilities, especially IOUs and RTOs/ISOs, can afford a robust 
investment in cyber response capabilities, like full-time cybersecurity staff or retainers with 
MSSPs.  For IOUs, cyberattacks pose a threat to the business and, ultimately, shareholders, so 
cyber resilience and cyber response are business risk mitigation strategies.  While they are 
compelled to excel and innovate cyber response methods that can efficiently and effectively 
mitigate risks, they are also heavily regulated under NERC CIP and must also focus on 
compliance with relatively precise response requirements. 
Regardless of the size of utilities, their individual strategies are often not codified or fall 
into an all-encompassing cyber resilience strategy and incident response plan.  These strategies  
and plans follow standardized cybersecurity approaches, typically using the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework, and few discuss how to address emerging threats, adapt their organization to new 
cyber response practices, articulate metrics by which the company measures its cybersecurity 
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posture, or, importantly, how the company differentiates its response based on the scale of the 
cyberattack. 
4.1.2 State Policy 
Even though state governments regulate nearly all companies involved in electrical 
distribution, they rely heavily on Federal guidance for critical infrastructure management.  In 
turn, state critical infrastructure strategies directly influence local incident management policy. 
Unsurprisingly, with 56 state and territorial governments, state policy and strategies 
uniquely reflect the electricity concerns within their jurisdiction and can be influenced by 
political administration changes and priorities.  For instance, one NGA (2017) memorandum 
reviewed 32 cybersecurity incidents and disruption response plans within 26 states and found no 
two the same [246].  Thus, state-level policies and strategies have little uniformity between them.   
Consistent with the political approach of intergovernmental and PPP, the concept of 
cooperation between the states and between states and the Federal government emerges as the 
main thrust of state and territorial cyber response strategies.  These strategies are formalized 
through the Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinators (EEAC) program. 
4.1.2.1 Energy Assurance Plans and Incident Response Plans 
In 1996, the DOE and NASEO, and later followed by NGA, NARUC, and NEMA, 
created the EEAC program in order to drive standardization of states’ processes governing all 
types of energy-related emergencies, including cyber incidents [230].  In addition to cyber 
incident or disruption response plans, states use energy assurance guidelines to develop adaptive 
strategies to respond to economic factors, natural and human-made disasters, and malicious 
threats to the energy supply. 
For PUCs, strategies for increasing cyber resilience and cyber response mimic the actions 
of FERC and NERC within the regulatory scheme.  PUCs’ strategies revolve around 
incentivizing the right level of investment in cybersecurity measures and compliance with critical 
infrastructure protection mechanisms to enhance cyber resilience.  However, they face the same 
challenges outlined in section 2.2.2.3 of this thesis. 
4.1.3 Federal Policy 
The Federal Government strategy to cyber response in the electricity sector is heavily 
influenced by its historical approach of PPPs with electricity market entities.  Indeed, partnering 
with the private sector by facilitating information exchange, providing intelligence, investing in 
research and development, and communicating with sector representatives remains the 
overarching strategy of the Federal Government.  The emphasis on each of these features may 
vacillate depending on leadership changes within the various Federal stakeholder agencies. 
Current strategic cybersecurity and critical infrastructure-related imperatives are captured 
in policies like Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs) 8, 21 and 41, various Executive Orders 
(EOs).  These PPDs and EOs recognize that cyber incidents require unique response capabilities 
and so have augmented traditional emergency management and response mechanisms, outlined 
in the National Preparedness and National Planning Systems products and other cyber-specific 
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plans.  These remain the critical documents by which the Federal Government communicates its 
strategy.  Although recent changes to the authority of the President and Secretary of Energy 
under the Federal Power Act (2018) to direct private sector entities’ response actions may signal 
a potential shift to increased involvement in the cyber resilience of the sector [116].   
The following subsection describes the strategic imperatives of the national government 
by analyzing PPDs, EOs, components of the National Planning System.  More detailed plans and 
processes are more closely aligned with the cyber response processes of the Federal Government 
and are discussed in the next section. 
4.1.3.1 Presidential Policy Directive – 8: National Preparedness 
PPD – 8 issued by President Obama in 2011 initiated the development of a “national 
preparedness goal” and the National Preparedness System to strengthen the nation’s resilience 
against the most significant national security risks, including cyberattacks.  Under the auspices of 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, the PPD directs an “all-of-nation, capabilities-based 
approach to preparedness” [247, p. 1]. 
The national preparedness goal is a synthesis of the National Security Strategy, 
applicable PPDs, Homeland Security Presidential Directives, National Security Presidential 
Directives, and national strategies.  These documents define the core capabilities necessary to 
prepare for “the specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to the security of the 
Nation, and shall emphasize actions aimed at achieving an integrated, layered, and all-of-Nation 
preparedness approach that optimizes the use of available resources” [247, pp. 2–3]. 
The outcome of the PPD-8 pertinent to the Federal Government’s approach to cyber 
incident response can be understood by examining the planning efforts in Figure 4.1 [190, p. 49].  
The cyber incident response strategies and plans that subsequently emerge from PPD-8 are 
described below, and the processes that are relevant to a cyber incident response are discussed in 
the next section. 
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Figure 4.1: Alignment of Planning Efforts with PPD-8 
4.1.3.2 Strategic National Risk Assessment (SNRA) 
The SNRA is another byproduct of PPD-8, which was led by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to identify the risks that pose a threat to homeland security [248].  In order to achieve 
preparedness goals set out by PPD-8, the SNRA evaluated known threats and hazards and 
categorized them into national-level events.  The SNRA’s evaluation categorized a “Cyber 
Attack against Physical Infrastructure,” i.e., the electricity sector, under the Adversarial/Human-
Caused Hazard/Threat Group and defined a “National-level Event” as: 
An incident in which a cyber attack is used as a vector to achieve effects which 
are ―beyond the computer‖ (i.e., kinetic or other effects) resulting in one fatality 
or greater or economic losses of $100 Million or greater [248, p. 3] 
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The SNRA also calls out cyberattacks within one of only five overarching themes 
revealed in the analysis.  Its emergence as an overarching theme indicates the cyberattacks have 
posed a significant risk, a combination of likelihood, consequences, and uncertainty, to the 
Nation and must be addressed as a national imperative.  Specifically, it states: 
Cyber attacks can have their own catastrophic consequences and can also initiate 
other hazards, such as power grid failures or financial system failures, which 
amplify the potential impact of cyber incidents [248, p. 5]. 
The classification of a cyberattack against the electricity sector and its emergence as 
“theme” in this way provides a good indication of the Federal Government’s recognition of the 
seriousness of the attack and, perhaps, under what circumstances it might intervene in the private 
sector.  While the SNRA informs the response mechanisms in the Federal Government, it 
nonetheless is only used to create a high-level strategy, not develop specific actions for a 
cyberattack. 
4.1.3.3 National Preparedness System 
The National Preparedness System is an “integrated set of guidance, programs, and 
processes that…enable the Nation to meet the national preparedness goal” and comprises five 
planning frameworks that govern prevention, protection, response, mitigation, and recovery to 
the Nation’s most significant security risk [247, p. 2], [249].  The National Preparedness System 
also created the National Planning System, which has four components:  
(1) a set of National Planning Frameworks that describe the key roles and 
responsibilities to deliver the core capabilities required to prevent, 
protect, mitigate, respond, and recover; 
(2) a set of Federal Interagency Operational Plans (FIOP)—one for each 
mission area—that provides further detail regarding roles and 
responsibilities, specifies the critical tasks, and identifies resourcing and 
sourcing requirements for delivering core capabilities; 
(3) Federal department and agency operational plans to implement the 
FIOPs; and  
(4) comprehensive planning guidance to support planning by local, state, 
tribal, territorial, and insular area governments, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO), and the private sector [250, p. 1] 
Among other things, it establishes the Nation’s approach to all-hazards response under the 
National Response Framework (NRF) as outlined below.   
4.1.3.4 National Incident Management System (NIMS) 
NIMS was born out of the need to have a “common, interoperable approach to sharing 
resources, coordinating and managing incidents, and communicating information” to address 
threats, hazards, and events across the nation at all levels of government and in both the public 
and private sectors [191, p. 1].  NIMS outlines the standard mechanisms to manage resources 
before and during incidents, describes leadership roles and organizational structures for incident 
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management, and describes systems and methods that help incident response stakeholders 
communicate and make decisions.  It operates on three guiding principles of flexibility, 
standardization, and unity of effort to achieve priorities of “saving lives, stabilizing the incident, 
and protecting property and the environment” [191, p. 3].  NIMS provides the “shared 
vocabulary, systems, and processes to deliver the capabilities described in the National 
Preparedness System,” but is deliberately broad and does not contain cyber incident-specific 
guidance [191, p. 1]. 
4.1.3.5 National Response Framework (NRF) 
The NRF “describes structures for implementing nationwide response policy and 
operational coordination for all types of domestic incidents” [190, p. 4].  The Framework further 
clarifies how the nation applies an all-hazards approach to incident response management.  The  
all-hazards approach describes a capability-based approach to dealing with any “incident, natural 
or manmade, that warrants action to protect life, property, environment, and public health or 
safety, and to minimize disruptions of government, social, or economic activities” [251, p. 1].  
The definition also implies that an all-hazards approaches are independent of scale and location 
of the incident but also recognizes that many incidents may occur simultaneously and with little 
warning.  Therefore, the NRF “focuses on core capabilities that can be applied to deal with 
cascading effects. Since many incidents occur with little or no warning, these capabilities must 
be able to be delivered in a no-notice environment” [190, p. 7]. 
The NRF is one of five National Planning Frameworks that fall under the National 
Preparedness System established in PPD-8.  Since NIMS is intrinsically linked to the response 
function, the NRF is closely aligned with the system’s guiding principles, priorities, and 
standardization protocols.  The NRF includes a base document, multiple Emergency Support 
Function (ESF) Annexes, and Support Annexes that detail the response process and mechanisms 
that the Federal Government would take in the event of specific incidents.  Relevant to the 
electricity sector’s response mechanism, the NRF contains ESF #12 and the Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) Support Annex.  The NRF also feeds the Response 
Federal Interagency Operational Plan (FIOP) which provides a more detailed concept of 
operations and tasks.  The relationship between the National Planning Frameworks, ESFs, 
Support Annexes, and FIOPs is shown in Figure 4.2 [190, p. 3].  Because ESFs, FIOPS, and 
Support Annexes provide significant detail on response actions, they will be covered in the 
following section: 4.2 Processes. 
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Figure 4.2: NRF, ESF, Support Annex, and FIOP Relationship 
4.1.3.6 Presidential Policy Directive – 21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
Building on PPD – 8, President Obama outlines the national strategy for critical 
infrastructure protection with PPD – 21.  The Directive reaffirmed the Federal Government’s 
approach to the cybersecurity of the electricity sector by stating that CIP is the responsibility of 
both the public and private sectors.  It identified the energy and communications sectors as 
“uniquely critical due to the enabling functions they provide across all critical infrastructure 
sectors” and outline three strategic imperatives [27, p. 2]: 
1) Refine and clarify functional relationships across the Federal Government 
to advance the national unity of effort to strengthen critical infrastructure 
security and resilience; 
2) Enable effective information exchange by identifying baseline data and 
systems requirements for the Federal Government; and 
3) Implement an integration and analysis function to inform planning and 
operations decisions regarding critical infrastructure [27, p. 2]. 
PPD-21 also calls for an update to the NIPP and refines the roles of the Federal 
Government in critical infrastructure protection by assigning roles and responsibilities to the 
SSAs, i.e., the DOE, as stated in section 3.2.13.  These roles and responsibilities broadly indicate 
the strategic approach of the Federal Government to serve as a collaborator with the private 
sector, other Federal agencies, and SLTT entities. 
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4.1.3.7 Presidential Policy Directive – 41: United States Cyber Incident Coordination 
PPD-41 defines the Federal Government’s response to cyber incidents [252].  The 
Directive assigns lead agencies and establishes an architecture for coordinating with the Federal 
Government.  It provides for five crucial strategic elements of the Federal Government regarding 
a cyberattack on the private sector.  First, it establishes a national definition of a significant cyber 
event as: 
A cyber incident that is (or group of related cyber incidents that together are) 
likely to result in demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign 
relations, or economy of the United States or to the public confidence, civil 
liberties, or public health and safety of the American people [252, p. 2]. 
Second, it reiterates the Government’s partnering approach to responding to a cyber 
incident by adopting a risk-based approach that intervenes only when necessary for national 
security and even then, works to protect privacy and civil liberties.  Third, it establishes three 
concurrent lines of effort, threat response, asset response, and intelligence support, which dictate 
broad actions it will undertake during a cyber incident.  Fourth, it sets out five principles for 
guiding Federal Government incident response activities: share responsibility between 
individuals, the private sector, and government agencies; risk-based response; respecting affected 
entities’ privacy and civil liberties to the extent it can; unity of governmental effort to coordinate 
Federal agencies’ efforts; and enabling restoration and recovery by facilitating transition from 
response actions.  These five guiding principles are echoed throughout all Federal guidance on 
cyber incident response and focus on the strategy and efforts of its agencies.  Finally, PPD-41 
provides an annex that outlines the structure of the Cyber Unified Coordination Group, the entity 
that coordinates Federal Government efforts with SLTT and private entities for during a cyber 
incident [253]. 
4.1.3.8 Executive Order 13636: Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity 
EO13636 again reinforces the Federal Government’s partnership philosophy by focusing 
on barriers to information sharing, such as the timeliness of intelligence reports, granting of 
security clearances to critical infrastructure owners and operators, and expand other information 
sharing programs.  Perhaps more importantly, it was the instrument that initiated the 
development of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and began the process of the developing 
frameworks, guidelines, and standards that dominates much of the sector’s response mechanism 
resources [24], [84], [85]. 
4.1.3.9 Executive Order 13800: Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and 
Critical Infrastructure  
EO13800 ordered an in-depth review of critical infrastructure sectors by the DHS with 
attention paid to the authorities and capabilities that the Federal Government could bring to bear 
to support the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure sectors.  More relevant to the electricity 
sector, the Order required a detailed examination of: 
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the potential scope and duration of a prolonged power outage associated with a 
significant cyber incident…; the readiness of the United States to manage the 
consequences of such an incident; and any gaps or shortcomings in assets or 
capabilities required to mitigate the consequences of such an incident [254]. 
The subsequent subsector report, Assessment of Electricity Disruption Response 
Capabilities, issued by the DOE in 2017 presents seven, high-level gaps in capabilities of the 
electricity subsector to respond to a cyber-induced power outage and drive the current Federal 
Government strategy [3].  The seven gaps align with much of the analysis stated herein and are 
detailed as follows: 
1) Cyber Situational Awareness and Incident Impact Analysis 
2) Roles and Responsibilities under Cyber Response Frameworks  
3) Cybersecurity Integration into State Energy Assurance Planning 
4) Electric Cybersecurity Workforce and Expertise 
5) Supply Chain and Trusted Partners 
6) Public-Private Cybersecurity Information Sharing 
7) Resources for National Cybersecurity Preparedness [3, p. ix] 
However, the recommendations to close these gaps as outlined in the report take an 
approach, as can be expected, that is Federal Government-centric.  The recommendations focus 
on what the Federal Government can do not necessarily what the private sector needs, which 
does not align with its approach to partnering with the sector.   
4.1.3.10 National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
The NIPP is the outcome of the PPD-8, PPD-21, EO 13636, and other national policy and 
strategy documents governing critical infrastructure protection.  It outlines the mission, vision, 
and goals of the Federal Government towards managing the risk to the Nation’s critical 
infrastructure in an all-hazards context.  The Plan provides seven core tenets “representing the 
values and assumptions the critical infrastructure community should consider (at the national, 
regional, SLTT, and owner and operator levels) when planning for critical infrastructure security 
and resilience” [192, p. 13].  Additionally, it provides three sets of activities, builds upon 
partnership efforts, innovates in managing risk, and focus on outcomes, that are aimed at guiding 
collaborative efforts within the critical infrastructure sectors.  Germane to the electricity sector 
response mechanism, the PPD-21 and NIPP require the all SSAs to develop Sector-Specific 
Plans (SSP), and the DOE release the Energy SSP in 2015 accordingly. 
The NIPP also lays out a framework, the Sector Partnership Structure, through which the 
Federal Government approaches working with the private sector for critical infrastructure 
protection.  The Sector Partnership Structure will be discussed further in section 4.3.3.1, but the 
Structure reinforces the paternalistic, Federal Government-centric view of its role in the cyber 
response in the electricity sector. 
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4.1.3.11 Energy Sector-Specific Plan (ESSP) 
The ESSP provides the most concise description of the Federal Government’s strategic 
approach to managing risk and providing for “protection, security and resilience” to the 
electricity sector because it reflects the consolidation of threats to the sector informed by the 
DOE [32, p. 1].  Its contents directly map to the NIPP 2013 Call to Action, as shown in Table 
4-2, [32, pp. 1–2]. 
Table 4-2: ESSP Mapping to NIPP 2013 Call to Action 
 
The mapping provides critical insight into the strategic cybersecurity approach of the 
DOE as the SSA, namely, that it directly reflects the Federal Government’s PPP approach, risk 
management, information sharing, and investment in R&D.  While not a cyber incident-specific 
strategy, the ESSP defines the Government’s steady state efforts to support critical infrastructure 
resilience. 
The vision, goals, and priorities of the ESSP, on the other hand, directly addresses the 
priority and approach to all-hazards incident response for the electricity sector.  The ESSP cites 
incident response planning and exercise as the means to achieve resilience through preparedness.  
Even though it concentrates on ESF #12 as the Federal Government’s response mechanism, it 
merely indicates that electricity market entities “have their own company- and facility-level 
response plans” and does not provide strategic approach or significant detail on their 
composition [32, p. 25].  Discussion of the current role of exercises as a cyber response 
mechanism appears in section 4.2.7.  The ESSP vision, goals, and priorities are shown in Table 
4-3 [32, pp. 3–4].  
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Table 4-3: ESSP Vision, Goals, and Priorities for the Energy Sector 
  
4.1.3.12 Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 
The National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 further codifies the strategy of the 
Federal Government and emphasizes its role to establish “to provide for an ongoing, voluntary 
PPP to improve cybersecurity, and to strengthen cybersecurity research and development, 
workforce development and education, and public awareness and preparedness, and for other 
purposes” [255, p. 2971]. 
4.1.3.13 National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 (NCPA) 
Similar to the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act, the NCPA reinforces the role of the 
Federal Government as an agent to facilitate information exchange.  The Act charges NCCIC 
with specific tasks to provide timely, relevant information to potentially affected sectors, 
especially the Federal Government to SLTT government and private sector entities and across 
sectors.  Additionally, it charges DHS with the creation of a cyber incident response plan to 
address cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure [256]. 
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4.1.3.14 National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) 
The NCIRP is the Incident Annex to the Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan 
(FIOP)(see section 4.2.6.2) and acts as the Federal Government’s strategic framework that 
“outlines the roles and responsibilities, capabilities, and coordinating structures that support how 
the Nation responds to and recovers from significant cyber incidents posing risks to critical 
infrastructure” [117, p. 4].  It communicates how the Federal agencies provide resources for 
cyber incident response, provides the structure and substance of response plans that all electricity 
sector stakeholders can draw upon, and dictates roles and responsibilities of the private sector, 
SLTT entities, and Federal Government that are critical to understanding the electricity sector’s 
cyber response mechanisms. 
The NCIRP also enumerates core capabilities and critical tasks that must be executed to 
respond to a cyber incident in alignment with the core capabilities of National Preparedness 
Goal, NRF, and Response FIOP [117, Sec. Annex F].  The core capabilities and critical tasks are 
associated with specific response processes in the event of the cyber incident and are discussed 
in section 4.2.6.2. 
The NCIRP focuses on “building mechanisms need to respond to a significant cyber 
incident” as defined by PPD-41 [117, p. 8].  The NCIRP also provides a standard Cyber Incident 
Severity Schema (CISS) to measure cyber incidents and provide a common framework to 
evaluate, assess, and communicate the severity, urgency, and response efforts required of the 
incidents.   
Perhaps most importantly, the NCIRP dictates the roles and responsibilities of the private 
sector, SLTT entities, and Federal Government within the three concurrent lines of effort during 
cyber response activities stated in PPD-41:  
1. Threat Response 
2. Asset Response 
3. Intelligence Support 
The implications of the NCIRP’s roles and responsibilities are far-reaching and reinforce the 
observations made in the political factor and stakeholder analyses in Chapters 2 and 3, 
respectively.  Specifically, the threat response is led by the Department of Justice through the 
FBI and NCIJTF, and they “use criminal and national security authorities to investigate, 
prosecute, and disrupt cyber threats and to apprehend cyber threat actors” [117, p. 13].  The role 
of the private sector in threat response is to promptly report the incident to the appropriate 
authorities with relevant information.  However, the roles are reversed for asset response where 
the Federal Government becomes a passive provider of resources and a conduit for information 
exchange, and in the case of the electricity sector, utilities become the primary responders.  This 
dynamic naturally puts the onus on the private sector to respond to any effects of cyberattacks on 
their systems. 
For SLTT and private sector entities, the NCIRP provides recommendations of 
formulating cyber incident response plans in accordance with NIST Special Publication 800-61: 
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Computer Incident Handling Guide and points to the NRF, Comprehensive Preparedness Guide 
101, and Response FIOP as references for their own operational planning and understanding the 
Federal Government’s approach to incident response [257], [258]. 
Finally, the NCIRP elaborates on PPD-41’s establishment of the Cyber Unified 
Coordination Group.  It outlines the authorities, circumstances for formation, responsibilities, 
and participants of the group, which coordinates the whole-of-nation cyber incident response 
[253].  Further, section 4.3.3.2 describes the importance of the Cyber UCG and provides greater 
detail of its function. 
4.1.3.15 Federal Power Act 
The Federal Power Act as amended in 2018 grants the President and Secretary of Energy 
the authority to “issue such orders for emergency measures as are necessary in the judgment of 
the Secretary to protect or restore the reliability of critical electric infrastructure or of defense 
critical electric infrastructure during such emergency” [116, p. 73].  The authority granted to the 
President and Secretary of Energy is expansive and unprecedented but, simultaneously, untested. 
However, the authority has never been asserted under the conditions of a cyberattack. What 
actions the Federal Government could take to enable a more effective response compared to 
utility owners and operators is a significant gap. 
4.1.4 Strategy Gap Analysis 
While electricity market entities’ response strategies are regularly tested at the scale of 
the individual company, they remain mostly untested for effectiveness in responding to a large-
scale malware attack on the grid.  For instance, while the Ernst and Young surveys suggest that 
utilities are confident in their own ability to respond to a cyberattack, the results reflect a degree 
of overconfidence because the sector lacks an objective measure of cybersecurity or response 
preparedness [32]. 
Likewise, neither the results nor the sum of the incident response plans cannot be 
interpreted as a comment on how prepared the entire sector is for a large-scale attack.  For those 
private sector entities that face resource constraints on cyber response mechanisms, the lack of 
metrics or authoritative guidance from FLSTT entities inhibits the ability to articulate 
deficiencies to policymakers or PUCs that can close funding gaps.  Despite this, the aggregate of 
Federal policies places asset response squarely on the shoulders of the private sector entities that 
may not be able to afford to respond.   
The dynamic that manifests from a lack of testing response strategies also emerges with 
the state and Federal Governments because their cyber incident strategies, much like the private 
sector, have not been adequately tested.  Simultaneously, electricity market entities, particularly 
POUs, openly state that they do they know how the government would or could provide 
assistance during an attack nor do they want government support, with less expertise, involved in 
a cyber response. 
The lack of trust that is created by low confidence stakeholders’ reactions during an 
incident is compounded by the conflicting and ambiguous definitions of a “cyber incident” 
between the SNRA and PPD-41.  The SNRA is very clear in what constitutes a national-level 
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cyberattack, and the PPD-41 provides a broader but not contradictory definition.  Yet, neither 
openly state at what point the Federal Government would step in or to what degree they might 
engage in private sector response actions.  The signing of the Federal Power Act makes that 
point all the murkier through its definition of grid security emergency which is broad to the point 
of being vague, but it still grants the Federal Government explicit authority to step in when they 
so deem.  These conflicting definitions and subsequent lack of clarity on the Federal 
Government’s roles reveal the source of some of the private sector’s mistrust but also point to 
government action that direct contravenes its stated partnering strategy.   
Analysis of the cybersecurity and cyber response strategies collectively supports the 
existence of the gap between private sector expectation and public sector response strategy.  The 
aim of the Energy Emergency Assistance Coordinator program and NIPP is to integrate public 
and private response efforts and resources.  However, the dearth of large-scale cyber response 
strategies at the state and electricity market entity-level and the inversely large number of 
Federal policies indicates that the sector is not capable, or vested in, providing for a response that 
goes beyond individual electricity assets.  This gap is not unexpected as the analysis in sections 
2.2.4 and 2.2.3 shows, but it can no longer be ignored.  The government has very clearly 
articulated its actions during a widespread cyber-related outage, but now it must incentivize a 
higher degree of preparedness, stipulate private sector actions during such an event, and provide 
easier access to resources. 
Separately, the structure of the electricity sector’s cyber response mechanisms is more 
nebulous than analysis of the structure of strategy would reveal.  Electricity sector response 
strategies generally revolve around individual utilities’ IRPs.  Despite the governments’ wealth 
of response strategies and processes, there is no overarching strategy or plan that ties individual 
response plans and actions to sector-wide ones, and the lack of an integrated plan is one of the 
primary gaps in the response mechanisms.  The EEAC program has, in theory, addressed this 
deficiency by outlining the interfaces between FLSTT and private sector plans as shown in 
Figure 4.3 [259, p. 5], but the degree of integration between plan, which is only recommended by 
the EEAC program, is questionable.   
The National Planning Frameworks compounds the lack of integration because it creates 
opacity in the ability to understand and navigate governmental response mechanisms.  The 
Frameworks documents have multiple, sometimes redundant reference documents for various 
incident types and lack cyber incident-specific response for all critical infrastructure sectors.  




Figure 4.3: Public-Private Planning Interfaces According to the EEAC Program 
The NRF, much like NIMS, drives a top-down approach from the Federal Government to 
SLTT entities and notes the importance of private sector entities, especially critical infrastructure 
sector owners and operators, in providing for a response to incidents.  However, beyond charging 
them with the role to promote resilience, it offers little in the way of incentivizing participation 
in incident response efforts that exceed business continuity.  The SNRA’s projected risk 
assessment for a cyberattack on the U.S. and the designated role of electricity market entities in 
the NRF are mismatched.  Business continuity should not be the aim of the electricity sector 
response strategies.  Instead, mitigation of the effects of a cyberattack on its infrastructure must 
be the key objective. 
This approach should not be confused with advocating for nationalization of the grid, and 
in the case of the Federal Power Act, ceding control over to the government during a cyber 
incident.  However, stakeholder interviews and current research suggest that gaps are created by 
an imbalance between national security and public interest on one side and economic impact on 
the other. More explicit and more stringent guidelines for and incentives to invest in cyber 
response mechanism that strikes such a balance must be sought after and included in the sector’s 
cyber response strategy to combat. 
Additionally, PPD-41 and NCIRP stipulate three concurrent lines of effort for the whole-
of-nation approach during a response to a cyber incident.  At face value, the clear division of 
roles and responsibilities and assignment of lead agencies and primary responders suggests that 
127 
incident response tasks not suffer from significant redundancy or miscoordination.  However, 
both documents fail to prioritize the lines of effort when their goals and the goals of the leading 
responders’ conflict. 
With OT and ICS in the electricity sector, in particular, there is a conflict between the 
actions of threat response, which include preservation of evidence, and asset response and 
regulatory requirements, which include the restoration of reliable power as quickly as possible.  
Often, steps to restore power involve the destruction of forensic evidence, e.g., wiping infected 
computers and restoring back-up versions.  This conflict is also interestingly reinforced by the 
NCIRP’s “Key Federal Points of Contact,” which suggest affected entities contact both threat 
response agencies, i.e., the FBI, U.S. Secret Service, NCIJTF, or US Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement / Homeland Security Investigations, and NCCIC for asset response [117, p. 41].  In 
another reported case, the Federal Government prevented ICS vendors from alerting system 
users of a critical vulnerability because it was in the process of investigating and did not want to 
alert the cyber aggressor exploiting it.  Therefore, there is a clear gap in the priority of effort for 
the electricity sector that also contributes to a low level of trust between the public and private 
sector [126]. 
Moreover, the division of roles and responsibilities in the NCIRP also neglects to treat 
cybersecurity as a public good as described in section 2.2.3.1.  The Plan indicates that the threat 
response is to be fulfilled with resources commensurate with national security interests.  Federal 
law enforcement agencies with the requisite legal authorities and jurisdictions are subsequently 
charged with providing that support.  Simultaneously, the NCIRP asserts that the role of asset 
response, which also has national security implications, falls to the private sector but without the 
resources, interests, or authorities of the provided to threat responders.  Many electricity market 
entities are neither resourced to provide cyber resilience or large-scale malware attack response 
capabilities, nor is it within their business interest to make such an investment.   
NCIRP relegates states’ roles to that of information conduit and facilitator of access to 
Federal resources.  The states’ response resources generally do fall behind those of the Federal 
Government, but the NCIRP’s approach does not entertain any measures to identify minimum 
levels of resources need for SLTT entities to be prepared.  This lack exists even though the 2018 
National Preparedness Report cited many instances of resource shortfalls and mismanagement 
during incidents, extreme funding shortfalls in the investment of critical infrastructure resilience, 
and an inherent complication of resilience efforts with the Federal Government [117].   
Optimistically, the NCIRP’s recognition of the importance of local governments roles as 
conduits of information and response resources is an indication that the Federal Government 
understands the need for greater access to response resources.  However, the Government does 
not and cannot require SLTT entities to formally act in that role which creates issues with 
information asymmetry in the sector and incidentally breeds high barriers to trust, which are 
described in 4.3.2. 
Finally, while Federal policies provide for many, much-needed inclusive mechanism to 
continually refine cyber response in the electricity sector, the strategy of the Federal Government 
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allows for partnering to the degree that may detract from the ability to achieve optimal 
cybersecurity.  The Federal Governments dependence on input and guidance from the private 
sector to increase cybersecurity neglects a more objective point of view and may empower the 
sector to place their interests over those of the public.  The FLSTT PPP strategies rely on the 
feedback from the electricity sector to develop its policy which, if not objectively measured, 
perpetuates a cycle that reinforces the illusion of preparedness for an attack.  Thus, there should 
be a mechanism that removes the influence of the private sector and incorporates a “non-
partnership” mentality into the development of Federal Government strategy.   
4.2 Processes 
The processes that surround responding to a large-scale malware attack on the electricity 
sector remain some of the most underdeveloped relative to other FSLTT and private sector 
response plans, such as those for major storms and other natural disasters.  Processes are 
arguably the core of cyber response mechanisms where effective processes directly translate to 
an effective response.  In limited cases, these processes, e.g., a utility’s incident response plan 
(IRP), outline the exact steps to be taken to respond to a cyberattack.  More often, incident 
response plans cover broad functions, resources, and capabilities to address any incidents that 
disrupt reliable electricity delivery.  Still, in other cases, there are processes which described 
enabling functions that facilitate response to an attack or disruption, as in risk management 
application and incident reporting.  Thus, the process element of the cyber response mechanism 
must be thoroughly examined for gaps and for improvements that can better support response 
processes.   
Additionally, unlike the other elements being examined, the process element of electricity 
sector cyber response mechanism influences and is influenced by all other elements.  These 
bidirectional relationships expose a high degree of connectivity between the mechanisms, which 
indicates that changing processes will propagate changes to all other elements – that is, to 
strategy, information, products and services, and organization.  In turn, this implies that 
identifying and fixing gaps in processes is extremely important to improving the sector-wide 
response mechanisms and that changes in processes will likely need be considered first to 
determine the impact on the sector’s mechanisms. 
As gaps in processes are identified and improvements considered, the degree to which the 
other elements change is unlikely to be consistent.  Therefore, analysis of the elements’ 
interactions is necessary to provide insight into the sensitivity of the other elements to changes in 
the process [244].  Currently, strategy drives many of the processes in the response mechanisms, 
but the policy and regulations by which strategies are enacted may also limit the processes to a 
narrower set of suboptimal mechanisms.  The same dynamic between strategy and process also 
emerges between processes and information elements because of the industry frameworks, 
guidelines, and standards that the sector uses to establish cybersecurity practices.  These 
documents consist of a variety of management-related and technical processes, and some of the 
more prominent standards for cybersecurity in the electricity sector include: 
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• Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.1, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, [24] 
• Guide to Test, Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans and Capabilities, 
National Institute of Standards and Technology, [260] 
• Guidelines for Smart Grid Cybersecurity, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, [145] 
• Framework and Roadmap for Smart Grid Interoperability Standards, National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, [85] 
• Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, [82] 
• Computer Security Incident Handling Guide: Recommendations of the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, [257] 
• Risk Management Framework for Information Systems and Organizations: A System 
Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy, National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, [84] 
• ISO/IEC 27000-series standards, International Standards Organization/International 
Electrotechnical Commission, [261] 
• NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection, North American Electricity Reliability 
Corporation, [76] 
• State Energy Assurance Guidelines, Version 3.1, National Association of State 
Energy Officers, [262] 
• Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Risk Management Process, Department of 
Energy, [83] 
• Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model, Department of 
Energy [87] 
Countless other cybersecurity standards exist or are in development.  They drive, if not 
directly dictate, the processes that stakeholders must follow during a cyber response and are 
reinforced by regulation that mandate compliance with them.  As a result, cyber response 
processes may be overly constrained to the mandated processes and unable or disincentivized to 
innovate better mechanisms.  Since Federal Government policy often charges institutions, like 
NIST, to create these frameworks and standards, strategy and organizations also become drivers 
of the process element. 
Products and services are slightly less influential to process than the other three elements 
and again emerge as originators of information asymmetry in the sector.  Products and services 
are incorporated into the response processes, e.g., MSSPs, as a way to compensate for known 
deficiencies in response plans.  Despite this, both elements can contribute to under and 
overconfidence in the ability for utilities and the sector as a whole to effectively respond to a 
large-scale malware attack. 
An assessment of the process element anatomy has many similarities to that of strategy 
because response functions are mainly process-oriented.  For instance, the artifacts of strategy, 
e.g., Federal Government response plans, state energy assurance plans, are the same as those of 
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the process element.  Likewise, the structure of the process element can be analyzed with the 
same three categories used to examine the strategy element (section 4.1) with the addition of 
supporting and enabling process categories. 
The remainder of this section reviews four enabling cyber response processes: cyber risk 
management, incident reporting, malware mitigation, and response plan exercises, and their 
implications on the response processes.  Additionally, the response plans for electricity market 
entities, states, and the Federal Government are examined.  An examination of response 
processes to second or third order effects of a cyberattack on the electricity sector, e.g., the 
response processes for coordinating critical transportation during a power outage, is limited to 
the impact on responding to the cyber incident. 
4.2.1 Implications of Risk Management on Cyber Response 
The Federal Government drives the electricity sector’s approach to cybersecurity, which, 
at its core, is based on risk management practices.  Cyber risk management frameworks, such as 
the NIST Risk Management and Cybersecurity Frameworks, encourage electricity market 
entities to apply business practices that weigh the cost of consequences of a cyberattack with the 
cost of mitigation.  In theory, risk management allows them to provide adequate security of the 
grid within the fiscal constraints of their operating model based on the understanding of risk and 
performance of mitigation measures.  However, Langner and Pederson (2013) suggest that 
electricity market entities do not fully understand cyber threats, the criticality of their assets, or 
the vulnerabilities of their systems to the degree required to make risk management decisions.  
Therefore, utilities are not appropriately incentivized to invest in cybersecurity to the levels 
required of national security [1]. 
4.2.2 Incident Reporting Process 
A similar electricity sector effort for cyber response is the process of incident reporting.  
This process is a realization of the Federal Governments emphasis on information sharing, and 
how it manifests in the sector reveals much about the dynamic that may emerge during a 
response to a cyber incident. 
Cyber incident reporting is required of electricity market entities that fall under NERC 
authority.  Specifically, NERC CIP 008: Incident Reporting and Response Planning requires that 
they report specific cyber incidents within specified timeframes [76].  Despite the guidelines, the 
CIP standards were open for sufficient interpretation, and affected utilities were found more 
likely to construe the terms of the regulations to delay or completely ignore the requirement to 
notify government agencies.   
Not unexpectedly, utility companies’ motivations to postpone notification to the last 
possible moment was to avoid scrutiny of their response processes, avoid potential fines for non-
compliance that the cyberattack exposed, or demonstrate competency to handle the incidents and 
thereby eliminate any chance of government intervention.  In turn, the government agencies lost 
advantages of reporting timeliness that is essential for developing situational awareness and 
common operating picture during a widespread cyber event. 
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In response, FERC and NERC recently updated CIP 008 with revision six that very 
clearly defines reportable incidents and timelines and removes any room for interpretation [263].  
The regulatory adjustment by FERC indicates some of the issues with risk management 
approaches and underscores the issues of trust between stakeholders in the sector. 
For unregulated utilities and many regulated ones, interviews conducted for this thesis 
demonstrated that they might have the opposite issue and not understand whom to notify, how to 
notify them, and under what circumstances they should be notified.  One of the chief complaints 
uncovered during REMEDYS research was confusion over whom to call to report an incident.  
Some utilities stated that there were too many entities with redundant reporting requirements and 
resources, and others stated that they would not know whom to turn to in the event a cyber 
incident.  Some of this challenge can be traced back to the top-down, Federal Government-
centric approach that Federal agencies take.  While they are all charged with working together, 
they each have different reporting requirements, e.g., threat response, asset response, or 
intelligence support, and provide different resources to the sector.  However, at the individual 
company-level or even the state level, where many of the Federal functions are combined into 
one entity, the reporting requirements could be overwhelming.  The adverse effects of unclear 
and complicated communications channels on cyber response mechanisms would only be 
amplified in a widespread cyberattack. 
4.2.3 Malware Mitigation Process 
Currently, the electricity sector has no single entity responsible for developing malware 
mitigations.  Mitigations steps include identification of exploited vulnerabilities and actions 
needs to eliminate them as well as the removal of malware from affected systems.  For OT and 
ICS in the electricity sector, mitigations can have impacts on the ability for systems to operate 
reliability and must often be tested to ensure that there is no loss of performance or reliability.  
For cyberattacks in the electricity sector, the difficulty in coordinating operational 
considerations, such as plant downtime or electricity provision, with the need to provide safe and 
tested mitigations is reflected in delays in steady-state patching of ICS software vulnerabilities.  
Under non-urgent circumstances, patching can take months to develop and release and still 
longer to be installed [264], [265]. 
4.2.4 Electricity Market Entities Response Processes 
Electricity market entities have limited roles in sector-wide cyber response mechanisms, 
but they are essential roles nonetheless.  The main contribution to the cyber response of the 
sector is incident reporting and timely notification, which feeds situational awareness at a higher 
level and allows regional, state, and national entities to respond.  Hence, the importance of 
timely reporting mentioned in the previous section. 
These roles are codified by NERC CIP 008-6: Incident Reporting and Response Planning 
for federally regulated utilities and by their respective state’s incident response plan 
requirements, if any, for state-regulated utilities  [214], [263].  Incident response plan regulations 
generally require market entities to be able “to identify, classify, and response to cybersecurity 
incidents” including attempts to compromise electricity system assets, to report the incidents to 
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higher level authorities, to identify roles and responsibilities of cyber incident response 
personnel, and to outline steps necessary to contain, eradicate, and recover from the incident 
[263, p. 7].  Notably, the response plans are subject to broad interpretation and do vary based on 
risk assessments, size, and resources of the market entity, its role within the electricity sector, 
and the geographic area it covers. 
Informally, electricity market entities such as large IOUs, regional and national trade 
associations, RTOs/ISOs, and joint action agencies also play critical sector-wide roles by 
extending cyber response programs.  These programs bolster the response capabilities of 
participants and interdependent stakeholders who would not otherwise be able to afford the 
investments.  The natural emergence of support for large electricity market entities may indicate 
an opportunity to empower them with expanded authority to govern and provide for a cyber 
response.   
4.2.4.1 Cybersecurity Mutual Assistance (CMA) Program 
Similar to the informal assistance for larger utility companies, the CMA was built to 
emulate other electricity industry programs and leverage the culture of mutual assistance which 
has formed around them.  The CMA is a free program wherein participants agree to share cyber 
resources, such as services, personnel, and equipment, for a short-term in response to a cyber 
event.  It currently includes more than 150 participants across the entire electricity sector [150]. 
Industry representatives view the CMA as a benefit to the electricity sector and valuable.  
Where other mutual assistance programs are built around responding to events with geographical 
borders, the nature of cyberattacks is not constrained to distinct locations.  Therefore, many 
stakeholders maintain that during a widespread event or when threats are imminent, participants 
will be disinclined to share resources they might need if they are attacked.  Additionally, the 
CMA has never been activated during a widespread cyber event, and its effectiveness remains 
untested. 
4.2.5 State Response Processes 
As with state and territorial strategies, the cyber incident response plans vary widely.  
PUCs and SEOs generally work with state law enforcement agencies, emergency management 
agencies, and the utilities within state lines to develop their energy assurance and incident 
response plans.  However, as the EO 13800 Section 2(e) Report (2017) noted, state energy 
assurance plans “do not fully incorporate cybersecurity concerns, including planning for long-
term disruption event” [254, Sec. 2(e)].   
At the same time, most state cyber incident response plans do not take specifically 
mention the unique requirements for responding to cyberattacks on the electricity sector or other 
critical infrastructure sectors [246].  However, they consistently identify lead and supporting 
agency roles and responsibilities in the state’s response to a cyber incident, address the response 
protocol, and frequently articulate threat level and response definitions.  Most states create ad 
hoc or permanent organizations for cyber incident response expertise and capability.  However, 
many reports note that despite recognition of the risk of cyberattack and planning efforts, as 
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shown in Figure 4.4, states repeatedly underfund expansion of cybersecurity capabilities [266, p. 
45]. 
 
Figure 4.4: State and Territory Cybersecurity Assessment Data from the 2018 National 
Preparedness Report 
Nonetheless, during a large-scale malware attack on the electricity sector, state 
governments will likely be on the frontline of response efforts.  Many have made concerted 
efforts to partner with their utilities, regional and national organizations, and Federal agencies to 
understand how to access resources when incidents expand beyond their resources [262].  In that 
event, the states provide a vital conduit to regional resources and Federal resources by declaring 
a statewide emergency under the Stafford Act [267]. 
4.2.5.1 Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 
Much like the CMA, the EMAC is an agreement between state governments to provide 
reimbursable mutual assistance during times of state or regional emergencies and when local 
resources have been exhausted.  All 50 states and four territories are members of the EMAC 
which was developed by NEMA and subsequently ratified by Congress.  It is meant to 
complement Federal Government response functions aligned with FEMA and the National 
Response Framework.  The EMAC construct takes an “all hazards – all disciplines” approach to 
rendering needed personnel, equipment, commodities, and services during a state emergency of 
any type [268].   
Also, like CMA, the EMAC has never been used to respond to a cyber incident.  A 
review of their mission response package templates, which are formulated for states to determine 
how to respond and calculate reimbursement costs, and after-action reports, which capture 
lessons learned after an emergency, indicates a focus on natural disaster response [269].  
Typically, the state closest to the affected state is requested to respond, but one of the other 
tenets of EMAC is that states are not required to send resources to another state if it deems the 
risk of an incident within its borders is too high.  Under the conditions of a cyberattack which 
lack geographical limits, it may be unlikely that states render assistance to affected states in 
anticipation of being attacked themselves. 
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4.2.6 National Response Processes 
The Federal Government’s cyber incident response processes are exclusively driven by 
the high-level policy, frameworks, and plans that define the National Preparedness System and 
cyber incident coordination strategies.  From these sources, the Government further documents 
the support it will provide, the conditions for activating response actions, the roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders, and the method for providing it during a cyber incident through 
five essential plans. 
4.2.6.1 Emergency Support Function (ESF) and Support Annexes 
The NRF’s base document is augmented with two types of annexes that provide greater 
detail to its vision and mission, ESFs and Support Annexes.  In general, ESFs “describe the 
Federal coordinating structures that group resources and capabilities into functional areas that are 
most frequently needed in a national response” [190, p. 8].  In other words, ESFs designate 
Federal Agencies with specific response functions, resources, and required capabilities aligned 
with their inherent missions, statutory authorities, and the National Planning Framework 
components.  Capabilities required by ESFs can be called upon alone or combined with the 
capabilities of other ESFs to fulfill an incident response requirement.  ESF #12 covers the 
response functions that would likely be needed to respond to a disruption in electricity delivery 
caused by a malware attack.  Other ESFs may be activated in combination with ESF #12, but it 
provides the most detail on the Federal Government’s response efforts and resources during a 
cyber incident on the electricity sector [270]. 
Similarly, Support Annexes describe “essential supporting aspects that are common to all 
incidents” [270, p. 1].  Where ESFs communicate functions and resources needed for response, 
Support Annexes describe how Federal agencies, SLTT entities, and the private sector coordinate 
to execute those functions for specific activities that arise during most national-level incidents.  
Of the eight Support Annexes, the Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) Support 
Annex is most relevant to cyber incident response. 
Emergency Support Function #12 – Energy Annex 
ESF #12 is dedicated to those national response functions that require support from the 
energy sector to meet the Nation’s energy needs in an all-hazards response context.  Under the 
NRF protocol, ESF #12: 
ESF #12 collects, evaluates, and shares information on energy system damage 
and estimations on the impact of energy system outages within affected areas. 
Additionally, it provides information concerning the energy restoration process 
such as projected schedules, percent completion of restoration, and geographic 
information on the restoration. ESF #12 facilitates the restoration of energy 
systems through legal authorities and waivers. ESF #12 also provides technical 
expertise to the utilities, conducts field assessments, and assists government and 
private-sector stakeholders to overcome challenges in restoring the energy system 
[270, p. 35].  
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Even though ESF #12 is not specific to cyber incident response, it provides two critical 
indications of the Federal Governments role in such an event.  First, it reiterates the authority that 
the Federal Power Act grants the Secretary of Energy to direct electricity utilities to alter their 
operation of the grid that “will best serve the public interest and alleviate the emergency” [271, 
pp. 12–5].  Second, it empowers the DOE to identify the prioritization of Federal resources 
during response operations, essentially dictating which utilities receive the means to respond to 
disruption over other utilities. 
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR) Support Annex 
The CIKR Support Annex consolidates existing incident response functions, resources, 
and authorities from other Federal policies and plans into a single reference.  More specifically, 
it provides a clear concept of operations that: 
[D]escribes specific organizational approaches, processes, coordinating 
structures, and incident-related actions required for the protection and 
restoration of CIKR assets, systems, networks, or functions within the impacted 
area and outside the impacted area at the local, regional, and national levels 
[272, p. CIKR-5] 
The concept of operations concentrates on four functions that are aligned with the NRF, 
NIPP, and Federal Government’s approach to critical infrastructure protection: “situational 
awareness, impact assessment and analysis, information sharing, and requests for assistance or 
information from private-sector CIKR owners and operators” [272, p. CIKR-5-6].  Given the 
emphasis on communicating within those four functions, the CIKR Support Annex is primarily 
dedicated to describing what and how information flows during a CIKR-related incident. 
4.2.6.2 Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan (FIOP) 
The Response FIOP builds upon the NRF and its annexes to provide: 
the concept of operations for integrating and synchronizing existing national-
level Federal capabilities to support local, state, tribal, territorial, insular area, 
and Federal plans and is supported by Federal department-level operational 
plans, where appropriate [250, p. 1]. 
The Plan translates the core capabilities in the NRF into a plan for Federal agencies to deliver 
them during incident response and helps SLTT and private sector entities to anticipate how the 
Federal Government will respond to an incident.  It focuses on coordination of Federal 
Government efforts to “save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet basic human 
need” within 24 to 72 hours of an incident [250, p. 1]. 
Just like the NRF, the Response FIOP has a base document with functional annexes with 
the addition of incident-specific annexes that address specific situations that require the 
specialized application of its strategy and processes.  
The base plan places the existing processes for accessing, organizing, and requesting into 
the context of incident response.  More critically, it provides insight into the Federal 
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Government’s response planning assumptions about how incidents will occur, how non-Federal 
entities will react, and what impacts incidents will have on the Nation.  Its functional annexes 
describe the planning, operational coordination, logistics and supply chain management, and 
communications aspects of organizing the response, and the appendices within each annex 
provide the concept of operations and tasks for the NRF core capabilities.  Similarly, incident-
specific annexes describe the Federal Government’s approach for incidents that require 
specialized approaches to a response. 
The Response FIOP’s Appendix 5: Infrastructure Systems of Annex C: Operational 
Coordination is the most relevant functional annex to the electricity sector.  The NCIRP serves as 
the Cyber Incident Annex and outlines specialized core capabilities and critical tasks, among 
other more strategic approaches, that the Federal Government has deemed necessary to respond 
to a cyber incident.  Additionally, the Power Outage Incident Annex to the Response and 
Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans serves as another incident-specific annex for the 
electricity sector. 
4.2.6.3 Appendix 5: Infrastructure Systems of Annex C: Operational Coordination of the 
Response Federal Interagency Operational Plan 
The Infrastructure Systems Appendix of the Response FIOP is a comprehensive process 
that breaks the Federal Government’s response efforts for both critical and non-critical 
infrastructure into three phases.  Each phase has distinct tasks further divided by ESFs.  The 
Appendix spells out the tasks and functions independently of the type of incident. 
4.2.6.4 National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) Core Capabilities and Critical Tasks 
Much of the guidance found in the NCIRP relates to the Federal Government’s strategic 
approach to handling cyber incident response.  However, Annex F: Core Capabilities and Critical 
Tasks outlines all of “tasks that are essential to achieving the desired outcome of the capability. 
Critical tasks inform mission objectives, which allow planners to identify resourcing and 
sourcing requirements prior to an incident” [117, p. 45]. 
4.2.6.5 Power Outage Incident Annex (POIA) to the Response and Recovery Federal 
Interagency Operational Plans 
The POIA establishes the guidelines for the provision of Federal resources to SLTT 
entities in the event of a long-term power outage and is organized into phases identical to 
NCIRP.  Unlike the NCIRP, the organizational structures, planning assumptions, required 
capabilities and tasks, and logistics and supply guidance are independent of the incident type.  
Nonetheless, the POIA make critical distinctions between the effects of a cyberattack and other 
natural disasters.  Notably, that organizational structures would be governed by PPD-41 and 
NCIRP and that “[p]hysical damage to electricity infrastructure may not be the primary 
hindrance to the restoration of power (e.g., power generation capabilities may be impaired due to 
a cyber incident)” [23, p. 8]. 
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4.2.7 Response Plan Exercises 
The final enabling process is the electricity sector’s mechanism for exercising its 
response plans.  In order to validate process and procedures to ensure that incident response 
plans are valid, it is necessary to test them under conditions that emulate real-world conditions.  
NIST, cybersecurity vendors, and other research and development institutes provide significant 
guidance to electricity market entities on how to formulate incident response plan testing, 
evaluation, and exercise, and also create opportunities to test them [260].  For BPS, NERC CIP 
008-6 dictates that federally regulated utilities must test its cybersecurity incident response plan 
at least once every 15 months [166, p. 468], and some state PUCs have imposed mandatory 
testing requirements on the utilities that they regulate. 
However, only two existing exercises exist which test the electricity sector’s ability to 
respond to a large-scale malware attack: Grid Security Exercise (GridEx), conducted by E-ISAC, 
and Liberty Eclipse, hosted by DOE.  GridEx is a centrally managed communications exercise 
that enables BPS members to test their IRPs ability to respond to both cyber and physical threats 
and incidents [273].  In essence, E-ISAC fulfills its role as a central communications hub during 
a cyber incident it designs to test the sector’s response.  It provides routine scenario injections to 
evolve the scenario and test different aspects of plans.  Participants typically use the opportunity 
to test and self-audit their IRPs while communicating externally through E-ISAC and other pre-
established guidance.  Figure 4.5 is a sample communications plan that demonstrates the purpose 
of GridEx [164, p. 17]. 
 
 
Figure 4.5: GridEx IV Communications Plan 
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Conversely, Liberty Eclipse is an exercise series that rotates its focus iteration, but its 
purpose is to test the effects of cyberattack scenarios on various components of the electrical grid 
and analyze the ability to respond and recover.  The most recent Liberty Eclipse to test cyber 
incident response at the sector level was held in 2017.  It was conducted as a tabletop exercise of 
a simulated cyberattack on the electricity grid in the northeastern U.S., and multiple FLSTT 
entities, energy sector companies, and trade associations participated.  While it founded some of 
the gaps enumerated herein and might even be considered a necessary first step towards 
exercising response mechanisms, the 2017 exercise did not require more real-time, detailed 
response actions from participants.  At the time this thesis was written, the DOE has no plans to 
hold a subsequent Liberty Eclipse exercise to stress test the EDS response mechanisms further. 
4.2.8 Processes Gap Analysis 
While much criticism of the deemphasizing cyber risk management focuses on the 
implication of “spending unbounded amounts of time and money on [cyber]security measures,” 
preparing for a cyberattack, regardless of threat vector, is always prudent and consistent with the 
all-hazards model in contemporary emergency management philosophies [88, p. 4], [192].  
Because of the dynamic of risk management and the culture of cybersecurity presented in section 
4.3.1, resources tend to focus on preventive measures, rather than on mitigations for an inevitable 
attack.  Thus, the current process of risk management does not enable adequate cyber response 
mechanism investment or development. 
Likewise, the current mechanism for reporting cyber incidents does not enable optimal 
response for a malware attack at scale.  The system disincentivizes early and detailed reporting 
from the private sector and provision of classified, actionable intelligence from the Federal 
Government.  Despite legislation like the National Cybersecurity Protection Act and regulations 
like NERC CIP 008-6 that requires information and intelligence exchange, communication of 
remains suboptimal due to cultural and trust issues [256], [263]. 
Another gap in the electricity sector’s response mechanism is the immature malware 
mitigation development mechanism.  Without a robust process to identify, develop, test, and 
disseminate mitigation, the electricity sector will be unable to respond as quickly as needed and 
prolong a large-scale malware attack.  Given the number of different resources available to 
electricity market utilities and the complex communications external plan noted in section 4.2.2, 
malware mitigation efforts would likely be redundant and drastically slow the process of 
containing and removing it from affected systems.   
In the case of the electricity market entities, interdependent security theories suggest that 
cyber resilience will increase as the number of utility incident response plans and their response 
capabilities increase.  However, the aggregate of these individual incident response plans does 
not create a sector-wide response mechanism.  To wit, there is no requirement for response plans 
to incorporate differences in response procedures in the event of a large-malware attack.  Most of 
the steps of individual incident response plans would likely remain during such an event, but for 
utilities that plan to rely on external resources, such as NCCIC HIRT teams or MSSPs, a large-
scale event might rapidly drain the capacity of those supporting organizations.   
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Additionally, both public and private sectors conflate the effects of natural disaster with 
cyberattacks.  Cyberattacks do not have the geographical or temporal boundaries that physical 
disaster has causes.  The public or private sector would be unlikely to share resources under 
mutual assistance agreements because malware has persistence and nearly unlimited potential to 
spread that natural disasters do not.  While some Federal Government plans recognize the need 
for specialized treatment of cyber incidents, they still rely on capabilities, tasks, and 
organizational structures built to handle a natural or human-made disaster.  Thus, the majority of 
cyber incident response processes are formed from overconfidence in current response 
mechanisms, which are suboptimal even for less dynamic natural disaster responses [266]. 
The complexity of the National Planning Framework that affects the sector’s response 
strategy also affects its response process.  Despite the thorough documentation and clear 
organization of the response planning guidance, greater transparency is needed in several areas.  
First, FLSTT response plans deliberately incorporate flexibility and adaptability that is 
traditionally required for an all-hazards-like approach to a cyber incident.  However, the 
differences between natural disasters and cyber incidents are such that flexibility and adaptability 
manifest as ambiguity and needless complexity in the response process.  Too often in the 
electricity sector, there is no authoritative standard by which to measure a response process, nor 
is there a central authority accountable for providing complete incident response.  Instead, the 
sector spreads authorities and responsibilities across the public sector, which is concerned for 
national security and welfare, and the private sector, which is concerned for business continuity.  
Unless these interests can be more closely aligned, incident response plans will continue, 
however subtly, to reflect the divergent interests. 
Second, the planning assumptions that inform Federal plans also create gaps in the 
sector’s response mechanism.  The Response FIOP assumes that only one catastrophic incident 
would occur at a time, which is a reasonable assumption given the precedent of natural disasters.  
However, cyber threat intelligence suggests that not only would a coordinated attack be 
exponentially more damaging to the nation but also the likely course of action for cyber-
aggressors [10], [65]. 
Third, electricity sector stakeholders routinely criticize the system for the inability to 
access resources before or during an event.  Such criticism is particularly prevalent in the case of 
the substantial Federal resources that have been created for increasing cyber resilience and cyber 
response.  Despite aggressive Federal agency outreach campaigns, the confusion comes from a 
combination the passive approach it takes during incident response, i.e., waiting for requests for 
assistance during an incident, and the dense, redundant, and sometimes conflicting National 
Planning Framework documents.   
Another critical process element gap that arose from stakeholder analysis was the lack of 
a consolidated, meaningful common operating picture (COP) for the sector during a cyber 
incident.  The complexity of monitoring the performance of a single utility network is technically 
challenging for its operators under normal conditions.  During a widespread cyberattack, no 
current system provides a way to consolidate multiple system statuses into a single picture.  
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Despite the need for a consolidated, real-time COP to enhance decision making, no process 
exists to create one.  Many Federal government centers, agencies, and working groups each have 
the responsibility for assembling a piece of the picture according to the Response FIOP, CIKR 
Annex, and POIA, but no entity has the responsibility to consolidate [23], [117], [250], [272]. 
Finally, current cyber incident response exercises for the electricity grid have shown to 
mature response processes and build awareness of threats to critical infrastructure.  However, 
most exercises only test the aggregate of individual IRPs through a non-real time, tabletop 
exercise, and do not place sufficient stress on the system to identify where it might not respond.  
Stakeholder analysis consistently revealed that self-audited IRP exercises failed to simulate an 
actual cyber event and take into account resource and personnel constraints.  When external 
auditors tested the same response plans and exposed personnel shortages or longer response 
timeframes than had been assumed, only then did individual organizations understand the 
deficiencies in their IRP.  Further stakeholder analysis and literature review exposed an absence 
of research on the effectiveness of self-audited response plans and identification and maturity of 
private sector critical tasks and capabilities. 
4.3 Organization 
Like the process element, the organization element of the electricity sector’s cyber 
response mechanisms is characterized by significant interconnectivity with the other ARIES 
view elements.  The electricity sector’s organization is driven mainly by the response strategy 
and processes of the sector.  The effect of the organization is best understood by examining its 
element anatomy. 
The organizational structure of the sector’s response organization is definitively 
hierarchical and functionally aligned as revealed by the stakeholder classification in section 3.4.2 
and implied by the governance in the National Preparedness System [249].  Figure 4.6 provides a 




Figure 4.6: Conceptual Organizational Structure of Electricity Sector Response 
Mechanisms 
Conceptually, the electricity market entities make up the lowest tier of the hierarchy.  That is, 
they operate the grid and are closest to the point of execution for cyber incident response.  Many 
utilities cover areas larger than town and city government, so local government response 
organizations are rare and usually have fewer, if any resources.  However, local governments’ 
may be involved in a sector-wide cyber incident response as an extension of the state 
government and can be categorized at the lowest tier as well. 
State response organizations make up the second tier because of their proximity to the 
sector’s operators.  Federal response organizations comprise the top tier of the sector’s response 
organization.  Trade associations and advocacy groups are woven through all tiers and hold 
formal and informal roles in the response organizations at all levels. 
Electricity market entities and state response organizational effects vary greatly, are too 
numerous for the scope of this thesis, and are omitted from further analysis.  Further supporting 
the non-inclusion of the electricity market entities and state governments is the dominance of the 
Federal Government’s formal and informal role in the sector’s response mechanisms.  As the 
strategy and process reveal, the substantial resources and efficiencies that Federal agencies can 
bring to bear during an incident incentivize alignment with national policies. 
The remainder of this chapter examines the behavior of the organization of the electricity 
sector cyber incident response mechanisms by assessing the culture of cybersecurity within the 
sector and the substantial role that trust plays in the health of its cyber response.  The structure of 
the Federal Government is presented in greater detail to understand how it contributes to the 
sector’s response mechanism and the gaps they inherently create in it. 
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4.3.1 Culture of Cybersecurity 
Analysis of the strategy and process elements have demonstrated that the electricity 
sector has a deeply ingrained culture of cybersecurity that heavily influences its approach to a 
cyber incident.  Therefore, it is necessary to understand the electricity’s organizational 
cybersecurity culture to identify how it reinforces the current cyber response mechanisms, 
understand how it creates gaps and keeps others closed, and determine what must change to 
improve the ability for the sector to respond to a large-scale malware attack.   
Huang and Pearlson provide an apt definition of organizational cybersecurity culture as a 
synthesis of organizational culture, national culture, and information security culture models and 
their analysis [274], [275], [276], [277].  Their definition is given as “the beliefs, values, and 
attitudes that drive employee behaviors to protect and defend the organization from cyber 
attacks” [278, p. 1].  Additionally, the authors provide a useful model of organizational 
cybersecurity culture model to analyze the effects of different influences on the culture.  The 
complete model is shown in Figure 4.7 [278, p. 7]. 
 
Figure 4.7: Huang and Pearlson’s Organizational Cybersecurity Culture Model 
With minor modifications, both the definition and model can be adapted to describe the 
electricity sector’s cybersecurity culture.  In that case, the modified definition becomes: the 
beliefs, values, and attitudes that drive stakeholders to protect and defend the electricity sector 
from cyberattacks.  The substitution of stakeholder for employee and organization for the 
electricity sector applies to the model as well.  Further, we can interpret “top management” as the 
Federal Government consistent with previous assertions.   
A full application of their model is not necessary to reveal the gaps in the response 
mechanism but an adaptation of the model, as shown in Figure 4.8, can be used to understand the 
most relevant points.  Most elements of the model would reveal the same gaps that have already 
been exposed by previous analysis.  For example, the “Top Management Priority” would reflect 
the effects of the Federal Government’s emphasis on information sharing and research and 
development on cybersecurity.  “Top Management Participation” would exhibit the influence of 
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the PPP approach and passive response role that Federal agencies use.  However, the two 
elements of the model have not been explored: “Societal Cybersecurity Culture” and “General 
Cyber Threat Awareness.” 
 
Figure 4.8: Huang and Pearlson’s Organizational Cybersecurity Culture Model Applied to 
the U.S. Electricity Sector 
Huang and Pearslon define Societal Cybersecurity Culture as “the societal norms, beliefs, 
attitudes and values in which an organization lives” [279, p. 9].  In the case of the U.S. electricity 
sector, the societal cybersecurity culture can be characterized as closely tied to the dominance of 
America’s military and economy.  The authors define General Cyber Threat Awareness refers to 
“the [stakeholder’s] knowledge and understanding of threats.”  As alluded to in this thesis 
definition of a cyberattack, each stakeholder has a different perspective on the threats to the 
electricity sector.   
The association between national preeminence and the U.S. electricity sector’s 
cybersecurity perpetuates the belief that cyber-aggressors would not attack for fear of provoking 
military retaliation.  Despite policy and evidence to the contrary, stakeholder analysis revealed 
almost unanimous agreement that a large-scale cyberattack on the electricity grid would 
constitute an act of war.  Combined with inconsistent awareness of evolving cyber threats, the 
cybersecurity culture has become overconfident in a low likelihood of large-scale cyberattack.  
This paper does not asses a high likelihood of an attack, only a higher likelihood than is currently 
presumed.   
One important consequence of the electricity sector’s cybersecurity culture is the 
emphasis on investment in preventive activities rather than response preparedness.  The former is 
typically easier to quantify, and risk management strategies enable an easy justification by 
comparing mitigated and unmitigated consequences.  On top of that, the cybersecurity culture 
suggests that preventive mitigations are can mitigate risks so that response preparedness becomes 
seemingly unnecessary. 
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Compare the U.S. electricity sector’s culture with that of Israel.  Israel’s critical 
infrastructure protection and cybersecurity strategies are also tightly aligned with their military, 
but they are also grounded in the belief that it is numerically inferior to and faces a constant 
existential threat from its neighbors [280].  Thus, its policies reflect a culture that must be 
continually evolving and have the ability to respond to an inevitable cyberattack on its critical 
infrastructure.  The central government asserts higher authority over the cybersecurity of its 
networks and critical infrastructure and provides stricter regulations for all functions of cyber 
resilience [280]. 
4.3.2 Trust and Cyber Response in the Electricity Sector 
Closely related to cybersecurity culture, the dynamics of interorganizational trust is 
another important organizational component of the electricity’s sector response mechanism.  
Stakeholder analysis revealed numerous challenges with establishing and maintaining trust in the 
sector, and an analysis of the economic factors influencing the electricity sector in section 2.2.4.1 
revealed barriers to trust as a function of information asymmetry.  Stakeholders from both sides 
recognized that issues with trusted relationships were impeding cyber response mechanism 
performance.  Thus, an examination of interorganizational trust within the electricity sector as an 
organizational element is necessary to understand what gaps exist and how they have been 
created. 
Since the 1980s, interorganizational cooperation and trust have been studied 
comprehensively for their positive benefits on organizational performance but has recently 
gained even greater importance as the global commons becomes increasingly interconnected 
[281], [282], [283].  Relevant to the electricity sector’s response mechanism challenges, three 
primary trust-related factors contribute to a gap in interorganizational trust in the sector. 
First, Zaheer et al. (1998) assert that trust is inherently relational and concluded that 
interpersonal trust between members of organizations is the origin of interorganizational trust 
rather than “being faceless and monolithic” [284, p. 143].  The authors contend that “individual 
boundary spanners” were members from organizations who actively fostered trust with members 
from other organizations [284, p. 143].  Stakeholder analysis suggests that many Federal 
agencies lack the recognition of the nature of interorganizational trust or capacity to actively 
foster the trust among the thousands of SLTT and private sector stakeholders in the sector. 
Second, Moorman et al. (1993) establish that trust has separate dimensions based on 
competence, i.e., skills and experience, and on integrity, i.e., motives and character, of the 
members involved in a relationship [285].  Connelly et al. (2018) compared both aspects and 
found that, while competence is importance, integrity-based trust significantly increases the 
performance of both members in the relationship [286].  Stakeholder analysis indicates that there 
are low levels of trust in the technical ability of the Federal agencies to provide for effective 
response and integrity of its politically influenced motive.  Similar levels of trust in the 
electricity market entities integrity to meet incident reporting timelines or invest in cybersecurity 
exist on the government side. 
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Finally, Inkpen and Currall (2004) state that several interorganizational trust propositions 
are relevant to the sector.  The authors argue that common objectives, clear responsibilities and 
performance expectations, and learning about other member foster trust and power asymmetries 
and dependence on formal control mechanisms decrease trust [287].  This paper has already 
shown that common response objectives, responsibilities, and expectations, if they exist, are at 
least challenging to discern, and the statutory power imbalance and regulatory requirements of 
the Federal Government create significant barriers to trust.  Therefore, the current response 
mechanisms do not enable trusted relationships to form easily at any level in the electricity 
sector, and cybersecurity and response preparedness suffers 
4.3.3 Federal Response Organization 
An in-depth discussion of the Federal incident and emergency response agencies would 
only serve to reiterate the complexity of national response mechanisms in an organizational 
context and present no unique issues.  For example, Figure 4.9 shows a simplified yet still 
complex representation of the coordinating mechanisms between the incident response and 
power restoration functions [23, p. 25].  During a malware attack, cyber response groups and 
operational centers would also be activated as well.  All of these entities bring to bear significant 
resources and response capabilities, but as current history has shown, the management of 
resources and ability to respond to the needs of affected areas struggles because of the complex 
organizational structure [266].  However, three organizational structures, the functions they serve 
to perform, and their membership create unique gaps in the electricity sector’s ability to 
coordinate a response to a cyberattack as outline below. 
 
Figure 4.9: Unified Coordination Between Power Restoration and Incident Response and 
Recovery Mission Area 
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4.3.3.1 Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnership Organizations 
The Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnership Model was created by the NIPP to 
encourage collaboration on CIKR issues between Federal, SLTT, and private sector stakeholders.  
The concept of the organization, shown in Figure 4.10, is comprehensive and provides the legal 
framework and coordination mechanisms for the stakeholders to collaborate on mutual issues, 
including incident preparedness and response [192], [288, p. 2]. 
 
Figure 4.10: Sector Partnership Model 
In the electricity sector, the Sector Partnership Model empowers the ESCC to represent 
multiple stakeholders throughout the sector, as shown in Figure 4.11, and comprises three co-
chairs, a nine-member steering committee, and 19 other representatives of electricity market 
entities [217, p. 3].  The ESCC is the primary mechanism that the Federal Government receives 
input from the electricity sector and how the private sector advocates for Federal Government 
policy.  During a response to an incident in the sector, the ESCC serves as “the mechanism for 
executive coordination and communication between the electric power industry and government” 
yet it lacks authority to direct response actions in the sector [23, pp. 26–27]. 
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Figure 4.11: Sector Partnership Model in the Electricity Subsector 
4.3.3.2 Cyber Unified Coordination Group (UCG) 
PPD-41 created the Cyber UCG in the event of a significant cyber incident to coordinate 
across Federal agencies and externally to SLTT and private sector entities.  Per the PPD, a Cyber 
UCG:  
serves as the primary national operational coordination mechanism between and 
among federal agencies responsible for identifying and developing operational 
response plans and activities during a significant cyber incident, as well as for 
integrating private sector partners and the SLTT communities into incident 
response efforts, as appropriate [117, p. 31] 
When a Cyber UCG is established, PPD-41’s three concurrent lines of effort are assigned 
to Federal agencies.  The DOJ through the FBI and NCJITF act as threat response.  DHS takes 
on asset response through the NCCIC, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence 
(ODNI) takes on intelligence support through the Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center 
(CTIIC).  The Cyber UCG also has other intelligence agency operations centers at its disposal to 
support coordination, communication, and situational awareness. 
4.3.3.3 ISACs and ISAOs 
ISACs and ISAOs remain the centerpieces of the Federal priorities for critical 
infrastructure protection.  Further, the benefits of information sharing and the framework for 
establishing productive information sharing environments in the cybersecurity domain has been 
well documented [96], [97], [121], [289], [290], [291].  Many ISAOs and ISACs have been 
established to, and been successful in, facilitating knowledge exchange.  They represent the 
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primary collaborative organizations in critical infrastructure sectors with the intent to share threat 
indicators, vulnerabilities, and lessons learned from cyber incidents throughout their respective 
sectors [95], [292]. 
O’Halloran (2017) and stakeholder interviews conducted as part of this thesis suggested 
that participation in these ISACs and ISAOs may breed the misperception that they are capable 
of coordinating a timely and effective response to a malware attack [103].  The confusion may be 
natural as the charter of many ISACs is to aid in the coordination of response efforts.  ISACs act 
as forums to develop and vet critical requirements such as emergency response plans, playbooks, 
and communications plans.  However, a survey of ISAC-related literature revealed a general lack 
of fully developed capability for incident response in these organizations.  Nonetheless, analysis 
of cyberattack response mechanisms assumed that ISACs would act as the coordinating authority 
for the response [293].   
Indeed, the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center (E-ISAC), an entity 
under NERC, “coordinates incident management” and provides services for “malware analysis 
and indicator extraction” which at first appear to provide a venue for coordinating malware 
response [108].  While E-ISAC retains those incident coordination and malware analysis 
mechanisms and could deploy them on a limited basis, it more explicitly uses them to act as an 
information sharing platform that facilitates communications between stakeholders.  A recent 
NERC cybersecurity exercise, GridEx III, revealed capability gaps in this response mechanism 
involving overwhelmed communications systems, difficulty integrating recovery resources 
between the public and private sector, and the challenge of prioritizing where to focus recovery 
efforts [171]. 
Similarly, polls ISAO participants reveal that the multitude of information sharing 
organizations, including government entities, can obscure the communications process, slow 
down response times, and obfuscate the cyber threat [103], [126], [290].  Energy sector ISAO 
participants and stakeholders have reported that the lack of standardized reporting procedures 
makes it difficult to obtain relevant threat and mitigation data.  These same stakeholders also 
noted that ISAOs often complicated the process of accessing cyber incident response resources 
by adding another entity between the utility and response resource provider. 
Further, ISACs have mostly be organized around a specific sector and cannot address the 
cross-sector dependencies stated above.  To that point, the Under Secretary of Homeland 
Security for National Protection and Programs Directorate, Christopher Krebs, recently stated 
that: 
Those [ISACs} focus on information sharing—in some cases on a sector-specific 
basis. ¬ The ability to go across sectors, go across agencies to understand true 
national risk, set priorities together, plan jointly, train, and exercise alongside 
each other was lacking [4, p. 38]. 
ISAC participation is not comprehensive, either.  The E-ISAC, for instance, does not 
include over 3,000 unregulated utilities.  The lack of participation from all utilities challenges 
any malware attack responders, which necessarily must have industry-wide reach [126]. 
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4.3.4 Organization Gap Analysis 
While the U.S. and its electricity sector do not face the existential challenges of Israel, the 
sector does face a more significant threat from cyberattack than its culture will allow it to 
acknowledge.  For those entities that do acknowledge the higher likelihood of a large-scale 
cyberattack, they are faced with governmental response mechanisms that direct its attention 
towards preventive measures.  Further, the influence of cybersecurity culture focuses on 
traditional all-hazards approaches for cyber incidents and do not make planning and resource 
assumptions on the nature of the cyber threat.  In order to increase cyber resilience in the 
electricity sector, its culture must change to openly recognize that a large-scale cyberattack is 
inevitable – though not necessarily catastrophic or an act of war – and rebalance investments 
across all cyber resilience functions. 
For a culture of cybersecurity to exist in the energy sector, interorganizational trust must 
also exist.  The current organizational structure does not foster the development of trust been 
boundary spanning members as noted above, particularly between the public and private sectors.  
Additionally, SLTT and private sector entities limited access to heavily centralized Federal 
Government response resources creates a high barrier to developing and maintaining trusted 
relationships.  While it is relatively easy to deploy those resources during an incident, it is far 
more difficult to spread awareness, develop technical knowledge, or create trusted relationships 
that are needed in crises. 
Analysis has also shown the limitations of the Sector Partnership Model.  The ESCC’s 
benefits for enhancing the cyber resilience of the electricity sector is indisputable.  However, its 
lack of objectivity inhibits the adoption of better response mechanisms.  The Council is 
inherently interested in protecting its members from government policies that have an adverse 
impact on their performance.  Since electricity market entities are only inclined to invest when 
risk management frameworks suggest its prudent, they are not incentivized to advocate for or 
adopt better cyber response mechanism.  In turn, the Federal Government relies almost 
exclusively on the ESCC for cyber resilience policy and are unlikely to think outside of the 
proverbial box. 
Despite the situational awareness and resources that the UCG can obtain, cyber incident 
response exercises have repeatedly revealed issues with the concept.  Primarily, after action 
reports spanning exercises from multiple years demonstrate a lack of understanding of the UCG 
by the private sector, and the UCG lacks authority to make an appropriate decision given its 
awareness and resources [294], [295]. 
ISACs have helped sectors recognize the importance of sharing information to mitigate 
cyberattack and working with other stakeholders to coordinate a response.  As sectors’ 
realization of ISACs as valuable tools has grown, so has its recognition that increased 
collaboration between private and public sectors [4], [171], [125].  Thus, cybersecurity 
coordination previously driven by ISACs has evolved and now requires a dedicated organization 
to bring together stakeholders from all sectors, coordinate public and private entities, and form a 
timely response to threats. 
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4.4 Information 
The information element of the electricity sector’s cyber response mechanism captures 
many of the current stakeholder priorities for cyber incident response.  Because information is so 
profoundly entangled throughout the ecosystem, this thesis has already covered many gaps that 
would have otherwise fallen into the information element category.  Specifically, the gaps 
stemming from issues timeliness of incident reporting; volume and quality of threat notifications; 
and frameworks, guidelines, and standards have been discussed as functions of economics, 
strategy, and organization.  The gaps arising evolving grid architecture, control systems, and 
convergence of IT and OT were discussed as functions of technology.  Classification of 
incidents, deployment of response resources, and formation of a common operating picture, have 
created gaps as well and were discussed as functions of strategy and process.  However, the lack 
of industry-standard resiliency metrics is a critical gap in the sector’s response mechanism.  The 
remainder of this section highlights the need for standardized cyber response metrics and the 
barriers to adopting sector-wide metrics. 
4.4.1 Cyber Response Metrics 
The 2015 ESSP and 2017 EO13800 Electricity Subsector report both noted a critical lack 
of cybersecurity metrics to “help support making risk-informed decisions, enabling prioritization 
of issues, and aligning resources to address them” [32, p. 31].  James et al. (2019) provide a full 
analysis of current resilience metrics for the electricity sector [214].  The authors draw several 
conclusions that expose the underdeveloped state of metrics and critical gaps they create.  First, 
they assert that, despite broad recognition of a need for cyber resilience metrics and many 
available options, there is no consensus on which metrics are essential to effectively measuring 
cybersecurity.  Second, they emphasize the need for cyber resilience-specific metrics as 
distinguished from the reliability metrics because of fundamental differences in risk calculations.  
Moreover, they contend that metrics need to be created for each of the four resiliency phases 
used by NERC, i.e., robustness, resourcefulness, recovery, and adaptability, and that each phase 
has different complexity from the others [214].  While the authors do not extrapolate their 
assertions to a sector-wide scale, the absence of any public or private sector metrics for 
measuring the electricity sector’s cyber resilience is a significant gap. 
4.4.2 Information Gap Analysis 
The emphasis that the current electricity cyber response mechanism places on preventive 
measures over response preparedness has already been discussed in the context of political and 
regulatory factors and its elements of process and organization.  However, the inability to 
quantify cyber response investments and evaluate them as a risk and business decision has 
contributed to asymmetrical investment in preventive measures.  Further, federally sponsored 
research has focused on the development of organizational-level metrics but omitted any for 
sector-wide or national-level cyber resilience metrics [214]. 
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4.5 Products and Services 
Products and services, like those described in section 2.2.5.6, play a relatively small but 
essential role in the electricity sector’s response mechanism.  In essence, cybersecurity products 
and services provide technological solutions to the cyber resilience issues that the sector 
encounters.  There are three categories of cybersecurity products and services relevant to sector 
response mechanisms:  
• Cybersecurity products, such as firewalls, network monitoring, and antivirus tool 
• Cybersecurity vendors and services, such as threat analysts, network monitoring, 
incident response, and forensic services 
• Cybersecurity insurance which protects businesses from losses caused by 
cyberattacks 
The structure, or types, of these products and services, are primarily driven by the 
strategy and information elements of the sector.  Both elements emphasize private market 
participation in the industry’s cybersecurity and establish frameworks, guidelines, and standards 
that dictate requirements for cybersecurity products.  Additionally, the information and 
organizational elements, i.e., the expertise and its location within the sector, create product and 
service demand, such as network monitoring and incident response services. 
4.5.1 Cyber Insurance 
Cyber Insurance has been come to the forefront as one of the leading cybersecurity 
mechanisms for all sectors and can improve all cyber resilience functions by reducing liability 
and incentivizing investment.  Cyber insurers would drive improvements in all areas of the 
electricity sector’s cybersecurity – prevention, response, and recovery – in order to mitigate the 
likelihood and costs of any claims.  For example, insurers would lower rates for utilities that had 
network monitoring and in-house employees trained to diagnose and respond to malware threats. 
DHS, through CISA, has pursued cyber insurance development and outreach to critical 
infrastructure sector stakeholders to improve robust insurance mechanisms and facilitate a clear 
understanding of what services are offered [296].  Specific priorities for CISA to engage with the 
insurance market include, building better incident information sharing and data repository, 
incident consequence analysis, and enterprise risk management capabilities [297], [298]. 
4.5.2 Products and Services Gap Analysis 
The behavior of the products and services in the industry can be naturally characterized 
as competitive.  Cybersecurity manufacturers, ICS vendors, and insurers compete with one 
another to attract business within the electricity sector.  For utilities, in particular, this creates 
many of the information asymmetries mentioned in section 2.2.4.1 and is compounded by the 
lack of metrics for the quality and effectiveness of the products and services.  The ambiguity 
created by the information asymmetry obscures the sector’s ability to identify the gaps in sector-
wide response mechanisms. 
On the other hand, insurance has tremendous potential to improve cyber response 
mechanisms in the electricity sector.  However, CISA’s implies that preventative measures 
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should be the primary driver for reducing insurance premiums.  Such a conjecture is reflective of 
the culture of cybersecurity in the U.S. electricity sector and the Federal Government’s strategic 
approach to cybersecurity, but it again neglects the importance of cyber response capabilities.  
With CISA as one of the main drivers in developing the market, the cyber insurance market may 
disproportionately focus on prevention compared to response and recovery, and cyber insurance 
may not realize its full potential as an instrument to collectively increase electricity sector cyber 
resilience. 
4.6 Chapter 4 Summary  
Application of the ARIES Framework view elements reveals several gaps in the 
electricity sector’s cyber response mechanisms.  Dense, inconsistent, and suboptimally integrated 
response strategies appear at the private sector, SLTT, and Federal levels of the cyber response 
mechanism.  Response processes and organization reflect issues created by the sector’s strategy 
are reinforced by its cybersecurity culture, low levels of trust, and lack of a mechanism to test or 
measure the effectiveness sector-wide response.  As a result of the existing response 
mechanisms, few electricity sector stakeholders are in a position to recognize the gaps that exist 




This thesis analyzes the current state of the U.S. electricity sector’s response mechanism 
to a large-scale malware attack.   Using the ARIES Framework to perform a comprehensive 
analysis of the sector’s landscape, stakeholders, and attributes of the response mechanisms, 
multiple gaps, and areas for improvement were identified.  Table 5-1 shows a summary of the 
gaps in the electricity sector’s response mechanism discussed in this thesis. 
Table 5-1: Summary of Gaps in the Electricity Sector Cyber Incident Response Mechanism 
ARIES View 
Element 
Gap in Electricity Sector Cyber Incident Response Mechanism 
Strategy, Organization 
Lack of a culture of cybersecurity that embraces current and future cyber 
vulnerabilities and threats and emphasizes adequate preparation 
Strategy, Information Lack of objective measure of preparedness and response capability 
Strategy 
Lack of singular, authoritative guidance on cyber incident response requirements for 
electricity market entities 
Strategy 
Lack of clear and consistent cyber incident response roles and responsibilities for the 
utilities, Federal, state, tribal, and territorial entities 
Strategy 
Lack of clear Federal definition of significant cyber incident and point at which the 
Federal Government will intervene on private sector response to a cyber incident under 
the Federal Power Act, et al. 
Strategy, Process 
Lack of cyber incident response-specific plans for government entities with clear 
integration of private sector entities 
Strategy, Process 
Lack of large-scale cyber incident response-specific plans for government and private 
entities 
Strategy 
Lack of incentives and resources for businesses to invest in cyber response measures 
commensurate with known risks and threats 
Strategy Conflict between threat response and asset response priorities for Federal Government 
Strategy, Organization 
Lack of objective feedback mechanism that has resources and knowledge of the 
electricity sector and cybersecurity to advise to provide policy guidance in the Nation's 
best interest 
Process 
Institutionalized overinvestment in and overemphasis on preventive measures, rather 
than response measures 
Process Strong disincentives for participating in information sharing programs, i.e. ISAOs 
Process 
Immature malware mitigation development, testing, implementation, and 
dissemination apparatus 
Process 
Lack of understanding and response mechanisms for cyber incidents' secondary and 
third order effects on public welfare and the economy 
Process Difficulty in incident reporting and accessing incident response resources 
Process 
Lack of an accessible, consolidated common operating picture of the electricity grid in 
the event of a cyber incident 
Process 
Lack of exercises that "stress test" electricity sector response plans to evaluate 
adequacy and identify gaps 
Organization 
Lack of trust between sector stakeholders, particularly between public and private 
sectors 
Organization Increased need for collaborative forums beyond ISAOs 
Products & Services 




Chief among these gaps, and perhaps the systemic cause of the rest, is the sector’s culture 
of cybersecurity.  The culture of cybersecurity leads public and private sectors to believe that the 
electricity sector is unlikely to suffer a malware attack and, therefore, should invest little to 
prepare for one.  This thesis demonstrated that current and future cyber threats are not well-
understood in the sector and many structural and cultural reasons that electricity market entities 
are not appropriately incentivized to invest appropriately. 
The ramifications of the culture are reinforced by the Federal Government’s long-
standing PPP approach to critical infrastructure protection and its existing, all-hazards approach 
to incident response.  The Federal Government’s centrality to large-scale incident response in the 
U.S. drives cyber incident response investments and preparations at lower levels of government 
and in the private sector.  Although other stakeholder groups had significant influence, the 
Federal Government was shown to be the only entity with authority to change the current cyber 
incident response at the sector-level.  However, it may lack the technical capability, objectivity, 
or motivation to make the necessary and challenging changes required to improve cyber 
resilience in the electricity sector. 
5.1 Next Steps 
In order to validate this research, REMAED researchers will develop a case study built 
around discovered gaps.  The case study is intended to be delivered to a representative cross-
section of the electricity sector stakeholders, to highlight the discovered gaps, expose any 
unidentified gaps, and build consensus among stakeholders on how to close the gaps.  The 
REMAED team anticipates that the process of identifying the gaps, validating, and building 
consensus on them will be iterative, but ultimately, it intends to lay the foundation to determine 
and implement mechanisms that will increase the ability for the entire energy delivery sector to 
respond to a large-scale malware attack. 
5.2 Future Work 
In addition to refining the gap analysis presented herein, the findings in this thesis were 
intended to support the broader goal of strengthening response mechanisms in the energy 
delivery critical infrastructure.  This thesis revealed potential areas for improvement that applied 
strictly to the electricity subsector.  However, further research should include the oil and natural 
gas sector due to their strong interdependencies.   
Simultaneously, the stakeholder interviews captured only a small portion of perspectives 
from the electricity sector.  Future efforts should be dedicated to performing more interviews 
with the same types of stakeholders and in different geographical areas. Mainly, interviews 
should target state and Federal Government entities, especially DHS, PUCs, SEOs, research and 
development institutions, and POUs which were not adequately represented in this study. 
Through these interviews, perspectives on cybersecurity culture, interorganizational trust, 
and the effects of technological and cyber threat evolution should be obtained.  While this thesis 
used past research to understand the influence of factors on the electricity sector’s response 
mechanisms, stakeholder interviews reveal perceptions that must be overcome to move the 
electricity sector towards consensus. 
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5.3 Call to Action 
The objective of this work was to do a deep analysis of the energy delivery subsector 
with an eye towards finding ways to mitigate malware in the energy delivery subsector.  The key 
findings of this work suggest that the U.S. energy sector is under-prepared for a large-scale 
malware attack.  Many gaps exist in the ability for the country to respond to such an attack, and 
we are now at a point that a major transformation of response mechanisms is necessary to 
achieve protection of our critical infrastructure. 
However, it is highly unlikely that we will be able to identify, create, implement, and 
sustain such a paradigm shift without first adjusting the culture of cybersecurity in the electricity 
sector.  As a country, we don’t want our energy executives and government to be caught 
unprepared when the welfare of our people and stability of our economy are on the line, nor do 
we want to count on cybersecurity vendors or mutual assistance agreements when they will 
likely not be available.  In many ways, we are lucky that our country has not experienced a 
cyberattack that resulted in widespread damage, injury, and economic loss.  But some say it’s 
just a matter of time before this is reality.  This thesis lays the foundation for building the unity 
of action in the energy delivery sector that is necessary to rethink our approach to cyber incident 
response, identify gaps, and work together to continually adapt response mechanisms to maintain 
cybersecurity of the Nation’s critical infrastructure. 
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Appendix A. Value Streams for Various Markets  
All figures are taken from [13]. 
 
Figure 5.1: Vertical Integration Value Stream Structure 
 
Figure 5.2: Hybrid Markets Value Stream Structure 
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Figure 5.3: Texas Value Stream Structure 
 
Figure 5.4: Energy Services/Aggregator Value Stream Structure[13]
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Appendix B. Stakeholder Classification 
Electricity Market Entities 
Federal Government Critical Infrastructure 
Advisory Bodies & Support Agencies 
Trade Associations & Advocacy Groups Information Sharing Entities 
Investor-Owned Utilities 
National Infrastructure Advisory Council 
(NIAC) 
Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council 
(ESCC) 
Electricity Information Sharing 
and Analysis Center (E-ISAC) 
Consumer-Owned Utilities Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Critical Infrastructure Cross-Sector Council 
Multi-State Information Sharing 
and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) 
Cooperative Utilities 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency (CISA) 
National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners (NARUC) 




Independent Systems Operators 
National Cybersecurity and Communications 
Integration Center (NCCIC) 
National Rural Electric Cooperative 
Association (NRECA) 
InfraGard 
Joint Action Agencies 
NCCIC Hunt and Incident Response Teams 
(HIRT) 
Touchstone Energy Cooperative State Fusion Centers 
Balancing Authorities 
National Infrastructure Coordination Center 
(NICC) 
American Public Power Association (APPA)  
Regional Entities National Operations Center (NOC) Edison Electric Institute (EEI)  
Power marketers National Risk Management Center (NRMC) 




Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) 
State and Regional Public Power 
Associations 
 
Consumers Department of Energy (DOE) Large Public Power Council (LPPC)  
 Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and 
Emergency Response (CESER) 
National Governors Association (NGA)  
 Energy Sector Government Coordinating 
Council (EGCC) 
National Association of State Energy 
Officials (NASEO) 
 
 Federal Senior Leadership Council (FSLC) 




State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial 
Government Coordinating Council 
(SLTTGCC) 
National Association of State Chief 
Information Officers (NASCIO) 
 
 Regional Consortium Coordinating Council 
(RC3) 
  
    
 Federal Trade Commission (FTC)   
 Department of Defense (DoD)   
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Attackers 
Standards, Research, & Development 
Organizations 
State, Local, Tribal and Territorial 
Government Critical Infrastructure 
Support Agencies 
Law Enforcement 
Cyberwarriors Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 
State Chief Information Security Officers 
(CISO) 




Federally Funded Research & Development 
Centers (FFRDCs) 
National Guard Cyber Action Team 
Cyberspies SANS Institute State and Territory Energy Office (SEO) 
National Cyber Investigative 
Joint Task Force (NCIJTF) 
Cyberthieves 
National Institute of Science and Technology 
(NIST) 
State Office of Emergency Management  
Cyberhacktivists    
    
Regulatory Bodies Cybersecurity Vendors 
Electricity Cyber-Physical Asset 
Manufacturers 
 
Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) 
Threat Analysts Electrical Equipment Manufacturers  
North American Energy 
Reliability Corporation (NERC) 
Monitoring Platform Vendors 
Industrial Control System (ICS) & 
Operational Technology (OT) Producers 
 
Public Utilities Commissions Response and Forensics Vendors   
 




Appendix C. Stakeholder Needs Analysis 




How well is 
need being met? 
A1 - Information and intelligence sharing H L 
A2 - Assistance developing frameworks, processes, and other tools for enabling 
optimal cyber response mechanisms 
H H 
A3 - Expectations for response process and clear roles and lines of authority H L 
A4 - Autonomy to manage risk and incident response measures H H 
A5 - Trusted relationships with supporting stakeholders H L 
A6 - Consistent, universal standards to define cyber resilience and cyber response 
for entire sector 
H L 
A7 - Support for cybersecurity investment recoupment H L 
 




How well is need 
being met? 
B1 - Integration into private sector response plans and efforts H L 
B2 - Compliance with legislation, regulation, and policies M H 
B3 - Information sharing and reporting from the private sector H L 
B4 - Recommendations and advice on cyber response policy, frameworks, and 
government action 
H H 
B5 - Trusted relationships with regional and local public and private partners H L 
 




How well is need 
being met? 
C1 - Information and intelligence sharing H L 
C2 - Integration into private sector response plans and efforts M H 
C3 - Consensus and support of membership for cybersecurity initiatives H H 
C4 - Trusted relationships with supported and supporting stakeholders H L 
 




How well is 
need being 
met? 
D1 - Information and intelligence sharing H L 
D2 - Trusted relationships with supporting and supported stakeholders H M 











How well is 
need being met? 
E1 - Business opportunities/feedback to provide cutting edge cyber technologies 
that increase cyber resilience 
H M 
E2 - Integration into response plans H L 
 




How well is 
need being met? 
F1 - Compliance with legislation, regulation, and policies H M 
F2 - Recommendations for rule-making of new and updated regulations H M 
 




How well is 
need being met? 
G1 - Information and intelligence sharing H L 
G2 - Investment in cybersecurity projects M M 
 




How well is 
need being met? 
H1 - Timely cyber incident reporting from electricity market entities H L 
H2 - Collaborative participation in information sharing programs H M 
H3 - Funding to support information sharing organization M H 
 




How well is 
need being met? 
I1 - Integration into private sector response plans and efforts H L 
I2 - Compliance with legislation, regulation, and policies H M 
I3 - Information sharing and reporting from the private sector H L 
I4 - Recommendations and advice on cyber response policy, frameworks, and 
government action 
H L 
I5 - Trusted relationships with regional and local public and private partners H M 
 




How well is 
need being met? 
J1 - Timely cyber incident reporting from electricity market entities M L 
J2 - Preservation of evidence and facilitation of investigation, forensic analysis 
to prosecute cybercrime 
L L 
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Appendix D. Acronyms 
AMI Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
APPA American Public Power Association  
ARIES  Architecting Innovative Enterprise Strategy 
BPA Bonneville Power Administration 
BPS Bulk Power System 
CAMS Cybersecurity at MIT Sloan 
CAT Cyber Action Team  
CESER Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response  
CIKR Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
CIP Critical Infrastructure Protection 
CIPAC Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Council 
CISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
CISS Cyber Incident Severity Schema  
CMA Cyber Mutual Assistance 
CNIO Critical National Infrastructure Operator 
COP Common Operating Picture 
COU Consumer-Owned Utility 
CRISP Cybersecurity Risk Information Sharing Program  
CTIIC Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center  
DCS Distributed Control System  
DER Distributed Energy Resources 
DERMS Distributed Energy Resource Management System 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
DMS Distribution Management System 
DNP3 Distributed Network Protocol version 3 
DoD Department of Defense 
DOE Department of Energy 
DRMS Demand Response Management System 
EDS Energy Delivery Sector 
EEAC Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinator 
EEI Edison Electric Institute  
E-ISAC Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center  
EMAC Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
EMS Energy Management System 
EO Executive Order 
EPRI Electric Power Research Institute  
ERO Electric Reliability Organization 
ES-C2M2 Electricity Subsector Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model 
ESCC Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council  
163 
ESF Emergency Support Function 
ESSP Energy Sector-Specific Plan 
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation  
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission  
FFRDC Federally Funded Research and Development Centers  
FIOP Federal Interagency Operational Plan 
FLSTT Federal, State, Local, Tribal and Territorial 
FSLC Federal Senior Leadership Council 
FTC Federal Trade Commission  
GIS Geographic Information System 
GridEx Grid Exercise 
HIRT Hunt and Incident Response Team  
ICS Industrial Control System 
ICT  Information and Communication Technology 
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 
IED Intelligent Electronic Devices 
IEEE International Society of Electrical and Electronics Engineers  
IOU Investor-Owned Utility 
IRP Incident Response Plan 
ISAC Information and Analysis Center 
ISAO Information Sharing and Analysis Organization 
ISO Independent System Operator 
IT Internet of Things 
LPPC Large Public Power Council 
MDMS Meter Data Management System 
MS-ISAC Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center  
MSSP  Managed Support Service Provider 
NARUC National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners  
NASEO National Association of State Energy Offices 
NCCIC National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center  
NCI National Council of ISACs 
NCIJTF National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force  
NCIRP National Cyber Incident Response Plan  
NEMA National Emergency Management Association 
NERC North American Electricity Reliability Corporation 
NGA National Governors Association 
NIAC National Infrastructure Advisory Council 
NICC National Infrastructure Coordinating Council 
NIMS National Incident Management System  
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NIPP National Infrastructure Protection Plan  
NISAC National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center 
NIST National Institute of Science and Technology  
NOC  National Operations Center 
NRECA National Rural Electric Cooperatives Association  
NRF National Response Framework  
NRMC National Risk Management Center  
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence  
OEM Office of Emergency Management 
OMS Outage Management System 
OT Operational Technology 
POIA Power Outage Incident Annex 
PPD Presidential Policy Directive 
PPP Public-Private Partnership 
PUC Public Utility Commissions 
RC3 Regional Consortium Coordinating Council 
REMAED Response Examination of Malware Attacks on the Energy Delivery 
sector 
REMEDYS  Research Exploring Malware in the Energy Delivery Sector 
RTO Regional Transmission Operator 
SCADA Supervisory Control & Data Acquisition 
SEO State Energy Office 
SIS Safety Instrument System 
SLTT State, Local, Territorial, and Tribal 
SLTTGCC State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Government Coordinating Council  
SSA Sector-Specific Agency 
SSP Sector-Specific Plan 
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